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ABSTRACT 
AGRARIAN CAPITALISM IN CENTRAL MEXICO: 
FR0!-1 HACIENDA TO RANCHO IN THE STATE OF QUERETARO; 184-5..;.1986 
SIMON MILLER 
This thesis takes issue with two commonly heldasstunptions of 
Mexican historioeraphy. One, that the cereal-producing hacienda 
(or 'great estate') of nineteenth-century Central Mexico was backward 
and semi-feudal. And two, commensurate with the first, that the 
emergence of an agrarian bourgeoisie in Mexico was delayed-until these 
archaic edifices had been swept away by the Revolution of 1910 and 
the subsequent ag~arian reform of the 1920s and 1930s. 
- - "" ~1e study focuses on the state of Queretaro and draws on detailed 
archival material for five haciendas in the area for the period from 
the 1840s: Sru1 Juanico, Juriquilla, San Jose el Alto, Chichimequillas, 
and Agua Azul. Close analysis is made of the economic structure and 
profitability of these estates by way of an examination of each of 
their major products - maize, wheat, chili, and milk. Particular 
-attention is paid to the popular accusation of hacienda inefficiency, 
and production costs are assessed in the light of comparative materia: 
from Europe and U.S.A. In this way the study doctunents a general trend 
during the latter half of the nineteenth centtiry tmrards the establishment 
of bourgeois production and economic success on the hacienda. 
~~ese beginnings of agrarian capitalism in Queretaro were then cut 
short by the outbreak of the Revolution and the subsequent period of 
-------------------uncertainty_ and agrarian reform in the 1920s_ and 1930s. The-second 
part of the thesis examines the-impact of these events and goes on to 
chart the revival of the agrarian bourgeoisie in the area over the 
years from the i940s. 
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Preface 
This thesis is based upon work carried out whilst I was a student 
I 
f 
in the Department of Anthropology at the University of Durham over the 
years 1978-81. The field-work was conducted during nine months in 
1979...:.80, and the writing-up in Cambridge over the winter months of 
1982-83. In the process of all this I have incurred a multitude of 
personal and intellectual debts, the most important of which I would 
like to acknowledge here. 
In Durham I was supported by grants from the Social Science 
Research Council and the Ford Foundation; I also owe a considerable 
amount to my supervisor there, Norman Long - he was always a source of 
sound advice and he gave me the opportunity of changing continents 
relatively late in a student life. I am grateful too to Robert Layton 
who has taken over the role of supervisor since Normal Long departed 
for Holland. 
In Hexico there were many more people than I could possible 
mention - this work is a tribute to the multitude of individuals·.:in 
Queretaro whose generosity and patience made it all possible. Some of 
these must however be mentioned by name, since without their help and 
kindness I would have been unable to work with primary materials from 
the haciendas and the research project would have .foundered - these 
are Sr. Gustavo Cabello, Sra. Javiera de la Llata de Estrella, 
Sr. Fernando Loyola, Sr. Remigio Am.ieva, Sr. Ignacio Villasante, 
Sr. Ignacio Cevallos, and Sr. Alejandro Soto. There were others, too, 
.. 
whose memories were of great help to me - Sr. Javier Cevallos, Sr. Jose 
Rol:z, Sr. Javier Urquiza, Srta. Ana Maria Urquiza, Sr. Hilario Ledesma, 
Sr. Alfonso Adame, sr·. Alejandro Fernandez, Sr. Jose Montes, and· 
Sr. Eduardo Urquiza. I am also very grateful to Sra. Marta Carefi.o for 
'· 
J..v 
grantin~ me access to the archives of the Notario Pubiico and 
Registro Publico in Queretaro, and to Professor Rodolfo Porras for doipg 
the same in the Departamento de la Reforma Agraria del Estado de 
Queretaro. Finally I would like to add a special word of thanks to 
Guillermo de la Pefia who met me in Hexico City when I first arrived 
and put me on the right road, both literally and metaphorically. 
Since arriving in Cambridge I have benefitted from the stimulating 
environment of the Centre of Latin American Studies. I have been 
particularly helped by the informative and penetrating suggestions of 
David Brading and Jose Marfa Caballero. Needless to say, however, I 
·am solely responsible for the work which follows, and for whatever errors 
it might contain. I am also most grateful to Helen Wilson who typed 
the thesis so well and under great pressure. 
A final tribute must be paid to all those people who gave me 
personal support and solidarity in this project, since it is to them 
that I am most profoundly indebted. Without them, this work would 
never have been started nor completed; they all suffered variously · 
my presence and absence - Sam, Mi-randa, Joey,· Sue, Pablo and Mercedes. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION: LIBERALISM AND LANDOWNERSHIP IN 
'NINETEENTH CENTURY MEXICO 
THE HACIENDA AND THE LIBERAL CRITIQUE 
t 
The theme of this study is the rise of an agrarian bourgeoisie in 
the central Mexican state of Queretaro. Its timespan is therefore 
considerable and incorporates the last 150 years. For much of this 
period landownership was a prominent issue in Mexican politics, and 
after the Revolution of 1910-20 the Mexican countryside was transformed 
by a comprehensive policy of agrarian reform. Modern Mexican land-
ownership has thus become a matter of small-scale properties. 
During the years before the Revolution, however, the situation was 
very different and rural Mexico was dominated by the large-scale 
ownership of the hacienda. This term is conventionally translated by 
'the great estate', but both terms are only loosely descriptive and 
1 
cover a wide variety of types. 
The hacienda had emerged as the dominant rural institution during 
. . M . 2 the years of Span1sh rule 1n ex1co. By the end of the ·colonial period 
it was beginning to attract criticism from liberal reformers, and was 
typically accused of wastefUl production practices and of depriving 
. most Mexican campesinos of access ~o land. 3 Within a few years of these 
criticisms Mexico was plunged into the devastation of the Insurgency, 
a vengeful populist uprising sparked off by an elite conspiracy·to win 
independence from Spain. The ferocity of this uprising reflected the 
---··· --·--------·---- --- -- ------------ ----------- . depth of resentment felt by those who had been impoverished by the 
excesses of the hacienda, and the lesson of this was not lost on the 
liberals "'ho rose to prominence in Mexico during the years after 
Independence. 
'· 
2 
True to their precursors in Europe the Mexican liberals were 
advocates of free trade and unfettered individualism. 4 Central to 
their ideology was also the notion of private property - one of their 
leading spokesmen, Jose I-1arfa Luis Mora, even referred to the word 
itself as having a "magical enchantment". 5 
Private property was accorded a special place in the liberal scheme 
on account of its apparent capacity to reconcile the dissonant principles 
of individual freedom and social responsibility. The creative energy· 
of personal freedom could only work for the public good when it was 
anchored by the responsibilities of ownership. It was thus argued 
that the right to hold private property should be enjoyed by a majority 
of the people rather than by just an elite minority. 6 
Mexican liberals of this period also envisaged an essentially 
agrarian development for their country and rejected the alternative 
strategy of state-protected industrialization. Widespread ownership of 
rural property thus became a basic tenet of their position, and the 
minority landowners, hacendados and the Church, came under liberal fire. 7 
The hacendados were accused of being absentee landlords who pursued 
a dissipated and extravagant life-style in the great cities. They were 
castigated for their wasteful and inefficient methods of production, 
for their practice of cultivating only a small portion of their estate, 
and for giving no encouragement to their tenants. 8 Perhaps above all, 
they were charged with obstructing the emergence ~~dev~~op~ent of a 
rural middle class. 
This was the numerous class of small property-holders which had 
been invested with all the liberal aspirations for a flourishing and 
peaceful modern Mexico. Its members were depicted as determined and 
industrious agriculturalists, living on the land that they worked, 
owned, and nurtured. By way of their presence and industry they w·:mld 
'· 
3-
increase the value and productivity of the land, and thereby make a 
definitive contribution to the overall welfare and stability of the-
country.9 The rural middle class would thus succeed exactfy where the 
r 
hacienda had failed - in fostering economic development on a multitude 
ofsmall enterprises, and by providing the social conditions for a 
stable polity. This was the essence of the liberal dream. 
Realisation of this dream was, however, a very different matter. 
After all, ·liberal ideology severely curtailed the scope for direct 
intervention on the part of the state.--this made it difficult for 
liberals in power to take measures designed to accelerate the 
disintegration of the hacienda and to give rise to a rural middle class 
in its place. There were in any case a number of landowners amongst the 
ranks of the liberals, and the movement as a whole showed little real 
understanding or sympathy for the actual Mexican campesino. 10 
Faith was thus placed in the development of colonization-programmes 
in frontier areas where there were no haciendas, and in the removal of 
any obstruction to a free market in land. To this end the_Liberals at 
first abolished civil entails and then turned their attention to the 
problem of corporate property - that of the Church and of the Indian 
communities. According to the Law of Desamortization passed in June 
1856 all corporately owned property was appropriated and offered to 
incumbent tenants at prices calculated on the basis of the rents they 
. 11 
were pay1ng. 
The economic power of the Church may have been broken by these 
measures but no middle class phoenix rose from the ashes. In contrast 
the hacienda flourished - the bulk of- Church property ended up in the 
hands of established landowners and many estates were given a new lease 
of life by the state's redemption of Church mortgages. The division 
of community lands into allodial family plots also gave hacendados the 
4 
12 
opportunity of encroaching on property previously beyond their reach. 
A colonization law in 1863 attempted to maintain the policy directed 
towards the creation of a rural middle class but little effort was 
made to implement it until the years of the Porfiriato, 1876 to 1910.13 
During the rule of Porfirio D1az the liberal ~easures of the 
earlier years were pursued more systematically. Executive efforts 
were made to speed up the division and allocation of community lands, 
and modifications were made in the laws of colonization to facilitate 
the carving up of the nation's unsurveyed and untitled areas. 14 An 
amendment to these in 1883 allowed surveying companies to file for a 
. '-
third of the lands they charted, and a further law passed in 1894 
removed all limits to the amount of land that any one individual might 
acquire. 15 The years of the Porfiriato were thus thought of as boom 
times for the Mexican hacendado, when the nation's lands became ever 
more concentrated into the hands of a tiny minority. By 1906.over 
eleven million hectares of Mexican land had been distributed as 
: . 16 
freehold property. 
VOICES OF PROTEST DURING THE PORFIRIATO 
There were voices of protest - by far the most prominent, those 
of Wistano Luis Orozco in the last decade of the century, and Andres 
Molina Enr1quez during the final days of Porfirio Dfaz. 17 Both protests 
echoed with the words of their liberal precursors of the mid-Nineteenth 
-·-- ---
century. They argued that the hacienda was socially invidious and an 
economic anachronism, a view best summed up by the phrase coined by 
_,. • _,. II • • II 18 (th . h. • Andres Mol1na Enr1quez, la hac1enda no es negoc1o , e ac1enda 
is not a business). 
The main focus of their attack on the hacienda. dealt with the 
institution 1 s twin characteristics - scale and methods of exploi·t.ation. 
The estates were enormous tracts of land - Orozco pointed to the 
'· 
5 
hacienda of Cedros in Zacatecas which covered more than three-quarters 
of a million hectares; Molina Enrfquez commented that one didn't need 
to travel as far as Zacatecas to find a large haCienda - t_here was. one 
I 
within 125 km. of the capital city called La Gavia with an extension of 
63,000 hectares. 19 Further to the north there were hacendados who· 
controlled even larger areas, such as the notorious General Terrazas, 
owner of close to two million hectares. 20 
According to Molina Enrfquez, these huge areas were monopolized 
by generation after generation of the same families, and exploited only 
for the minimum return of a secure rent, sufficient to support the 
21 
owners in a city life-style of 'feudal' splendour. His precursor 
was a little more specific in his attack on the scale and exploitation 
of the hacienda. Orozco constructed a model of the typical hacienda 
and showed the extent to which such scales of ownership demanded 
considerable capitalization. He took as his typical case a property of 
around fifty thousand hectares, only a third of which was suitable for 
maize cultivation. Even with half of this land lying fallow every 
alternate year, Orozco calculated that close to five thousand oxen 
were required for the cultivation and 3,690 workers. He concluded that 
such a scale of investment as this presupposed a circulation of capital, 
an economic liveliness, and a quality of enterprise in the owner that 
could not be found in the Mexico of 1895 - the result was that 
ha.cendados were reduced to cultivating a mere tenth of their resources. 22 
Molina Enrfquez and the Mexican ranchero 
----------------------Molina- Enrfquez adopted--this analysis of Orozco and extended it 
to argue that large-scale ownership and effective production of the 
land were. natural antagonists. 23 Like_Orozco before him, he saw the 
solution to the problems of agrarian Mexico in the development of the 
24 sm~~...:ho_~~~-~~___:__-~~E.~-~-:U:l_~:U.!~li_s~, _whom he called the ranchero. 
'· 
6 
· A number of these hard-working farmers already existed, on the 
marginal lands left by the hacienda and on the plots carved out of the· 
community lands at thetime of liberal Reforms. ·They provided Molina 
Enr1quez with the beginnings of a rural middle class, since he argued 
that they were already "the real agriculturalists" on the·mesa central 
and were responsible far the regular supply of cereals to the urban 
market~ 25 But they were confined to small areas by the excesses of 
hacienda monopolization, and he therefore regarded the destruction 
and division of the great estate as a sine qua non for the rise of a· 
real middle class - to be composed of a populous: group of mestizo 
small-holders. 25 
Molina Enr1quez's views on agrarian matters were to have a lasting 
impression on rural Mexico.sirice they were instrumental in the shaping 
of the policies of land reform 1n the years which followed the 
Revolution of l910. The class to which he attached so much importance 
has however remained obscure and ill-defined. A few recent studies 
have served to shed at least some light on the origins and activities 
. 27 
of the so-called ranchero. They tend to confirm the impression 
left by Molina Enr1quez - small units of land developing during the 
second half of the nineteenth century and in the marginal areas of 
Mexico; inaccessible pueblos with their communal lands divided up; or 
remote haciendas which had fallen prey to economic pressures and had 
disintegrated into a number of smaller farms. ThiE;_is the_ ~ind of-· 
history turned up by the studies of rancheros in the highlands of 
Guanajuato, Michoacan, Jalisco, Hidalgo, and Guerrero. The~r 
evidence does not, however, support Molina Enrfqu~Zi '.s contention that 
it was from these properties that the cities' workers were fed. 
Determined and hard-working, fiercely independent and proud to be 
property holders - all of these things they may have been, but the 
'· 
7. 
poverty of their lands and the distance from the maJor ci_ti_es must 
have severely limited their economic contribution. · 
The· relative dearth of information on the history and, composition 
I 
of Mexico's rancheros makes it difficult to classifY them as a class. 
·Schryer· is right to. point to the fact that today's usage of the term 
is. misleadingly elastic - it may refer to the highly capitalistic 
farmers of the Pacific North-west as well as to the autonomous peasant 
who works his plot of land or minifundia on the basis of his .own 
1 b d . f .. f . 28 a. .our an that o h1s am1ly. 
The rancheros of Pisaflores who form the subject of his work fall 
somewhere between these extremes - they antedate those of the North-West 
andJare clearly better off than the independent peasantry. These 
men emerged late in the Nineteenth century and came to own land of 
between 25 and 1500 hectares,29 a similar range to that found in San 
Jose de Gracia, Michoacan, by Luis Gonzalez, where the average holding 
30 
was in the region of 265 hectares. Despite the differences in their 
landed assets Schryer argues that the group constituted a social class 
by virtue of the fact that all of these landowners managed their own 
enterprises and employed waged labour; they also produced for the market 
and acted as entrepreneurs, and yet they dressed and behaved in the same 
way as the mass of the Pisaflores peasantry. 31 To denote this blend of 
two classes Schryer dubs his rancheros a "peasant bourgeoisie", a strata 
lying between the richer absentee hacendado and the mass of landless 
· · ·f· d" t 32 labourers and m1n1 un 1s as. 
It is quite likely that Molina Enr1quez had such men as these in 
mind when he wrote of the crucial class of mestizo small-holders. He 
had, after· all, rejected the hacienda as beyond reprieve~ and had in· 
addition pointed to the model of the United States' homestead, limited 
to only 65 hectares and yet responsible for the maize and wheat 
'· 
. . t At . . t Eur 33 pour1ng across he lant1c 1n o ope. His mentor Luis Orozco 
was better disposed towards the larger~sized properties. ·He had just 
the same vision of a flourishing and democratic Mexico, borne up by 
the populous ranks of a rural middle class, but he seeins to have 
conceived this class in rather different terms. 
Orozco: advocate for the smaller hacienda 
Wistano Luis Orozco was born in the small town of San Cristobal 
de la Barranca on the border of Jalisco and Zacatecas in the year of 
the Liberal Reforms, 1856. 
Jalisco and in Tlaltenango, 
He studied in Guadalajara, the capital of 
34 Zacatecas, and worked in both states. 
He was thus familiar with the area's countryside and able to speak 
·with authority. In this way he was able to support his attack on the 
hacienda with a great deal more specific information than Molina 
Enr1quez. 
Orozco cited two pairs of comparable districts, one in Jalisco, 
the other from Zacatecas. In each case the soils of the district were 
fertile, the climatic conditions were favourable to agriculture, there 
was an abundance of water available, and the road connections with 
the regions' cities were good. What distinguished two of the cases 
from the others was the scale of landowning. 
Villanueva in Zacatecas and Cocula in Jalisco were both surrounded 
by a few, large-sized haciendas - those of the latter Orozco described 
as "enormous" whilst those of Villanueva averaged some 4"cf,-OOO he'ci;ares 
in extension. All of these properties conformed to the wretched 
stereotype of the feudal estate - the owners were permanently absent, 
very little of the land was cultivated, and no effort was made to 
introduce a system of leasing. As a result the areas were bereft of 
commerce, the towns' buildings were in a state of decay, and the 
population languishc·d in poverty and inactivity. These lands Oroz·:o 
'· 
described as "vast and wastedricheswhich serve neither God, nor man, 
nor even the Devil11 } 5 It is worthnoting that the only hacienda to 
attract moderate approval from Orozco in either Villanueva or Cocula 
I 
I 
was that of La Quemada in Zacatecas - this property had at least rented' 
out its pastures and was reported to be in quite good condition. ·It 
w was also by far the smallest property surrounding Villanueva, with 
only nine thousand hectares compared to the upper limit of eighty 
thousand.· 
By contrast, the other two cases were characterised by a much 
reduced scale of landowning, and were in turn rich and flourishing 
centres of activity. In Jerez, Zacatecas, valley bottoms and hillsides 
alike were divided up into small and medium-sized properties, the 
majority in the region of 1750 hectares with others ranging from about 
45 to 430 hectares. There were also a few "small and beautiful 
haciendas, such as Santa Fe, Buenavista, and El Tesorero" - these were 
properties of between five and eight thousand hectares. Orozco's 
·account of the area was lyrical- "throughout the valley rancherl:as 
abound, and everywhere you see maize or wheat fields flourishing, 
livestock grazing, or workers gathering in bountiful har:Vests". 36 
His report on the area of Ameca in Jalisco, surrounded by haciendas 
of "a sm8.ll size", was no less eulogistic. 
It is clear from Orozco's writings that these cases were 
fundamental to his arguments on the question of land tenure. He 
explicitly set himself against a policy which would produce a myriad of 
small plots, and crisply disassociated himself from "socialist" 
-~--~~-~-- .. -~ ... ·-~-----~- ___________ .,, -·' -~-~. ---.. -- .... ~.... . .. -- . . 37 
. proposals to give each and every man an equal area of land. He made 
it clear that the object of his attack was the larger-sized haciendas 
of some 50,000 hectares or more. His analysis of conditions in t?1e 
flourishing Jerez and Ameca led him to argue in favour of a range ()f . 
. - ---·--·-····;; ---------------···-
'· 
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landholdings between a minimum of 85 hectares· and a. maxiJnum of around 
ten thousand. Appropriate sizes within this range would vary accordin~ 
to the diversity of local conditions of soil, climate and market-
access -in the area around Mexico city, for example, he reckoned the· 
minimum size might slide below 85 and the maximum would rest at around 
38 
seven thousand. 
Orozco's ·vision of a Mexican rural middle class was thus somewhat 
at' odds with that of Molina Enrfquez. He was clearly not opposed to 
properties of up to a ceiling of ten thousand hectares. They were 
justified in terms of the economy of scale, and they also provided the 
smaller farmers with a model to aspire for. The backbone of Orozco's 
middle class was ambition for self-improvement - he envisaged a 
multitude of small and medium-sized landowners all dedicated to 
raising themselves in society, to educating their children, to being 
better-dressed and better-housed, and to mixing in higher society. 
Such aspirations would drive the farmer to ever greater efforts on his. 
land, promoting a continuous struggle to raise levels of productivity. 
and to emulate the standards of the larger property just beyond his 
reach. 39 
THE CEREAL HACIENDA: FEUDAL ESTATE OR JUNKER ENTERPRISE 
In the event it was Molina Enrfquez's image of the agrarian 
society which prevailed, and the stereotype of the hacienda as a 
feudal monopoly on land was wfdely accepted in the years after the 
. 40 . . . 1 h ht f . t f 1. •t• Revolut.J.on. .MexJ.co was 1ncreas1ng y t oug o J.n erms o po arJ. J.es -
a handful of colossal landowners and a mass of landless labourers, 
many of whom were drastically underemployed. An additional part of 
this conventional view was that the dynamic sectors c~ the agrarian economy 
were seen to be those serving the export market, such as sugar, cotton, 
11 -· 
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and henequen. In sharp contrast'·. the inore typical hacienda of the 
central areas of Mexico, which was responsible for the. production of 
cereals, essentially maize and wheat, for the domestic market was 
depicted as being stagnant and as archaic as ever - with the result 
. that it failed to attract any of the foreign capital then flowing into 
42 the country. So apparently poor was the performance of this cereal-
producing sector that it was argued that gross output of both :iQ.aize 
and wheat actually declined over the period 1877-1907, and that thes·e 
traditional haciendas were even failing to feed the Mexican people-
' hence.Molina Enrl:quez's contention that it was the small-holding 
ranchero and pueblo Indian who attempted to supply this market from a 
mere tenth of the· arable lands. 43 
This disparaging depiction of the cereal-producing hacienda 
certainly applied in many instances, but it also failed to take account 
of the country's wide diversity and gave no place to the dynamic 
smaller units uncovered by Orozco. Recent research into this sector 
has done much to redress the balance and it is now clear that Orozco's 
examples from Jalisco and Zacatecas were by no means isolated cases of 
. 44 
a rare phenomenon. 
As in the case of sierra-based rancheros these properties and the 
people responsible for their administration are only now making their 
appearance on the stage of Mexican history. Together
1
the two groups 
constitute the beginnings of a rural middle,class, and in turn raise 
important questions of their role in Mexican development. For this 
reason Schryer has chosen to designate the rancheros of Pisaflores as 
a "peasant bourgeoisie" and likens them to nineteenth-century Russian 
. 45 
kulaks. . The hacendados of this study represent the other side of 
this class formation by virtue of the scale of their assets and the 
nature of their enterprises - they share the rancheros' practice c:r 
'· 
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employing wage labour and their clear design to produce for the· 
market, but their activities were in general of a far higher order~ 
Their lands were usually more extensive and considerably more productive, 
and their access to the market and to sources of credit was far better. 
For these reasons the scale of their operations were larger and more 
varied, the numbers of their waged workers were far higher~ and their 
profits and capacities to reinvest much greater. They also differed 
from the rancheros in terms of culture and life-style,. for althoUgh 
tney took direct responsibility for the administration of their 
estates, they did not always live on them and in any case maintained 
a household routine more akin to life in the great cities than to that 
qf the rough and ready backlands. 
For all of these reasons the hacendados who feature in the pages 
which follow were less like the kulaks of Russia, and more akin to 
the Junker landlords of Brandenburg and Prussia further to the west. 46 
No historical parallel of this breadth can match up at all points and 
there are clear distinctions between the Junkers and the progressive 
hacendados of the Mexican mesa central·- the latter, for example, never 
had access to the free labour services of tied serfs, arid neither were 
they in conflict with the towns and their inhabitants. 47 In general 
terms, however, the two groups followed the same path of agrarian 
development, referred to by the German term, Gutscherrschaft, after 
the notion of the "lords (Gutsherren) who cultivated their lands •••• 
and became agriculturalists". 48 The Junkers at first survived, and 
then flourished, by expanding demesne cultivation with free labour 
services at a time when corn prices were on the increase- " ••• agriculture 
. ak" n49 • had become a prof1 table undert 1ng .. and those Wl th best access to 
the trading routes of the navigable rivers became the most successfUl. 
Their triumph was assured, thus opening the way to the development of 
13 
large-scale capitalist agriculture ivhere "landlord and farmer ·were 
identified in the same person, the Junker ••• and ground rent and profit 
were appropriated by the one actor". 50 
THE RISE OF AN AGRARIAN BOURGEOISIE IN QUERETARO · 
The story which follows will trace a similar path, but in this 
case taken by the progressive hacendados of the state of Queretaro in 
central Mexico during the course of the nineteenth century. Their 
circumstances were somewhat the same, since there too the stimulus for 
increased direct cultivation came from a rise in the demand for cereals, 
although the source of this was domestic rather than external. Under 
. these .conditions agriculture became more attractive to the landlord than 
rent, since labour costs, though not free as in the case of the Junker 
estates, had remained low and may have even fallen. In this favouraqle 
environment the medium-sized property entered an epoch of bourgeois 
production, and the Queretaro hacendados began to bear all the ·hallmarks 
of the enterprising bourgeoisie - they produced specifically for the 
market on the basis of demesne cultivation and wage labour; they exhibited 
a rational commitment to modify the form of production in the pursuit 
of maximum profits; and they revealed ail active disposition to reinvest 
these in diversification, mechanization, and the raising of productivity. 51 
This epoch of bourgeois enterprise came to full bloom during the 
years of the Porfiriato. By the beginning of this century at least a 
part-of the central Mexican countryside was characterised by an 
unmistakeable brand of agrarian capitalism, borne up by the domestic 
-·-·---·-·-----~E!!ll~~C!-. __ i_!l_~§l~_ic _s_~~:pl~s~ In __ the case of Queretaro, and of the Bajio 
in general, this emergence_had not entailed any dramatic encroachment 
on lands previously held by indigenous populations. The region had 
developed as a frontier area and thus had a long history of Spanish 
and mestizo colonization and acculturation. By the beginning of the 
'· 
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twentieth century the number of indigenous nuclei was inconsiderable 
and as a result there was little in the way of a basis for community 
solidarity and collective action. The Revolution of 1910-20 was 
therefore a somewhat muffled affair in the region although the local 
economy did suffer from the generalised instability and disruption. 
On account of this damage the golden age of the bourgeois hacienda 
came to an end 11Tith the outbreak of the Revolution, and there followed 
a protracted period of some thirty years of difficulties and economic 
depression. By the end of the 1930s the hacienda had disappeared from 
the rural scene and the agrarian bourgeoisie was in retreat. The last 
part of the following study examines the fortunes of this class during 
these years of ruin and goes onto trace its revival and reemergence in 
. the period after 1940. 
15 .. · 
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CHAPTER TWO 
PRELUDE TO AGRARIAN CAPITALISM: ECONOMY AND.SOCIETY IN 
QUERETARO BEFORE 1845 
QUERETARO: LOCATION AND ORIGINS 
The state of Queretaro lies in the middle of Mexico just to the 
north of the capital city. It is one of the smallest states in the· 
Republic, and is surrounded by those of San Luis Potos1, Hidalgo, 
Mexico, Michoacan, and Guanajuato; the shape thus formed is said to 
have the appearance of a rabbit about to jump. 
The northern part of the state, up beyond the towns of Col6n, 
Cadereyta, and Toliman, is dominated by the sheer and unyielding slopes 
of the Sierra Gorda, and will barely feature in the story which follows. 
The stage for this is rather to be found on the plains of the ceritre-
south, composed of those broad and fertile basins which connect the area 
with the region sweeping westwards to Jalisco and known as the Bajfo. 
Perhaps Queretaro is best known for the part it played in the 
. Creole conspiracy for independ~nce from Spain in 1810.1 By this time 
the area certainly bore the unmistakeable imprint of Hispanic culture 
and society. Clearly this was not always the case. Previously the 
region had fallen within the confines of the Tolteca civilization, 
although by the time of the Conquest it had already been conceded to 
the dominion of the Chichimecas. By 1532 it had been recovered by. way 
of a combination of Spanish design and indigenous soldiery, and by 
1538 it was granted the status of 'pueblo de indios' under the 
. -
leadership of a Christianized Otom1 called Hernando de Tapia. 
To begin with, Queretaro served as a bridgehead and bastion 
against the expansionist Chichimecas. Some 
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little time later its future was assured by the discovery of s~lver in 
Zacatecas, and thereafter it was to enjoy the b.enefits of acting as an 
entreport between the capital and the extending frontier to the north, 
I 
benefits which were also to attract the attentions and ambitions of 
immigrants from the Peninsula. 
·THE JEWEL OF NEW SPAIN: ECONOMIC EXPANSION IN QUERETARO 
As a result of these attentions Queretaro became inc.reasingly 
Hispanic in character and composition, although there remained a 
substantial, if somewhat submerged, indigenous population. The 
cronista Larrea remarked upon the four hundred Spaniards living there 
in 1638, and he also sung the praises of the bountiful orchards, 
productive soils and plentiful herds. Part of this Hispanic dominance 
.must have come from the city's flourishing Catholic community; predominant 
within it the Franciscans, which had developed from the en~ of the 
seventeenth century. By 1700 the city must have greeted the visitor 
with a splendid array of ecclesiastical buildings, and overall.to 
have appeared to justify its reputation of being one of the brightest 
jewels in the crown of New Spain. In addition to trading interests and 
fertile surrounds the city could nm1 boast of thriving concerns in 
woollen textiles and tobacco, thereby providing a base of sufficient 
diversity and resilience to see it through the period of recession which 
followed. At least it was a city which seemed to inspire strong 
loyalties: Archer tells-of the extreme reluctance of even the poorest 
Queretano to succumb to the charms of the army's recruiting sergeants, 
----·-···-·~-----M9. _ _!;_l1r_I}~ __ l!P __ t~o.'"O _Cfl:Sel:l gf pe:r.sistent desertion, with one Carlos Almaraz 
. . 2 
making it back to Queretaro all _the way from Havana! 
PRESSURE ON THE CEREAL PRODUCING HACIENDA: LABOUR SHQRTA.GES A,ND LOW 
DEMAND 
Late in the Colonial period, however, Queretaro~s reJ?uta.tion ha.d 
been somewhat dented by a recession in woollens, and by the exJ?osure 
of the inhuman working conditions which characterised the. industry's 
works.hops. 3 
Agriculture at least appeared to be more buoyant. Humboldt could 
scarcely contain his enthusiasm for the region's fertility, and Dominguez 
· observed that since his arrival as Corregidor there had been a rapid 
extension of the area of land under cultivation. This turn of events 
h 
. . . 4 
was owever fa1rly recent. Earlier on iri the eighteenth century the 
hacienda's fortunes had been at a very low ebb. This state of affairs 
had come about as a result of the combined agencies of an inadequate 
I 
labour supply and a low level of market demand for maize, the main 
crop. 5 
In this latter respect the hacienda had been hoist on a petard of 
its own making. Queretaro was a frontier society and suffered from 
labour shortages: the hacienda had attempted to overcome the problem 
by adopting the strategy of leasing out land in return for labour 
services. It was as though the hacienda had opened its gates to a 
trojan horse, since the tenants thus attracted were all too familiar 
with the business of producing maize for the market as well as for 
subsistence. Forthwith they became suppliers and thus competitors with 
. ( 
I 
thehacienda- with market demand for the produce Jrready·at-a low ebb 
'-.. 
such extra supplies meant that prices remained dangerously close to 
. 6 
cost. 
The defects of this contradictory arrangement were then accentuated 
by other pressures on the hacienda's incomes. Getting agricultural 
produce to the· urban markets on the backs of mules was, as we shall see 
later~ an expensive business, and there were further deductions to be 
'· 
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made for excise duties, tithes for the Church, and interest p~ents 
which had been incurred by loans. · Under these adverse conditi.ons the 
hacienda was clearly no money spinner. 
I 
Indeed, just how hard it was for the hacienda to survive can be 
. gauged from a set of castings elaborated in 1739 for an area in 
ruebla very similar to Queretaro. 7 According to these calculations, 
~ plot of land of 3.6 hectares required an investment of 86 pesos if 
it was to produce a crop of maize. Manual labour, seed, carriage and 
a.dministration accounted far fifty percent of this total, with rent 
costing a further 9 pesos. The remaining 34 pesos was charged to the 
hire of,' oxen. This last item can be discounted since thevast majority 
at; haciendas stocked their own beasts, and in any case, the amount 
charged for hire is more than it would have cost to purchase a yoke 
of animals at the time. 
The rest of the figures are however revealing. What they show is 
the extreme severity of the situation facing the maize-producing 
hacienda mid-way through the eighteenth century. · Making no allowance 
at all for the cost and upkeep of oxen, production costs still reach 
the. level of 52 pesos for the 3.6 hectares. To have just broken even 
on this basis would have been a tall order. Assuming a deduction of 
ten per cent for diezmo, and a sale price of one peso the fanega, these 
costs would have required yields of more than a ton per hectare. 
Neither this productivity nor the market rate of one peso could have 
been assumed by the hacendado,-and in addition to these uncertainties, 
he would have been confronted with the heavy costs of transport from 
------··- -- hacienda--to market place. Small wonder, then, that the less well 
endowed hacienda of Juchitlan and Los Panales to the north of Queretaro 
fell into the hands of its creditors in 1752, and that others attempted 
to maintain production on the basis of labour services received in 
lieu of rent. 8 
-~. -- --~---·-··-·---------··. 
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THE HACIENDA SURVIVES 
Survival for the cereal-producing hacienda was clearly ~ 
precarious business,·although theproduction of pulque and li.vestock 
was more remunerative, and elsewhere, of course, crops such as sugar 
~aye the hacienda a more profitable basis. The main focus of this study 
concerns the hacienda dependent upon the production of such staples as 
maize, wheat and beans- these were thepropertiesunder economic 
pressure during the later colonial years. 
One thread of security for them was provided by the practice of 
leasing lands for a cash rent or part of the tenant's crop, thus giving 
the hacendado an income over the leanest of periods. Alternative lines 
of production were also vital, especially wheat, since these gave the 
hacendado the chance to produce beyond the reach of his competitors in 
the maize market, the tenants and smallholders. Crops like wheat could 
not be raised around Queretaro without irrigation and this required 
access to water and capital, both of which the hacendado was able to 
dominate. 
A further aid to the ailing hacendado, as just suggested, came in 
the form of loans. The Colonial economy had operated largely on credit 
transactions which required sources of securities and collateral. The 
almost solitary source for these had been land, and this had guaranteed 
the agrarian sector a steady infusion of capital and the landowner 
the capacity to raise loans. 9 
The final corner-stone to survival was derived from the ironic 
cooperation of an otherwise antagonistic climate. Although the area's 
average annual rainfall of 500 mm was sufficient for the cultivation 
of maize, it was not at all reliable, and years of drought turned up 
with cyclical regUlarity. In times like these the area's maize 
production plummeted, and marketprices soared. In order to explo::i.t 
'· 
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These were conditions which gave momentum to a tentative trend of 
change in the hacienda, manifested in the extension of cultivated land 
noted by Dominguez, and in the attempt to raise rents or to increase 
I 
demesne production at the expense of the hacienda's tenants. Cases 
of this attempt were recorded on Queretaro haciendas in Atongo and 
La Griega, as well as in nearby Celaya, and they were met with resistance 
16 
and resentment on the part of the tenants. 
Here, then, were the conditions of struggle between landowner and 
labour surely conducive to the development of a powder-keg of antagonism 
in the area, creating a submerged threat which the Creole conspirators 
were apparently prepared to ignore. They could hardly have been immune 
to the rising tide of tension, since by 1809 desperation born of famine 
had been added to the burden of the masses. By this time things had 
deteriorated to the extent that troops were needed to accompany convoys 
of maize into Queretaro and Celaya, and that both the Corregidor of 
Queretaro and the city's cabildo were expressing anxious doubts as to 
whether their forces could contain the storm of violence building up 
around urban recession and the trends of change in the countryside.17 
THE INSURGENCY AND THE INTERRUPTED TRANSITION 
Hidalgo's spark in nearby Dolores was all that was needed to set 
this smouldering mass alight, and within a short space of time the 
whole of the Baj1o was ablaze with popular protest and revenge. The 
entire network of commerce in the centre of Mexico came to an abrupt 
halt, in the Baj1o many haciendas were forced to suspend production, 
. 18 
- - -and some were even burnt to the ground by the enraged populace. 
The initial devastation to the Queretaro area by Hidalgo's throng 
was undoubtedly severe, but it was probably also short lived. What is 
perhaps more impressive is the evidence that some haciendas manage1 to 
these market conditions hacendados took advantage of their superior 
access to capital, and built barns either on their haciendas or in the 
town. Maize from bountiful years, when the small producers' supply 
flooded the market and kept prices at or even below cost, was then 
stored in these barns and only released onto the market when shortages 
had pushed prices through t~'le roof, thereby securing for the hacienda 
· t bl r· · 10 an accep a e pro 1t marg1n. 
THE TIDE TURNS FOR THE HACIENDA 
These precarious conditions prevailed throughout the large part of 
the eighteenth century, but by the 1770s things were beginning to look· 
better for the hacendado in Queretaro •. Part of this was due to the 
region's expanding urban sector, which raised levels of demand. ·Mining 
was booming in nearby Guanajuato, and Queretaro itself was a hive or· 
urban activity, based on textiles, tobacco, trade and construction. 
The general increase in population was probably of even more 
significance. From 1747 to 1790 the jurisdictions around Queretaro 
doubled in population,11 and the entire area grew from around 70,000 to 
a little over 126,500 in the last two decades before the Insurgency.12 
Such trends in urbanisation and demographic increase had the twin 
effects of raising demand and of swelling the labour supply - although 
to some extent this last was partly neutralised by the comp~tition for 
labour generated by the expanding urban sector.13 By and large, 
however, these trends had the effect of unshackling-the haciendafrom 
the torments of the earlier epoch, and it is clear that this period 
witnessed a considerable increase in the volume of agricultural 
. . . t . . 14 w t. . d product1on and a r1se 1n marke pr1ces. ages mean 1me rema1ne 
stagnant, and may even have fallen from the daily rate of two reales to 
one and a halr.15 
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maintain production, even in areas near the eye of the storm, such as 
Duarte, near Le6n, which had suffered depradations and was left with a 
severely depleted stock of draught oxen, the key to cultivation.19 
I 
. I 
Recent research in this area suggests that it was only the 
peripheries of the Baj1o, around Dolores and San Miguel in the north 
and Maravat1o, Salvatierra, and Acambaro_in the south, which resisted 
the Royalist counter-offensive of 1813 and remained disrupted for very 
lorig. Elsewhere the objective of pacification and a return to production 
was probably accomplished soon after the beginning of the Royalist 
campaign. Some students of the area are even prepared to suggest that 
the city of Queretaro in fact benefitted from the disruption by 
becoming the centre of contraband activiti~s. 20 Surrounding haciendas 
do not appear to have been devastated or abandoned, since attempts by 
Iturbide in 1813 to requisition livestock and produce between Queretaro 
and San Juan del R1o were met with a concerted campaign of resistance 
on the part of the hacendados. One gets the same sense of the hacendados' 
· ~tubborn commitment to their properties from their outright rejection 
of the Viceregal project to settle. rancheros on hacienda lands between 
neighbouring Apaseo and Le6n .to the north. 21 A last clue to the area's 
restoration before the end of the decade of the Insurgency may be 
found in the fact that the rate of inflation in maize prices in the 
pacified areas was considerably lower than that of the rebel strongholds, 
and certainly never approached the heights of the 1786 famine. 22 
Disruption, then, there may have been, but it is clear that actual 
physical devastation was far less profound. And yet there can be no ,. 
----------------douot--tna~ the year·s ··after the· decade of insurrection found the area in 
-the depths of a depression,- and that recovery from this was delayed 
until as late as the 1840s. 
. QUERETARO IN THE ERA OF INDEPENDENCE 
The persistence of this depression and sluggish nature of the 
recovery dominate the pages of a meticulous report on the Queretaro 
economy prepared by one Jose Antonio del Raso, the deputy to the 
·National Congress, during the first years of the 1840s. Raso was no 
stranger to the business of running haciendas, since his family had 
been the exacting owners of Juchitlancito from the turn of the century, 
.and the detailed depiction of Queretaro that he presented to the 
state Assembly in 1845 has the ring of authenticity. 23 
By way of omission his work tends to confirm the impression that 
the direct effects of the Insurgency on the area's productive capacity 
were largely ephemeral. No mention is made of burnt-out buildings, 
nor of irreparable damage done to the area's system of irrigation, 
despite the fact that the entire drift of the report rests on the 
contrast of the state's agrarian economy with the "brilliant" years 
24 prior to the Insurgency. Neither does he even refer to a depletion 
-·of livestock, upon which the whole process of cultivation depended; 
indeed, if we are to. believe the reports made by the Corregidor in 
1799, elaborated on account of a dispute between the armi· and the 
local hacendados over the provision of mounts for the cavalry, it is 
clear that at least the number of horses held on the haciendas in the 
1840s. far surpassed those of the earlier date. 25 
The Insurgency had certainly affected the state of trade in the 
whole of central Mexico, and this had accentuated the hacienda's 
perennial problems of finding markets for its produce. But in 
addition to this, Raso laid emphasis on the chronic shortage of 
currency and capital which meant that both landowners and large-· 
scale tenants were unable to "give fli~ht" to the full potential t)f 
their properties. 26 The routine cycle of production was hampered by 
'· 
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insufficient cash, and any move or intention to improve or diversify 
production was effectively frustrated by the scarcity of capital. 
ECONOMIC RECESSION AND THE CRISIS IN MONEY SUPPLY 
Raso's words would have found an echo in virtually every corner 
of independent Mexico. This monetary crisis had dominated the 
economy for some time, and it is clear that the roots of the problem 
stretched back to the years before the outbreak of the Insurgency to 
the days of the Consolidaci6n. The effect of this metropolitan 
measure was to syphon off from the Mexican economY something like 
eleven million pesos between the years 1805 and 1809. 27 There had 
been a general consensus that the measure would damage and debilitate 
the development of agriculture, mining and trade, but these arguments 
failed to move the Crown. 28 This serious blow was then compounded by 
the collapse of silver production during the Insurgency, and by 
fUrther withdrawal of capital effected by rich Peninsulares returning 
to Spain in its aftermath. 
Bourbon mintage rates were not restored until the lf330s, and it 
was only with the discovery of the rich lode of La Luz in Guanajuato 
in 1848 that production levels were lifted to a level which could have 
. . d d 1" 29 compensated fully for the dra1n wh1ch ha occurre ear 1er. 
Estimates made by the British consul O'Gorman for the decade from 
1832 to 1842 for the output and destiny of Mexican silver suggest that 
sixteen million pesos were mined every year, but that only six per 
cent of this total was retained in Mexico "for domestic uses; Church 
db · a· ·a a1 " 30 If O'Go ' f. --- t b --------------plate--and -hoa!"de - y 1n 1 v1 u s . - rman s _1gures are o e 
trusted the implication is that the domestic economy, reputably already 
short of currency in circulation, received an annual injection of less 
than one million pesos, whilst four and a half millions were destined 
for ~he e_cg_J?.~J!IY- _Q__(_the United States._ Small wonder then that Raso 
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identified the main block to recovery and development in Queretaro as 
this chronic shortage of money. The other major problem was the 
population. 
QUERETARO AFTER THE INSURGENCY: DISEASE AND POPULACE 
By the eve of the Insurgency the upturn in population growth had 
left the state of Queretaro with a population of 126,597. This number 
,was then rapidly depleted by the effects of the insurrection, although 
those actually accounted for by the military encounters were surely in 
·the minority. The more important causes included hunger brought on by 
th~ crisis in production, but particularly far-reaching were the effects 
: of epidemic disease, notably the outbreak of yellow fever in 1813. 
Once ail these various scourges took their toll, the state's population 
, plummeted to 73,757 in 1822. 31 
Such disruption of the population can only have had adverse 
effects on the level of demand and the flow of labour supply. Effects. 
which clearly compounded the damage done to the economy by the collapse 
of commerce and the drain on the money supply. 
Population may have recovered faster than these lat~er aspects 
of the economy, thanks to the prolific fertility of the area's women, 
but even here problems dragged on. Perhaps a brand of Mexican bandit-
ridden stability had indeed returned to protect the people of Queretaro 
from the ravages of war and civil disorder before the end of the 
second decade, but such measures had precious littl·e- impact on the 
virulence of the period's epidemic diseases, and these relentlessly 
continued to afflict Queretanos in town and country alike. ·Between 
the years 1822 and 1844 over twenty-two thousand people were to perish 
from.a number of outbreaks, including two of small-pox and measles, 
one of scarlet fever and dysentery, and a scourge of cholera in 1833 
which claimed almost six thousand dead. 
33 
Deaths caused by such epidemics accounted for thirty per cent of 
Queretaro's reported burials, and they had the overall effect of 
debilitating the work force and reducing the level of dem~d. In this 
I 
respect, one should guard against imagining that the bulk of the casual-
ties affected the very young, and that therefore the impact on labour 
and demand was less onerous. Certainly a disease like measles held 
considerably less threat for adults than it did for children, but other 
c~mmon kiilers like cholera appeared to discriminate the other way 
around. Over eighty per cent of the six thousand reportedly carried 
off by cholera in 1833 were adults, thereby producing an overall 
pattern of de_aths by disease which cut more deeply into the labour force 
th •t d.d . t 32 an 1. 1 1nto he young. A natural consequence of this pattern 
w:as that the population in Queretaro remained biased towards the youth, 
~uch that forty-three per cent of the population wer·e below the age of 
;pub.erty in 1844. This demographic profile can only have had an adverse 
,effect on the supply of labour and the level of demand, and in this 
··way played a part in the protraction of economic problems in the area 
I 
;and the sluggishness of recovery. 
i :THE AGRARIAN ECONOMY IN 1845: QUERETARO ON THE THRESHOLD OF REVIVAL 
We come now to Rasa's diagnosis of these problems and his assess-
: ment of the area's potential for the future. His careful survey 
, revealed that the state of Queretaro extended over some 35,630 
caballer1as, or a little· over a million and a half hectares. Almost 
forty per cent of this area was held in private title, divided into 
I 
_________ J.l24- .haciendas_ and -398 ranchos. An area slightly larger than ·this, 
I -
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predominantly to be found in the mountainous northern part of the 
state, was classified as unappropriated, the property of the nation. 
A further 205. caballer1as of land had been charted as the legal gr:,mts 
...,,, 
J"t 
of the state's fifty-two pobiaciones, whilst an additional 820 
caballer!as were designated communal lands attached to the pueblos of 
the Sierra, Toliman, Cadereyta, and Amealco. The remaining 6,150 were. 
taken up by roads, rivers, streams, gulleys and so on. 33 
The arable lands were in general of the best quality, composed 
of a rich mixture of clay and sand, a composition which made for great 
fertility, with the vital capacity to retain water and hence resist up 
to sixty days of drought. Within the domain of the haciendas and ranchos 
there were almost seven thousand hectares of irrigated land, and close 
to a hundred .thousand of rain-fed temporal. Over three and a half 
thousand hectares of similar quality ('tierras de pan llevar superiores') 
were still covered by wild brush, and awaited clearance before they 
could be brought into cultivation; the fact that this area constituted 
little·more than three per cent of the haciendas' arable lands shows 
that the charge of wasteful underexploitation was inappropriate in 
the case of Queretaro. There were in addition to these lands close to 
. forty-eight thousand hectares of poor quality soils, amenable only to 
the raising of barley, beans, or maguey, and almost four hundred and 
fifty thousand hectares of hillside pastures, where the haciendas grazed 
their herds of . 34 cattle, horses, sheep, mules and goats. 
Here then were the lands which Humboldt had found reminiscent of 
the plains of Lombardy. The area's native son, Jose Antonio del Raso, 
was no less impressed by the landscape around Queretaro, and waxed 
lyrical over ''the striking vistas which met the eye, haciendas rich .. 
with the diverse bounty of their cultivation, flourishing villages of 
great beauty, and a spread of irrigation works, ·ancient and modern!' 
And yet still afflicted by a torpor born of a protracted depression. 35 . 
'· 
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THE HACIENDA IN QUERETARO: PROBLEMS AND PRESCRIPTIONS 
The depression had contained Queretaro's potential; probably 
much of Rasa's lyricism came from a vision of how the area might have 
I 
looked under more favourable conditions. As it was, the disruption 
of population and the shortage of money had forced the hacendados to 
abandon their tentative move towards a more intensive system of 
demesne cultivation, and to revert instead to the archaic practice of 
leasing out their lands in small plots. 
At this point it is worth stressing that this progressive trend 
of increased direct cultivation, which has already been remarked upon, 
was in all likelihood a very partial and tentative development • 
. Although the changing circumstances in labour supply and market demand 
gave some momentum to this transition during the last years of the· 
Colonial epoch, it 1s by no means clear that these changes were of 
a sufficiently significant order to bring about wholesale transfo~tions 
in a sphere of production which had always been hazardous. I refer 
here, of course, to the cultivation of maize temporal on unirrigated 
.lands. 
Humboldt may have suggested that a fortune could be made in maize, 
but set against this,optimism there were many reports of persistent 
problems with the crop. It is clear that many hacendados at the turn 
of.the century had their doubts about the virtues of moving into 
increased direct cultivation since the Corregidor Dominguez observed 
at.this time that one of "the principal businesses" of the hacienda 
was still to lease out small plots of land from between five and ten 
. -
hectares in return for money rents or a part of the harvest. 36 Further 
evidence of the inconclusive nature of this trend can be found in the 
common lament that poor work rates and high labour costs pushed 
production costs too close to the market price •. This complaint, n'')ted 
by Dominguez in 1801, found an echo throughout central Mexico from 
Puebla to Michoacan and Veracruz. 37 Part of the problem lay with the 
prices, as shown by the case of the complaint made in 1806 by the owner 
of the Ixtla hacienda to the west of Queretaro: the gist of this was 
· that the going rate of five reales the fanega was insufficient to 
cover the costs of production and maintenance. 38 The other side of 
the equation was the much disputed productivity of the Mexican peon. 
Many hacendados of the late eighteenth century blamed the 
shortcomings of maize production on the inefficiency of the Mexican 
peon, who was said to be less than half as productive as his Spanish 
cousin. This comparison cannot concern us here, but it is worth noting 
that costings elaborated by one Juan Cervantes of Puebla in 1739 
(referred to earlier) do suggest that production costs in Mexico were 
high. The Cervantes case was taken from land similar to that of the 
plains of Queretaro, land apparently flat and not the most difficult to 
work. And yet the time required to prepare the land for sowing, 9.44 
man-days per hectare, was almost double that needed in seventeenth 
· · . . 4o 
century England and Switzerland. Comparisons made between the 
Cervantes figures and recent observations made by anthropologists of 
contemporary Mexican peasants working the land with similar tools, 
shows that the coercive regime of the hacienda - close supervision and 
a dawn-to-dusk work-day - squeezed a thirty per cent better work-rate 
out of the eighteenth century peon than that of thec-presel!~-~ay . _ 
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unfettered peasant. This suggests that there may not have been that 
much space for improved productivity amongst the Mexican peo~s, but at 
the same time it cannot alter the implication that Mexican conditions 
in the round demanded relatively high investments of manual labour. 
This .in turn underscores the proposition that unit profit margins on an 
undervalued crop like maize were bound to be tight, if not prohibitive. 
'· 
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Returning now to the situation reviewed by Raso~ it should come 
as no surprise to find that the long years of depression had put paid 
· to the move towards increased demesne cultivation. Livestock interest$ 
i 
and irrigated wheat still remained in the hands of the landowners, but 
the entire temporal sector had been returned to the sphere of the 
small tenant~ with an additional if limited use of sharecropping. 42 
The extent of this leasing and subleasing had reached the point where 
some parcelas were barely large enough to support the family which 
worked them. 
There are two sides to Rase's account of this situation. On the 
one hand he took the firm view that this reversion to leasing represented 
a block to the full development of the area's assets. But on the other 
hand, he recognised the social bemifits of such a widespread distribution -
of the land. Previously, he argued, income from the land had tended to 
end up in the pockets of the area's 110 hacendados and 392 rancheros; , 
the system of small leases had considerably extended the number of these 
beneficiaries, now incorporating some 2,623 tenants of various types 
and dimensions. "Whilst such a division of labour and profits might 
reduce the wealth of a few"~ he observed, "it also alleviates the 
penw;-y of many others."43 This alleviation was given further momentum 
by the haciendas' other practice of leasing out all rights to. the 
eitploitation of their marginal assets, such as the felling of' timber~ 
the production of charcoal, and the gathering of wild cactus: the number 
of these tenants was as high as 2,170. 
Part of Rasa's study included a meticulous compilation of the state's 
agricultural production for the year 1844, and of' the pattern of 
employment which corresponded to this production. As a result of 
these figures it is possible to demonstrate the full weight of Rasa's 
observed social benefits. His data takes the form of : · · 
'· 
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the pattern of distribution of the year's total value according .to 
occupation within the economy. From this we can see that tenants of 
land or marginal assets did indeed benefit. vfuilst clearly not doing 
as well as hacendados or rancheros, who averaged an annual income of 
more than twelve hundred pesos, their position proved t6 be eminently 
preferable to that of wage labour. Vfuereas the tenants accounted for 
close to forty. per cent of the total value of production and on average 
received almost a hundred and fifty pesos per year, labourers on the 
haciendas, more than three times as numerous as the tenants, could not 
even account for a quarter of the total value and emerged wi.th incomes 
ot; less than thirty pesos. Tenants, in effect, were enjoying standards 
44 
ot; living .s.ome five times higher than those of waged labour. 
Clearly, then, Raso was right to acknowledge the social benefits 
of leasing out land. But he also reckoned that the position of waged 
labour was acceptable, since the vast majority of families had at least 
one member in gainful employment. This was beca~se the economy was 
finally stirring, and that as a result there was a growing demand for 
labour. Since around forty-five per cent of the male population -w-as 
either less than twelve or more than seventy it was hardly surprioing 
that the majority vras in gainful employment, even if only on a seasonal 
basis. 45 . From Rase's figures it is possible to estimate that the total 
rural population in 1844 was in the region of 130,000; discounting all 
-women, and males below puberty and in senility, this represented a 
total work-force of around 36,000.males between twelve and seventy. 
Given these figures, and with over twenty thousand at work in·the 
agricultural sector, it was probably legitimate for Raso to conclude 
that the population in general "may not have been living in opulence, 
but neither were they suffering in penury". 46 
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Despite the social benefits of this distribution, however, such a 
spread must have been undesirable to Raso the economist. And yet 
when it came to production he was apparently in an optimistic frame of 
. . I . 
mind. It is clear from his comments that many of his peers did not 
sha.re such sentiments,· and much of his work seems to be designed to 
dispel the gloomy impression that the state's agriculture was 
continuing to decline. ·To supp<?rt his case, Raso pro.vided data which 
.showed that the total value of the sector's production had surpassed the 
two million peso mark, and that this produce met the needs of the 
popula:tion and left a. surplus for sale outside the state. By the end 
qt; his survey Ra.so was prepared to herald a new dawn for Queretaro's 
haci.endas with the prediction that "directed well, they would progress". 47 
40 
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CHAPTER THREE 
MAIZE PRODUCTION ON THE HACIENDA: THE DIL~lliA OF THE 
TEMPORAL LANDS 
THE CROP: PRECEDENTS AND POTENTIAL 
Maize, the indigenous staple of the New World, "the holy grain, 
the teocentli. of the Aztecs", was the foundation of the civilizations 
of Middle Arri.erica and the centrepiece of their religions and rituals} 
I.ts virtues or extraordinary adaptability had provided those surpluses 
of food and time so necessarY to the elaboration of complex and hier-
axchica.l societies. The-conquistadores may well have been cast down 
when they discovered that Mexico was rich in maize instead of the gold 
they had dreamt of, but their eventual survival and prosperity in the 
New World was in the end largely due to this prolific grain and the 
population it nurtured~ There is, as a result, a degree of poetic 
irony in the fact that it was this same crop, maize, which came later 
to plague the institution perhaps most closely connected w:ith Spanish 
settlement, the haCienda. We have witnessed the problems it had given 
the cereal~producing hacendados_ in the years before 1840;. they' could 
only be assure~ of recovery and_ expansion once these problems had b.een 
resolved, and the majority of their lands had been put to profitable 
us.e. As noted earlier, in the case of Queretaro these temporal lands 
covered: close to a hundred thousand hectares in the 184os, and represented 
a. substantial proportion:- of the ·capital invested in the agrarian economy. 
The key to the haCienda 1 s breakthrough and expansion thus lay in the 
·-----·---opt-imwn-use-of this ·invested capital. 
'' '+'+ 
STRATEGY ON THE HACIENDA: RENTS OR DIRECT CULTIVATION 
The central question, ·then, which faced the hacendado was what 
to do with the temporal lands on his hacienda, rain-fed lands which 
were only amenable to the provision of pasture or the cultivation of 
maize.• One option, as we have seen, was to turn these over to a number 
of small lease-holders. This practice, as shown already, had originally 
served the separate function of attracting labour to the hacienda 
when this was scarce in the region. As labour became more available, 
such leases took on a different purpose, and began to provide the 
hacendado with. an important supJ?lY of regular cash income. With land 
vaJ.ues rising towards the end of the Colonial years, these :rents 
aJ?parently began to.look increasingly alluring, and with maize production 
still I?lagued with difficulties and dangers, it has been suggested that 
landowners would have been better advised abandoning the temporal 
sector altogether, and settling instead for rental incomes. 2 
The mystery is that there is less evidence of this. option being 
taken up than the a priori case would suggest, except during those· 
years of the depression after the Insurgency, when hacendados were 
scarcely making a choice, but were rather having the single pattern for 
survival imposed upon them. On the other hand, cases of this option 
being chosen during less strenuous times are indeed rare: the solitary 
recorded instances appear to be the Mariscales de Castillo in the 
Baj1o, and the Porres Baranda entail to the east of Guadalajara. 3 The 
unusually large size of these properties suggests that the option was 
only realistic for the most extensive of the latifundia. 
The key to this puzzle is that small-scale leasing did not alter 
the objective problems of production which had been set by the quality 
of the soil and the reliability of the rains. Most tenants of this 
sort were hardly more than subsistence peasants, and were vulnerable to 
' 
all the hazards involved in raising maize on temporal lands. As such 
they could hardly have represented a reliable source of income for 
the hacendado, a fact which is borne out by the frequency of entries 
I 
in hacienda accounts of rents from small parcels of land being unredeemed, 
written Off, a,nd simply l?iling up from year to year. 4 
In addition to this problem there were the difficulties of 
supervision and rent collection. Rents would not have made their own 
way to the hacendado's coffers, and management in the absence of the. 
owner was, as noted by the assiduous Jesuits, notoriously expensive and 
wide-open to corrupt practice. 5 As a result, probably only the largest 
Of l?roperties could command a sufficient magnitude of potential rents 
to compensate for these inherent flaws in the system. 
In any case, a further point should be made in relation to the 
rate of rent accruing from this form of leasing. The general tendency 
is to reckon this to have been ten pesos the fanega de sembradura 
throughout most of the nineteenth century •. This was the rate introduced 
to the north of Queretaro in Atongo, and to the west near Celaya, after 
population growth had favoured the hacienda in the last years of the 
Colony. By the middle of the nineteenth century we find similar rates 
recorded , and of other cases of land being rented out for ten and 
twelve pesos the f~ega in San Juanico and Juriquilla, haciendas close 
to the city of Queretaro, and again in the 1880s. in the hacienda 
Miranda to the south. 6 These are the figures which underpin the 
suggestion that landowners would have been better off abandoning 
cultivation in the temporal sector. 
But there. are problems with the assumption that all maize lands 
could command rents at these remunerative levels, since all of the 
cases referred to concern areas which were endowed with relati vel~'· 
fertile soils and favourable locations. Rents, after all, merely 
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reflected values, which were themselves only refractions of productive 
potential. This capacity, we know, encompassed a huge diversity of 
soils and locations. Even the briefest review of the notarised land 
transactions in Queretaro, and nearby Guanajuato, will reveal this 
wide range. ·Temporal land sold in the middle decades. of the nineteenth 
century in these areas sold from as little as twenty-five pesos the 
fanega, right through to the peak values of two hundred. 7 Surely it is 
not toe> much to expect 'rents. to have varied accordingly. ·Or more · · 
likely, land leased on .:this model was lii!lited to the better qualities 
of temporal, since rents cha,rgeable on lands of more meagre worth 
J?robab.ly ba,rely ~usti.fied the effort involved. 
The· picture is now somewhat clearer. Variable land qualities would 
have combined with the disincentives of the administrative hazards and 
costs involved to make the option of extensive piecemeal renting far 
less attractive than ~t may at first have appeared., Hacendados 
ce:r;-tainly took up the option, but what is now clear is that their reasons 
for doing so ma,y well' have been defensive, and that the money they made 
;from such a system hardly amounted to a satisfactory return on their 
investments. The crucial question, then, is whether or riot such a 
situation amounted to Hobson's choice for the hacendado, or whether the 
OJ?tion of direct cultivation on temporal lands was any less ominous. 
THE Tro~ORAL LANDS: SEASONS AND FERTILITY IN-QUERETARO 
Maize in Queretaro was sown during the first days of the rains· 
which started variously between mid-May and early June. The first 
young shoots appeared after some eight days, and weeding was· required 
twenty days after sqwing, and again after thirty-five. The crop 
matured, according ~o variety, within ninety to a hundred and tw~nty 
days, but actual h~vesting was delayed until the corn-cobs were dried 
' 
and hardened, about: the .beginning of December, so that t.O.e harvest 
'· 
could coincide with the ·feast of the Virgin of Guadalupe. 
Beans, the other native staple, were also sown alongside the· 
maize, and were harvested somewhat earlier, during the middle and the· 
' . I 
I 
end of October.· Apart from providing a supplementary crop from the 
same land, this practice of raising beans intercalado, with their 
;runners climbing the maize stalks, had the important function of giving 
the young maize shoots some cover from hazardous early frosts, and 
of: reJ?lenishing the soil. 
Other crops were also grown on the milpas in the same way. 
Various species of squash were recorded growing in San Juanico in the 
late 1850s, and these were harvested later on just before the pizca, 
or maize harvest. It is probable that these plants served the same 
protective function as the beans, and that the produce was both eaten 
and also used to make domestic receptacles. 
Barley was also cUltivated amidst the maize, and formed an 
important part of the diet of the hacienda's livestock during the WrJ 
season, when pastures became very sparse. 
Once the land had been cleared of all its various products, the 
' 
maize stalks, or rastrojo, and the barley straw was left on the land and 
provided another source of fodder for the livestock; any manure thus 
deposited was seen as :a welcome means of replenishing the soil. This 
replenishment was als~ achieved by leaving the land fallow every 
alternate year, such that a plot was able to revive itself from the 
opening of one year U1rough to the March of the next, when the land was 
first worked on in preparation for sowing. It is also said that the 
soils of Queretaro were blessed by the replenishing naturz of the area's 
storms: -rain. falling :amidst the turbulence of thunder and lightni_ng 
was claimed to be rich -in nitrates and therefore especially good for 
the soil. 
.... ·----·-..................... l.. . ·- . 
'· 
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Of course, the other characteristic of the Queretaro rains was 
their unreliability, as has been pointed out. Over the years from 
1810 to.l843 only six were described as good, fifteen were reckoned 
8 to be average, and twelve were bad. In addition to the hazards of 
unreliable rainfall crops were also subject to damage from frosts and 
. ha.il-stoms. · 
Whether or not the rains, when they did come, were indeed 
replenishing lS unknown, but it is clear from the reports Of the period 
that the soils in the Queretaro area were prodigiously fertile. This 
was certainly the impression left by Humboldt's enthusiastic claims 
for the lands between Queretaro and San Juan del R1o, which he had 
singled out for particUlar praise. The prime case in his eUlogy was 
the ha.cienda of Buena Esperanza: there Humboldt claimed to have 
witnessed Yields of eight hundred to one, enough to fulfill dreams, 
· let alone hopes, and that average returns were of the order of between 
9 three and four hundred to one. In contemporary terms, this rate of 
return woUld mean a regUlar harvest of up to four tons a hectare, no 
meru1 feat by today's standards, let alone those of two hundred years ago. 
Jose Antonio del Rasa was more familiar with the area's soils and 
the climate's fluctuations. He commented directly upon the reports of 
Humboldt, and implied:that the top eight hundred to one yields of 
Esperanza were perhaps an exaggeration. He did nonetheless confirm 
that haciendas such as Esperanza were very fertile, .. and mentioned. 
' . 10 
others besides, such as Jofre, Juchitlancito, and Montenegro. Once 
he had done this, however, he went on to considerably modify.the 
impressions left by the Prussian visitor. 
Rase's calcUlations were based on an intimate knowledge of t.he 
area, of Juchitlancito in particular, as his family's property, and of 
other haciendas where he had had access to records of production: 
'· 
I-4)1 . 
thirty-three years' in Esperanza, twenty from Tequisqiapan, ten from 
Juchitlancito, and several more from haciendas around San Juan del 
R1o, Amealco, Cadereyta, and Jalpan. 
I 
We can therefore safely assume that his judgements are more 
reliable than Humboldt's: second-hand reports which he shows to have 
erred,significantly. ·He stressed.how production levels were determined 
b:y variations in climate and sqil q_uality, thereby producing considerable 
fluctuations both within the state and between different years. In ·. 
pressing home this point, Raso referred to the.year 1829 in Esperanza, 
a hacienda with some of the best soils in the country, when drought 
I 
reduced yields so catas·hophically that the hacienda managed to harvest 
a mere twelve hundred ;fanegas of maize from a sowing of one hundred and 
eighty, a ratio of less than seven to one. 
Other years swung in the opposite direction: 1802 yields in 
Juchitlancito were of the order of six hundred to one; 1804 in Jofre 
recorded some five hundred to one; and in 1830 Esperanza managed four 
11 
· hundred to one. Over the thirty-three years examined in Esperanza 
almost six hundred thousand fanegas of maize were produced, giving an 
annual average yield ratio of some eighty-two to one. Raso aligned 
·this information with .similar data from his other sources, an·d 
concluded that the area's soils could be relied upon to give average 
annual yields of eighty to one.12 
Information drawn from the records pf other haciendas in the area, 
such as San Juanico, Juriquilla, Calamanda, Chichimequillas, Carretas, 
and San Rafael, strongly suggests that such an average represents a 
----·------------ -----·- ---------- ------· . - . ---
realistic return from the best temporal lands in the area, but that 
returns from less well endowed soils would have been at least twenty-
!3 five per cent lower. : · The discrepancy here may well be due to the 
fact that Raso's sam~le incorporated only the better lands, since it 
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will be recalled that some nine thousand fanegas· of land were designated 
"middling ••••• suitable only for raising barley, beans and maguey". 14 
The chances are that as the century progressed and increased demand 
brought more land into cultivation, these inferior lands were also 
used to produce maize - the data ~rom San Juanico etc. referred to 
above probably reflected an assessment of their inferior performance. 
There are in any case indications that this extension was underway 
at the time of Rasa's wpiting, since there was an increase in the area 
under maize of some thirty-seven per cent from 1841 to 1844 in the 
districts of Queretaro,. San Juan del R1o, Cadereyta, and Jalpan; if 
this increase had been general across the state, it is clear that the 
lands designated by Rasa as temporal and suited to maize production, 
had already been taken!beyond the limit of what was available. 15 
QUERETARO IN THE 184os: COSTS AND PROFITS IN A NEW DAWN 
Such an intensification of activity was certainly possible, 
since the agrarian sector was in general working well below capacity. 
The year 1840 is a case in point. That year 8,996 fanegas of land 
were cultivated within. the hacienda sector; some one hundred and sixty 
of these were irrigated, and ·r ,811 were committed to maize production. 
Taking the round figure of nine thousand fanegas as the area cultivated, 
-and making no allowance for the fact that the various crops were 
produced at different·times of the year, it follows that such a level 
of activity would have required at least the same number-of yoked oxen 
and ploughs - one such team was reckoned sufficient for the preparation 
of one fanega of land 1n the Queretaro area, equivalent to 5~35 
hectares. 
Raso' s survey shovs hmf this requirement fell within the capacity 
of the local stocks of oxen and implements; since the number of th.~ 
former exceeded twenty-six thousand, and that ploughs were produced. 
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16 from hillside timbers at the rate of eight thousand a year. These 
latter were fitted with iron shares and steel coulters, and were then 
valued at twelve reals each. 17 
Maize was thus cultivated in the Queretaro area, and in 1840, 
with average yields at eighty to one, some 624,880 fanegas were 
harvested. Consumption of the grain in the state ran at some 87,148 
fanegas in the capital ~ity, and a further 368,852 in the districts, 
leaving a theoretical quarter or more of the 1840 crop as surplus, 
. . 18 
available for sale outside the state. 
Transport costs, however, made such an option uneconomic for the 
hacienda, and as a result, local maize during the Raso years was either 
consumed on the hacienda of origin, some sold, some given as rations, 
and some fed to stock, or, as in the case of much of the produce, was 
deposited in the city's alhondiga and sold according to the decision 
of the producer. 19 
Land use and marketing 
Here again there ·are some clues as to the structure and direction 
of the agrarian economy. In the first place, it is clear from Raso's 
analysis and descriptions that most· of the state's temporal sector ~ro.s 
leased out; even so, it is also clear that the hacienda controlled 
some of the maize supply, thus raising the question of. its source. 
The probability is that much of this supply came from the small-
producers' sector, either in the form of rent paid in kind, or as a 
purchase made by the hacienda from tenants unable to market their 
-----------produce--in-town; other amounts probably crone from the limited use of 
sharecropping, and from the tentative return into direct cultivation 
where conditions wer~ optimum. Yet, predictably, within the midst of 
all this, Raso's reference to the use of the alh6ndiga and the pra~tice 
'-
of selling only at the qehest of the owner, has all the hallmarks of 
the hacendado's time-worn dilemma of being caught between saturated 
demand and low profit-margins, such that his only profitable years were 
those of famine and inflation. 
The validity of th~se inferences is confirmed by Rasa's subsequent 
discussion of the problems of maize production and its high cost of 
labour. 
Production and labour costs 
Rasa's first comment is cautionary, and thus indicative of his 
meticulousness and probable accuracy. He averred that "the cost of 
cultivation is very variable; it is not the same in every case, either 
in terms of the land or in terms of the year. The quality of the soil, 
the amount or rainfall, and the degree of intelligence on the part of 
20 the labourer, all contribute to the final cost of production." 
He then goes on to report that local calculations put the cost of 
raising maize at seventy pesos per fanega of land. Rasa argues that 
such estimates were unreliable since they were based not on careful 
measurements of area cultivated, but rather on the volume of seed used. 
His objection is that such a method of costing cannot take account of 
the differential requirements of the various soil conditions: the more 
fertile soils will produce adequately with a low seed density, whereas 
I 
the poorer areas nee~ heavier sowings. Put in modern terms, this 
variation would have been of the order of between ni-ne kilos -per -
hectare for sowing the better soils, up to twelve kilos for the-
. f . 1. 21 1n er1or qua 1ty. 
It is clear that in Queretaro the traditional measurement of land, 
based on the area which could be sown with a given volume of seecJ., 
confusingly called a: fanega, amounted to over 5.35 hectares.. This 
I 
represented a heavy seed density of around twelve kilos per hectare. 
Lower density requirements probably evolved as the conditions of land 
and seed variety improved over the decades of clearance and seed selection. 
By the beginning of the nineteenth century there were parts of the 
I 
Queretaro area which did well with densities of only nine kilos to the 
hectares and this would. have meant that any entry of cultivation in terms 
of seed useds as was the conventions concealed the larger land-surface 
in production. In simple terms s whereas one fanega of seed had 
previously denoted the cultivation of around 5.35 hectaress it could 
now mean that the area 'had risen to 7.22 hectares. Translated into 
cos·ts per surface areas this meant that conventional castings in terms 
of seed sown in fact conceal~d a 25% reduction. In this way Raso 
revised the castings given by local hacendadoss and reduced them from 
the original 70 pesos per fanega of seed to a new format of 50 pesos 
per fanega of land area, . 5. 35 hectares. These 50 pesos were. then 
subdivided into the three component factors, each being attributed a 
value: thus rent and oxen cost 10 pesos eachs and labour with seed 
22 
·30 pesos. 
The way Raso shaped these contributions is importants since at the 
heart of his project is the question of why profits seemed to be so 
elusive: "it's incredible" he wrotes "that soils so fertile as our's, 
attracting as they do the surprise and admiration of all who visit the 
area, in fact yield such lmr profits". 23 
The new costing for labour, with wage rates running at 1.5 reals 
a day, represented an investment of some 156 man-days' ~ork to raise a 
maize crop from a fanega of land. This amounted to a 14% reduction on 
the estimates . made by Juan Cervantes a century before. I-t~ is possible 
that such a reduction was the result of improved technology, but it is 
more likely that it reflected the attempt on Rasa's part to exhort the 
hacendados in Queretaro to greater efficiency. 
'· 
The exhortation comes out in two ways. Firstly, when the new 
costs are given the guise of targets by Rasa's insertion that such rates 
24 
are presupposed by 11 expert management 11 • And then again when it 
becomes. clear that Rasa shares the conventional viewpoint on the 
subversively high costs.of Mexican labour. Here, however, his position 
is more sophisticated than the common lament on the laziness of the peon. 
His argument is drawn from a comparison of Mexican agriculture with 
that of England. According to this comparison, more than half of the 
' . . . . 
entire disposable value of Mexican agriculture was consumed by the· costs 
of production, over three times as much as occurred in England. This 
difference Rasa attributed to the use of machinery in England instead 
of labour, and he thus deduced that similar savings could be made in 
Mexico where the soils were so much better. Given these savings, Rasa 
predicted that profitability would rise by 35%, and that Mexico would 
then join the ranks of the great granaries of the world, like Egypt and 
Rome. To this end, he made a strong appeal to the government to take 
all measures necessary to facilitate the introduction of machinery, 
. 1 d. th f . t d t. . t. 25 l.nc u J.ng e use o prl.zes o encourage ames J.c J.nven J.on. 
Such a diagnosis may have given Rasa grounds for optimism, but 
the whole tenor of hi9 assessment, culminating on a note of exhortation, 
reveals the true nature of maize production at the time. Many 
hacendados were clearly despondent with the rates of return from direct 
cultivation. These were only decisively better than those from rents 
under conditions of famine and scarcity. With fresh memories of the 
Insurgency, and of the price inflation which lay behind it, hacendados 
naturally hesitated before the choice.of strategies which lay ahead of 
them. Neither option was proving to be wholly satisfactory, and thus 
it is no surprise to: find the hacendados'. representative, Jose Antonio 
del Rasa, pouring over statistics and comparisons in the search fo;-: 
55 
a solution to the problem. His depiction was thus o~ an economy at a 
cross-roads, and his prescription for progress entailed more e~~icient 
m~agement and a reduction o~ labour costs. We now need to exaMine 
the ~ate o~ such a prescription within the context o~ speci~ic 
·haciendas and o~.their operations in the years which ~allowed. 
MID-CENTURY IN SAN JUANICO: PROFITS IN A FAVOURED HACIENDA 
The case of the hacienda San Juanico provides us with the 
opportunity of assessing the development of maize production over the 
period 1858-65. These were times beset with severe problems of civil 
war and foreign invasion. Of all the areas of Mexico, Queretaro suffered 
the most from these disruptions,26 and not least affected was the 
hacienda of San Juanico. November 1859 found the administra:tor of the 
hacienda on the roof of the cowshed, observing the dawn manoeuvres of 
the competing armies of the Liberals under General Velez, and of the 
Conservatives commanded by the victorious Miram6n; by dusk he was 
picking his way through a battle-ground of dead and wounded, counting 
amongst them men from.his staff, and noting with disgust the corpse-
choked irrigation system. · Symbolic and symptomatic of this period 
for Queretaro was the final execution of the Hapsburg Emperor Maximilian 
and his Conservative generals Miram6n and Mej1a, on a hill outside the 
city in June 1867, the climax of various military encounters and a 
protracted siege and b.ombardment of the city itsel~. 27 
The hacienda of San Juanico has· ·a history a:s long as the city. of 
Queretaro.- It had formed a part of the property of the city's 
----- -- -~--original--cacique Hernando de --Tapia, and was then donated to· the convent 
of Santa Clara de Jesus by its founder, Hernando's son,-Diego, in 
honour of his daughter, one of its first novices. Despite its mvdest 
size, it became an important source of income for the Convent by '\:ay 
o:t:__p!'oducti_Q:t:t ___ 9f __ xnaize and wheat from the early seventeenth centur;,- on. 
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By the late 1840s it formed part of a cohesive unit of properties on 
the western edge of Queretaro, the others being the haciendas of 
Santa Maria Magdalena, Santa Marfa del Retablo, and El Cerrito, this 
last named after the concealed pyramid of the Tolteca civilization.28 
This group of haciendas was perfectly situated within the fertile 
basins to the west o'f Queretaro, thus enjoying the benefits of soils 
worthy of Humboldt's enthusiasm. They were also blessed with a very 
convenient location, with the casco of San J~anico b~ing pl~ced 
alongside the road leading from Queretaro to Celaya by way of the 
hacienda Obrajuelo, and a mere three kilometers from the city 
itself. A further asset was the fact that the river Queretaro ran 
from its source in Pinal de Zamorano, past the city on its northern 
side, and on. through the haciendas of San Juanico and Santa Maria 
· Magdalena be·fore emptying into the tributary of Lerma, the river 
Apaseo, just. over the border in neighbouring Guanajuato. The other. 
two haciendas in the. complex were similarly favoured, though in their 
case by the river Pueblito. This rose in the southern part of the 
·state, making its way north past Hul:milpan and Villa Corregidora 
before bordering on the haciendas Santa Maria del Retablo and El 
Cerrito on the way to the same tributary of Lerma in Guanajuato. 
As a result of this access to water, the haciendas of San Juanico. 
were able to produce' substantial harvests other than maize temporal. 
Even so, the majority of the land was specified as_ temporal,_ and in. 
notes made on the composition of the haciendas by their administrator 
in 1862, there are 196 fanegas of land designated for the p~oduction of 
this crop. At about this time there had been an initiative from the 
Ministry of Justice and Development (Justicia y Fomento) to rationalize 
and standardise the various Mexican measurements 'of area and volume. 
A fanega of sembradura of maize within this system became equivalent 
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to some 3.5662 hectares, or one twelfth of a caballer1a. It is clear 
from the notes of the haciendas' administrator that this system of 
equivalence had been adopted in San Juanico, and we can therefore be 
i 
sure that the area referred to above as temporal lands suited to maize 
production amounted to some seven hundred hectares. 
Demesne cultivation of maize temporal and political upheaval 
Not all of these lands were being directly cultivated by the 
hacienda in the late 1850s. We know from the haciendas' ledgers that 
rents were s-till beipg received for small plots, and the indications 
are that the area thus leased came to around 24 fanegas, each one 
- 29 
earning ten pesos for the year. 
This left the hacienda with around a hundred and seventy fanegas 
to cultivate directly. It is clear that most of this was cultivated 
in the years 1857, 1860, and 1861, assuming the haciendas followed 
the convention and },eft the land fallow during alternate years. 1858 
and 1859 were years of very reduced cultivation, with perhaps only a 
third of the land in use; why this happened in 1858 is a mystery, 
unless it can be attributed to the relatively good harvests of the 
previous year, but it is clear that the area was clirtailed in 1859 by 
the.delay and subsequent failure of the rains. 30 
Here, then, is a case of fairly extensive direct cultivation 
of maize temporal, providing us with a great opportunity of assessing 
the success of such ·a--system iii actual practice. Conditions for 
production were hardly ideal. Letters -.;-rritten from the hacienda 
--------------during-the--period are rife with complaints of the "incredible number 
- and frequency of hold-ups" with little attempt on the part of govern-
- -- 31 
ment to remedy the situation. The criss-crossing of competing _ 
an:ries was also a menace to production: at one moment in March of 
1859 we __ f'i:gd_th~ ___ administrator_ of the hacienda holding off demand~-
'· 
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from the liberal, Constitutionalist army in Queretaro for a 
contribution of three thousand pesos in cash and various numbers of . 
horses, cattle, and arms, whilst at the very same time the owner of 
the hacienda was being harrassed for similar items by the conservative 
government of Mir&~6n in Mexico City. The entire correspondence is 
.spiked· with references to collapse of business, the acute shortage 
of. ready money, and to the decline in· the numbers and quality of .. 
laboUrers, the resul~ of the fear struck in the heart of the population 
by the army campaignp for conscription. 
These manifold problems were then accentuated by the prolonged 
drought of 1859 and 1860, which reduced the maize plants to the 
"size of onions", caused the administrator to attempt a form of 
watering in the temporal sector, and provoked him to refer to the times 
as being as "bad as any in memory" and as "the work of the devil". 
Harvests were so badly hit that by September 1860 prices for maize 
had more than trebled their normal level and gave every appearance of 
continuing to rise, such that rioting became virtually inevitablE:! and 
d th t t . d t f t . 32 cause e governmen to s ep 1n an preven any ur her 1ncreases. 
Hardly an auspicious moment to make the transition into direct 
cultivation. 
In spite of these difficulties the five years' record of production 
is relatively successful. The average yield for the period came out 
at almost seventy-five to one, and as a result, a total of 10,650 
. 33 fanegas were produced. It is clear however that profit-margins 
were still tight, and that prices in the-market were sometimes too low 
to justify sale. The harvest of 1858 was a case in point: on San 
Juanico yields were.of the order of over a hundred and seventy to one, 
perhaps giving harvests of over a ton and a half per hectare. St·.ch 
bountiful returns clearly saturated the market, and in January 1859 
'· 
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all sales in the .hacienda were suspended "because the price is so low" •. 
The situation had not changed by the middle of May, with almost 
nothing being sold "since there is a lot on the market at ,seventy-five 
f 
I 
cents, at which we make nothing~'. 34 Piecemeal sales were being made 
on the hacienda, presumably to its resident peons, at the rate of one 
peso the· fanega, and then towards the middle of September, a letter 
noted that the drought was intensifying and that the river Pueblito 
had run dry. Another, a week later, reported that the maize harvest·· 
had been lost throughout the area between Queretaro and Celaya. By 
the middle of October letters referred to prices being on the move, 
signifying the end of the unusually plentiful supplies left over from 
the previous harvest. 
At this point prices were raised in San Juanico by some 25 per 
cent, and within three weeks the administrator had started to sell 
maize in much. larger quantities, despite reporting that reserves were 
running low. Rates of sales leapt up from a weekly level of around 
10 fanegas in September to a peak of over 170 in mid-November, a huge 
increase of 1,600% correlated with the doubling of prices which had 
occurred. It is worth noting here that the hacienda could have made 
more from this price· boom that it did, since prices in the hacienda 
were 25 cents lower than those prevailing in Queretaro, and 50 cents 
below the general rate in the Baj1o. We do not know if this was an 
. r 
instance of a commercial strategy tempered with a little mercy, or 
whether it reflected the hacienda's inability to shift the produce 
to the most inflated market. Famine conditions prevailed th!oughout 
the following year, and prices achieved by the hacienda rose to an 
. . 
average, exorbitant ;level of 3.95 pesos the·fanega: this success 
' 
suggests that the prior failure had more to do with opportunity than 
mercy. 35 
' --- -------------·-·· --r-·--·· -----· 
'. 
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Here, then, is a further instance of the way the hacienda 
benefitted from the cyclical failure. of the rains. Drought conditions 
continued through 1860 such that yields in San Juanico plummeted to 
a ratio of 26.52 to 1. And yet, thanks to the inflated price of 3.95 
pesos the fanega, the meagre harvest of that year, a mere 1,051 
fanegas, gave the hacienda its best profits of the period, with 
2,584.75 pesos, two-thirds of which being explicitly attributed to 
the artificial increase in price. 36 
A concealed trend: profits without famine 
It is possible, however, to make too much of this factor of 
famine-inflated prices and to overlook an important concealed trend of 
profits made in maize without such a dependence upon failed harvests. 
Thus a closer analysis of the figures for San Juanico over the years 
1857-61 shows that the drought of 1859-60 brought a year of total / 
deficit as well as one of splendid profit. 
TABLE 1: Maize Production in San Juanico~ 1857-61 
Year 
1857 
1858 
1859 
1860 
1861 
Totals: 
Sowing 
37.47 
12.36 
12.24 
39.30 
40.27 
143.20 
Harvest 
3,414 
2,205 
761 
1,051 
3,219 
10.650 
Cost· 
1457.78 
1019.45 
911.59 
1564.63 
2115.20 
7068.65 
Sales 
3424.30 
2951.80 
904.86 
4149.38 
3219.00 
Profit 
+1966.52 
+1932.34 
6.72 
+2584.75 
+1103.80 
.-t-7580.69 . 
Annual 
Averages: 28.30 2,130 1413.73 2989.87 +1510.14 
Sewings are given in fanegas and cuartillos. 
Harvests are given in fanegas. 
Costs, sales, and profits are given in pesos and centavos. 
Source: ASJ/D t861 
'. 
On average, the years affected by the drought worked' out less 
profitably for the hacienda than did those of more plentiful harvests: 
profits recorded for 1859-60 averaged out at 1289 pesos per year, 
I 
I 
thanks to the 3.95 p~sos price in 1860, whilst those for the other 
three years showed an average profit of over 1667 pesos, even though 
prices recorded for those years fell to an average of 1.09 pesos. 
Taking the five year period as a whole, annual profits emerged at 
1516 pesos on the basis of yields slightly lower than those specified 
as average by Raso, ~t around 75 to 1, and of average market prices of 
1.38 pesos the fanega • 
. Production c.osts 2 transport and profit margins 
Further analysis of San Juanico's records shows that the 
hacienda was assessing the costs of maize production in terms of only · 
seed and labour, without making any allowances for oxen or rent, let 
alone administration. On this limited basis the costs of producing 
one fanega of maize (approximately 65 kg. in weight) from the point 
of cultivation to shelling the grain ready for market came out at an 
. 37 
average of 66 cents. By this time San Juanico had dispensed with 
voluntary diezmo pa~ents, and so gross profit-margins were only 
subject to further deductions for transport and excise. 
Trade in Mexic9 had always been hamstrung by the problems of 
transport. The terrain was difficult, there was no navigable river 
system to compensate for this difficulty, and in addition to all this 
there were the hazards of banditry. Mexican liberals and free-
--·--- ____ i;;]."_adiJ:lg __ .f.()J."E:!_tgn _vi_s,it.ors wer,e of one voice on the prime necessity 
of resolving this problem, a unanimity which bestowed on the ra~lways 
the illusory aura o.f a panacea. 38 But in the meantime, the Mexi'!an 
hacendado had to struggle against the costs and hazards of mule 
transport, and att~mpted to adhere to the principle that all haciendas 
' + ·- - ----------------··--- --·---- ·-·-··---· 
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should possess their own mule-trains. The record of San Juanico in 
the 1860s demonstrates the wisdom of this axiom. 
We know from the letters written from the hacienda during these 
years that wheat was being transported to Mexico City on the backs of 
hired mules. As a result it is possible to calculate with a degree 
of certainty the cost of such a factor for a similarly bulky commodity 
like maize. Mules would carry up to 165 kilos weight over a distance. 
of some forty kilometers in a day. 39 The journey {rom Queretaro to 
Mexico City took some fiv~ days to complete, and transport for such a 
journey was eharged in the mid-l860s at a rate of 30 reals the carga 
40 
of wheat. ·In this way it is 'possible to calculate that a day's 
journey for two fanegas of maize, some 35 kilos lighter than the carga 
of wheat, would have· cost around six reals. This means that any 
hacienda within a day's journey of the urban market must have suffered 
a 38 cent reduction in the gross profit-margins on a fanega of maize, 
unless they had been able to supply their own transport. In other 
words, for maize to 'be profitable under such conditions, market prices 
would have had to exceed 1. 04 pesos, or nearer 1.10 once excise had 
been taken into account as well. The fact that San Juanico had been 
able to make good profits in 1858, 1860, and 1861, with an average 
price of 1.09 pesos the fanega merely serves to emphasise the hacienda's 
good fortune in being so close to the city's market. 
At the same time it should be noted that transport rates for the 
Leon area in the 1820s and 1830s were perhaps only half of these charges 
. l~l 
for Queretaro in the 1860s. In all probability rates had risen as 
a result of the civil war. Quite apart from the ·effect of the 
widespread requisitioning of livestock by both armies it is clear from 
the letters leaving San Juanico in this period that the scale of 
banditry in the area deterred many people from taking to the highw~y. 
It was only after on~ member of a local gang had been publicly 
hanged outside Celaya that trade began to pick up once again. 42 
Given these arguments, it would perhaps be prudent to reduce 
I 
the deductions for transport from 38 cents to around 20 per fanega 
of maize transported over 40 kilometers. This would then mean that 
under normal conditions maize became profitable for well-endowed 
haciendas like San Juanico once market values exceeded 90 cents. 
Such a conclusion is entirely consistent.with the.refusal to sell 
maize in San Juanico in 1859 when prices were at 75 cents the fanega, 
a level where the hacienda apparently "made nothing", and also with 
the earlier complaint from the similarly favoured hacienda Ixtla, 
that prices of 63 cents were insufficient to cover costs. 43 
All of this lends support to the view that by the mid-nineteenth 
century good soils, convenient locations and self-sufficiency in 
transport were able.to make acceptable profits from the demesne 
cultivation of maize temporal. 
The preferred option: demesne cultivation of maize 
It is also possible to dra\<r a second, connected conclusion on the 
question as to which strategy, rents or direct cultivation, emerged as 
the dominant trend during this transitionaJ. period. The figures for 
San Juanico demonstrate that optimum conditions made demesne 
cultivation preferable to leasing land for a money rent. The argument 
in its favour would have run as follows. 
The average area under direct cultivation in the years 1857-61 
_ .. ----·-- -·---~8Jile_t() ___ s;t~gh.tly _l~s.s_ t}1an s;ixty fanegas. Even with rents running 
at the maximum rate of 12 pesos the fanega, the income from such a 
strategy would only have been 720 pesos, less than half that of :naize. 
The hacienda's internal consumption of maize, in the form of rations, 
I 
a saving of the pr~cious supply of ready cash, and of fodder for 
I" I. 
liLt 
livestock, made the logic for this choice even more persuasive: with 
price fluctuations still the order of the day, it was an imprudent 
administration that allowed the hacienda to fall prey to vagaries of 
the open market. With heavY requisitions of maize compounding the 
low harvest of 1860, San Juanico suffered a similar fate, and was 
found purchasing 240 fanegas of grain from the hacienda Bravo in April 
1861 at the stiff price.of 3.38 the fanega. 44 
Not only was demesne cultivation a preferable option to leasing·· 
temporal lands, but it was also justifiable in terms of the return it 
gave on invested capital. The land in San Juanico was valued in 1869 
at 1,500 pesos the fanega (3.5662 hectares). 45 Strictly speaking, 
the annual returns from maize cultivation should be measured against 
double the area actually in production, since successful cultivation 
relied upon a fallow period of one year during which time the land 
yielded nothing but rough fodder for the hacienda's livestock. Profits 
from the average area of 60 fanegas are therefore set against the 
value of 120 fanegas, or 15,000. pesos. The area in question would have 
required some 40 yoke 
production these were 
of oxen equipped with ploughs: at the time of 
46 
valued at some 48 pesos each. These valuations 
mean that the invested capital involved in such demesne cultivation 
can be considered to amount to some 16,920 pesos. Average profits of 
1,516 pesos from this activity can then be expressed as a percentage 
return on this investment of almost nine per cent, a very acceptable 
rate when general interest rates were around five per cent. To some 
extent, of course, this is an artificial reckoning since other aspects 
of investment, such as the hacienda buildings, should be included in 
the calculations. But against this it should be remembered that the 
oxen involved in maize cultivation were also shared by other 
activities in thehacienda at different seasons, such as the production 
'· 
of wheat. Even if the value of the entire casco, hotise, barns, office 
and so on, is distributed as an addition to the value of each fanega 
of land, thus bringing the investment involved in demesne maize to 
. I 
almost 21,000 pesos, the return on this activity still looks very 
healthy at over 7%. 
All of this goes _to show that no matter how adverse the political· 
circumstances in the area, the transition from piecemeal rents to 
demesne cultivation of maize was indeed underway by the 1850s and 
fully vindicated by the profits earned. Does this signify that the 
Raso prescriptions for prosperity had been adopted on the hacienda? 
To answer this question, we now need to turn to an analysis of the 
pattern of production which prevailed on San Juanico, and of its costs. 
Productivity ahd labour costs in maize production 
It will be remembered that Raso attempted to reformulate the 
production ·costs for maize, such that rates were reduced from 70 pesos 
per fanega of seed sown, to 50 pesos per fanega of land under cultivation. 
Of this latter 50 pesos, only 30 were to be committed to seed and labour. 
These last two factors are the only ones which appear in the San 
Juanico books beneath the heading of maize temporal, since the conven-
tions of book-keeping for the time disregarded rents, and entered 
livestock and administ~ative costs separately. 
What emerges from an analysis of the records for 1858-61 in 
San Juanico is that costs of labour and seed averaged out at the rate 
of 49.44 pesos per fanega of seed sown. These were excellent soils, 
-------~----and--so we---can--safely assume that the area cultivated per f~~ga of 
- seed ( 65 kg) was around 7. 22 hectares. Making an ·allowance of 14 cents 
for the cost of seed in;volved in the cultivation of one hectare from 
land preparation throu~ to shelling cobs in the granary came· to 
_ _6 ._70 pes()_~-· ____ Rtth ___ wage-rates running at one and a half reals or· $0. 1875 
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for a 12-hour day, this figure signifies an investment of 35.75 
man-days' labour per hectare of maize production, compared with estimates 
of 41.5 man-days submitted by Cervantes 120 years before. This 
apparent improvement in labour productivity, of some 14%; may well 
represent the margin of error involved in such estimates and comparisons, 
but it is also possible that it had something to do with the widespread 
use in Queretaro of steel coulters to cut into the soil and of iron 
· ploughshares to turn it over, a practice which could hardly hav~ been 
employed in early seventeenth century Pu.ebla. 
' . 
What is more pertinent to the discussion here, however, is that 
the San Juanico labour investments of 35.75 man-days per hectare work 
out at ,a cost per fanega of land (5.35 hectares) of 35~88 pesos, only 
some 6.36 pesos above the target levels prescribed by Raso fifteen 
·years earlier, once we have accounted for the cost of seed.· Nmv, 
whilst there can be no denying that this achievement still fell some 
way short of the target, it is also safe to assume that such reduced 
costs were crucial to San Juanico's healthy record in maize production 
over the period. It should also be noted as an aside that these 
figures may well have represented a lower rate of labour productivity 
than was reckoned possible by the hacienda's administrator, since it 
should be remembered that his letters featured complaints in 1859 and 
1860 of the problems o'f army conscription, and of labour desertion 
born of panic, such that, in the disparaging words of one letter of 
March 1859, he was reduced to working the hacienda with "indios de 
Santa. Rosa y Pueblito". 47 With the resumption of more stable 
circumstances, production costs may well have taken on a more favourable -· -· ---· 
appearance, even closer to those prescribed by-Raso. 
This, however, is very far from the total picture. San Juanico 
can only be taken as ~epresentative of those haciendas with level 
'· 
land of good quality and convenient locations to counter the otherwise 
crippling costs of transport. Whilst there were a good number of such 
properties in the Queretaro area, and in the Baj1o at large, there 
I 
I 
were a greater number of less well-endowed haciendas, less favourablY 
placed, and with stoney soils and uneven ground. The transition to 
demesne cultivation of maize may well have been underway in the 1850s 
and 1860s where the optimum conditions prevailed, but elsewhere 
inferior haciendas were still impaled on the horns of the time-worn 
dilemma of temporal lands, where neither rents nor direct cultivation· 
could provide the owner with a compelling solution - as the following 
case of Juriquilla will amply testify. · 
JURIQUILLA 1858-65: A CASE OF AN UNRESOLVED DIL:Bl>fMA 
Juriquilla and its subsidiary properties La Solru1a and San Isidro 
were situated in the hilly country to the north of Queretaro, adjacent 
to the road connecting the city to the small pueblo of Santa Rosa• 
In the 1850s :i:ts majo~ asset was an abundance of water, stored behind 
the dam Dolores, which had been built across the torrent of Santa 
Catarina. 
Much had been made of this single asset in an attempt to sell the 
hacienda in 1859 to the owner of the neighbouring property, Jlirica. 
The attempt had failed, leaving the potential purchaser Eulogio LOpez 
de Ecala unimpressed by the depiction of Juriquilla as a thriving arable 
-enterprise .with annual ~aize c~9ps of 3,000 fanegas. By an ironic 
twist of fate, the hacienda was to fall into the hands of the author of 
this account, then the administrator, some ten years later •.. In 
contrast to the eulogy of his earlier depiction, Juriquilla was then 
disparaged as having 'malas tierras', and within a couple of yeat"s of 
it falling into his lap, the new owner was complaining that losses on 
. 48 
the hacienda were forcing him to think of abandoning it altogether. 
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In short, Juriquilla provides us with an alternative case to San 
Juanico, where in place of fertile plains we come across stoney slopes. 
Small wonder then that the pattern of exploitation during these 
years approximated to the traditional model of livestock and leasing. 
Proceeds from fat-stock sales were claimed to be of the order of 
~,000 pesos a year, although the best year on record only yielded 
2,000. The leasing of land was a more reliable source of income for 
the hacienda, with average revenues reaching almost 1,500 pesos a year. 
This was hardly the case for maize temporal: over the six years on record 
orily the boom harvests of 1858 worked out well for the hacienda; no 
crop was attempted in the drought of 1860, and in the poor years of 
1862 and 1863 net deficits were recorded. Even if we disregard the 
suspension of activity in 1860, which should strictly speaking be 
taken into account, the average annual income for maize temporal did 
not reach 275 pesos, a figure often exceeded, sometimes doubled, by 
the leasing out of marginal assets on the hacienda such as the collection 
of firewood and the gathering of wild cactus fruit. 49 So unimpressive 
was the.record of this line of production that the hacienda began to 
run it down, reducing the area under direct cultivation by at least 
half over the period. 
But more important for our case here is the evidence of the 
relatively high labour costs involved in the production, presumably 
due to the more demanding nature of the soils and surfaces. As 
recorded in the correspondence of the time, these were poor lands, a 
fact reflected by their valuation at less than half that of $an 
Juanico's, and we can safely assume that seed densities used were in 
the region of 12 kg. per hectare. ·WQrking on this assumption, the 
total costs for seed and labour recorded in the hacienda's books can 
be reduced to a per hectare cost of 10.13 pesos - or, in other wor·ls, 
'· 
over $24 above the target levels submitted by Raso. Once an allowance 
has been made for seed this figure can be translated into a figure 
for the number of man-days needed to raise a maize crop. At 53 man-
i 
days per hectare direct cultivation in Juriquilla appears to be very 
labour intensive in comparison with San Juanico. The difference in 
labour requirements represents an almost 50% reduction in labour 
productivity, a disadvantage in Juriquilla which would have been. 
further compounded by ;t-ower yields- although here it .should be said· 
that the land's inferior fertility was compensated for by heavier seed 
densities. 
THE DILEMMA RESOLVED: .SHARECROPPING AND PROFITS FROM THE TEMPORAL 
Haciendas like Juriquilla must have been in the forefront of 
Rasa's mind. Here were properties which possessed temporal lands 
perhaps inferior to the rich loams of San Juanico and the like, but 
which were nonetheless capable of producing an acceptable crop. Their 
... :Problem was the amount of labour required to raise such a crop. If 
the lanus were to become decisively profitable, these costs had to be 
substantially reduced, as Raso perceived. However, the recommendation 
of saving labour through mechanization, as suggested by Raso in general, 
could not really apply to the production of maize. Three~quarters of 
the production costs there were incurred in the early stages of field 
cultivation, and in this area the technology remained largely unchanged, 
and continued to require high ·levels of labour intensity where land 
conditions were difficult. 
--------·--·----The-significance of this situation was not -lost on a later 
commentator on the hacienda economy, J.B. de Santisteban. 50 If labour 
costs are prohibitive and cannot be significantly reduced by 
improvements in technology or supervision, then an alternative method 
... must _be found __ where .the .factor_ of labour is unremunerated. The so~_ution 
'· 
·to 
to this puzzle was found in the practice of sharecropping, a universal 
strategy where the land is provided by one party and the labour by 
another, with the produce of this alliance being divided according to 
some prearranged agreement. J.B. de Santisteban was the author of a 
popular guide to hacienda management, Indicador·Particular del 
Administrador de Hacienda: Breve Manual, within which he submitted a 
clear case for the use -of sharecropping in the production of maize 
temporal. His argument was straightforward. Successful maize 
cultivation first·needed·high·inputs of heavy labour in preparing and 
ploughing the land; th~reafter the milpas required regular care, and 
benefitted from round-~he-clock vigilance. He argued that such 
intensive labour commitments rendered the crop unsuitable for the 
hacienda: either it be.came too expensive to be economical, or the 
short-cutting procedures introduced to save on labour costs seriously 
affected the size of the harvest. On the other hand, however, such 
crop determinants made maize ideal for the system of sharecropping, 
·since the seasonal patterns of work provided the scope and incentives 
to involve a wide range of family labour. The initial heavy tasks of 
preparing the land and then ploughing it with a yoke of oxen fell to 
the male adult; later'tasks of weeding, vigilance, and harvesting 
could be accomplished by women and adolescents. In this way, without 
being explicit, de Santisteban incorporated within his discussion two 
of the most important rationales for sharecropping, the reduction of 
costs by way of unremunerated labour, and the improved levels of 
productivity achieve~ through the incentives of the share system and 
the involvement of a wide range of family labour. 51 
Santisteban might well have also mentioned the additional 
advantage of risk reduction. Sharecropping eliminated most of the 
expenditure previously committed on faith, since it was very hard to 
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withhold field labour until the crucial factor of the weather had 
shown its hand: in 1859~ for example, San _Juanico had invested over 
six hundred man-days between the. beginning of March imd the beginning 
I 
of April, 113.73 pesos, before the land could be ready for sm·ring 
after the rains had started. In the event, the rains were delayed, 
sowing and weeding occurred throughout late June and early July, with 
costs of 225.81 pesos in wages, and in the last analysis the res.ultant 
.low yields of some 60 to 1 failed to justify earlycosts, with the · 
year registering a net ·deficit on seed arid labour alone of 6.72 pesos. 52. 
This kind of eventuality was eliminated for the hacienda which 
introduced the system of sharecropping, since initial inputs on its 
behalf were limited to a plot of land, usually in the region of 5-6 
hectare~, a yoke of oxen equipped to plough, and the· seed required to 
raise a crop from such an area. Habilitaciones, or maize rations, were 
.also advanced to the sharecropper at this early stage, so that he and 
his family were able to survive the lean period running up to harvest 
time in December; these allocations were then reimbursed from the· share 
of the crop assigned to the sharecropper. The operation of the· 
harvest was supervised and financed by the hacienda, predominantly a 
means whereby the hacienda could be sure that the entire crop was 
disposed to the systemof sharing and that pilfering prior to this 
division· was eliminated. The costs of harvesting were then b.orne by 
the sharecropper in proportion to the percentage share of the crop that 
was his prearranged due. 
Two variations of this system were practised around Queretaro 
.. ·-- - . 53 
and in the Baj1o in general. 'A medias' involved sharecroppers, or 
medieros, who possessed their own oxen: the hacienda provided the land 
and the appropriate seed, and was entitled to half the harvest, a.s well 
as a reimbursement of half of all the costs involved in the vigila~ce, 
'· 
harvesting and cleaning of the crop. The other variation was known as 
'al quinto', and this drew into the system sharecroppers who could not 
provide their own animals and equipment. This arrangement proceeded in 
the same way as the other, although in this case the sharecropper was 
obliged to make good any losses of oxen or implement incurred during 
production, except in cases of"genuine misfortune". The division of 
the crop and of the expenses entailed was, however, modified to take 
account of the larger investments made by the hacienda: under the 
'a.l quinto' arrangement; the hacienda took sixty per cent of the crop 
and bore sixty per cent of the costs, whilst the 'quintero's' share 
was only forty per cent of the produce and the costs. 
It is clear from other sources on the area that the system of 
sharecropping was no stranger to the hacienda. There is evidence of 
its widespread usage in Puruandico in the 1760s, and it is also clear 
that at least one hacendado in the Leon area of the same period was 
aware of its virtue of turning deficits from maize temporal into 
f •t 54 pro 1 s. In the 1790s it was being employed to colonise new lands 
in the Dolores hacienda Charco de Araujo and to make the most of its 
. a· .1 55 me 1ocre so1 s. Then again it was to be found in use around 
Queretaro and Leon in the 1820s and·l840s as a partial answer to the 
post-Insurgency problems of cash shortages and collapsed demand, perhaps 
56 
also of disrupted labour-supply. 
All of these cases show the sporadic emergence of the practice of 
sharecropping from the end of the Colony on. But the picture overall 
is unclear. We know from other sources that the practice virtually 
dominated the temporal sector by the times of the Porfiriato, even if 
this fact had been conveniently overlooked by Andres Molina Enr!quez.57 
The question of when and why this proliferation occurred remains an 
open question. The drift of what has been discussed in the preceding 
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pages, together with the following data on sharecropped maize 
production in Juriquilla, San_ Jose el Alto, and Ague. Azul in the. late 
nineteenth century should go some way towards answering it. 
Temporal triumphant: sharecroppers and profit, Juriquilla 1850-1910 
Bernabe Loyola may have originally doubted the possibilities of 
making a good living out of the 'malas tierras' of Juriquilla, but 
had he anticipated the scale of the contribution available in the 
system of sharecropping he would not have continued. to worry, at least 
about the profitability of the then-bankrupt temporal sector. 
We have seen how maize in Juriquilla in the late 1850s and early 
1860s barely justified the effort of production, with average annual 
revenues of less than 275 pesos. Within thirty-five years the dire 
condition of this line had been transformed beyond recognition, largely· 
on account of the introduction of sharecropping. Output from the 
temporal iands over this period ·had leapt up by some six hundred per· 
cent, whilst profits had increased even more dramatically by 1100%, 
registering a.verage gross revenues of well over 3, 000 pesos. 58 
It is impossible to tell exactly when this introduction and 
proliferation occurred. It is clear, however, that the practice was 
already in use before the end of the 1850s, if only on a limited scale. 
We know that there were ten sharecroppers working lands on Juriquille. 
in 1857, and further.evidence suggests that the system was extended as 
a result of the poor showing in demesne maize over the difficult years 
from 1859 to 1862. 59 It will be recalled that droughts were so severe 
_______ during these _ _yeru:s _tP,at _no m~ize was cultivated at all in Juriquilla 
in 1860.. With further deficits of over 150 pesos for the activity 
in 1862, it looks as: though the administration decided on a tactical 
withdrawal from dire.ct cultivation, and to increase instead the number 
of sharecroppers on the hacienda: the area under cultivation fell to 
'(4 
the smallest on record, less than 20 hectares, whilst the number of 
sharecroppers increased to 16, working perhaps as m~ as 100 hectares. 
The move was immediately vindicated: in 1863. the hacienda suffered 
another terrible drought and the demesne crop was written off with a 
70 peso deficit. The sharecroppers, on the other hand, succeeded in 
making at least a small harvest, and with market values soaring, the 
. hacienda was able to register profits on its share of the crop of almost 
.4 6o 2 0 pesos •.. Similar arrangements and outcomes followed for the years 
1864 and 1865, with the hacienda's crop recording an overall deficit 
of almost 40 pesos for the two years, whilstthe sharecropped sector 
. 61 
yielded profits of over 200 and 430 p~sos. 
The picture is now a great deal clearer. As revealed in the 
eariler discussion, direct cultivation of temporal lands was hamstrung 
by highproduction costs; by the mid-l860s it.looks as though this 
interest in Juriquilla had dwindled to an insignificant level, and 
had been replaced by an expanding sharecropped sector with growing 
significance both 1n terms of providing the hacienda with its internal 
requirements of maize, and of leaving a surplus for profitable sales. 
Even so, the size of the transfers made to the hacienda, apparently 
never more than 250 fanegas, suggests that the system was still in its 
infancy. 
Clues as to when sharecropping became fully-fledged are hard to 
come by. All that can be gleaned from the documents available is 
that maize production was already considerably increased by the end 
of the 1870s, and that by the beginning of the 1880s.both were working 
in Juriquilla, ('medieros' and 1quirtteros'). 62 It has been argued 
that the latter system was only introduced during the Porfiriato, 
, "when real wages paid to hacienda labourers fell sharply", thereb;;r 
presenting the hacendado with a dilemma: "If sharecropping wao to 
7C:: 
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remain as profitable as direct use of hacienda land, the hacendados 
had to find a means to reduce the real income of the sharecroppers 
as much as tha.t of the agricultural workers". 63 The drift continues 
• I 
with the proposition that the reduction in real ~ncome was effected 
by the strategy of barring the medieros' beasts from the hacienda 
pastures, thereby forcing them to convert to the quintero variation. 
The detail of this assertion cannot concern us here, but it is worth 
mentioning that the notion of a tension developing between potentially 
higher profits from direct cultivation on the one hand, and those 
accruing from the sharecropped sector on the other, seems somewhat 
misplaced, at least in the circumstances of the medium-quality 
temporal lands. It seems unlikely that a relative decline in labour 
costs would have been sufficient to persuade the hacendado to reverse 
a policy which had been so dramatically successful in resolving the 
major dilemma of the hacienda economy, both in terms of making profits 
and of reducing risks in the use of the temporal lands. 
An alternative view of the reasons as to why the quintero 
variation crone to dominate the sharecropped sector is that such an 
arrangement was deemed yet more profitable for the hacienda than that 
of the medieros, or even, more s:l.mply, that the increase in the area 
under cultivation eventually entailed the introduction of men who 
did not own their own beasts or ploughs - the mnnbers of peons who 
were ·so equipped could hardly have been all that high. Whatever the 
reasons behind this variation, it is probably fair to see their 
coexistence in Juriquilla from the 1880s as an indication that the 
---- -·----sysfem :w·a.s· bythat time ·already well-established, having developed 
during the late 1860s and the 1870s~ According to the evidence of 
maize production in the !lacienda for the years 1888-95, the system 
of quinteros had superceded that of the medieros, but not to the 
point o~ excluding the latter. Table 2 berow shows that some two and 
a quarter times as much maize was transferred from quinteros as from 
medieros. This suggests that there may well have been three times 
as many quinteros working in Juriquilla as medieros~ 
~ABLE 2: SharecropEed Maize Production 
in Juriquilla, 1888-95 
Quinteros 
Year Maize Beans 'Costs Sales Profits 
Harvested 
1888 2,128.00 223.26 313.05 2,351.54 2,038.49 
1889 1,321.24 186.01 701.03 1,748.80 1,047.77 
1890 3,464.00 308.02 551.51 4,380.65 3,151.14 
189J. 1,196.00 196.00 312.81 3,434.37 3,121.56 
1892 1,051.00 129.00 488.96 1,332.88 843.92 
1893 2,359.24 491.00 529.96 3,219.09 2,761.13 
1894 740.00 364.00 251.32 1,811.54 1,560.22 
1895 577.00 120.12 208.74 1,521.68 1,312.94 
Totals 12,843 .2017.31 3363.38 19,872.55 16,509.17 
Annual 
Averages: 1,605.18 252.90 420.42 2,484. o·r 2,063.65 
Medieros 
1888 919.24 110.01 188.02 1,029.52 841.50 
1889 402.24 58.13 337.67 549.22 • 211.50 
1890 1,302.00 138.00 347.92 1,697.74 1,349.82 
1891 542.00 89.32 131.77 1,566.36 1,434.59 
1892 702.00 85.35 199.h0 88o.66 681.26 
1893 . 1,482.00 324.00 330.77. 2,107.08 . 1,776.31 
1894 288.00 282.29 208.63 1,083.98 875.35 
1895 108.00 80.10 180.26 584.19 403.93 
Totals 5 '71~6 1168.21~ 1924.44 9,498.75 7 ,574.·31 
·Annual 
Averages: 718.12 146.03 240.56 1,187.35 946.79 
Maize and Beans harvested are given in fane gas and cuartillos; 
Costs, sa.J:es, and profitg are given in pesos and centavos. 
Source:.AJ/CC,.July 11, 1896. 
. . 
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In any event, the system of sharecropping provided the hacienda 
with regular and substantial amounts of maize and beans. Vlhat is 
truly remarkable is that in not one case over a cycle of eight years 
I 
did the system fail to yield a profit for the hacienda, even during 
the catastrophic seasons of 1892-3. In dramatic contrast, the 
demesne crop failed three years out of six between 1888 and 1893, 
with only 1890 emerging with any real credit - and even here the 
extent of the failure is concealed by the better performance of 
irrigated maize. 
/ 
TABLE 3: Direct Cultivation of Maize in Juriquilla, 1888-93 
Year Maize Costs Sales Profit 
Harvested 
1888 789.00 560.62 852.50 + 291.88 
1889 487.24 1092.51 595.50 - 497 .01_ 
1890.- 1322.00. 497.09 1723.50 +1226.41 
1891 131.00 322.88 262.00 60.88 
1892 924.00 861.75 924.00 + 62.25 
1893 36q.oo 489.75 360.00 - 129.75 
Totals 4013.24 3824.60 4717.50 + 874.90 
Annual 
Averages: 668.1~4 637.43 786.25 + 148.82 
Maize harvest is given in fanegas and cuartillos. 
Costs, sales and profits are given in pesos and cent~yos. 
Source: AJ/CC, July 11, 1896. 
This is important evidence that sharecropping improved the levels of 
---- -----·-l?rodu·ctivity·in maize production. The incentives involved in the -
-share system gave workers an interest in the quantity of the.harvest, 
and they therefore invested higher levels of care and attention in 
their work. This was enough to make the difference between a crop 
being written .. off __ and something being salvaged. It also ~ppe~rs tc. 
have raised productivity rmder optimum conditions, since Raso records 
that one of the extraordinarily high yielding years in Esperanza, that 
of 1830 with yield ratios of 400 to 1, was produced by sharecroppe~~. 64 
The triumphant rationale for sharecropping is clearer than ever 
when the results areexamined alongside the production costs 
involved. These had worked out for the earlier period at 74 cents 
per fanega of grain produced. According to the figures for demesne 
production in 1888-93. these costs. had inc~eased to 81 ~e:rits, .. probably 
reflecting a small rise in wage rates. This amount is considerably 
higher than the costs incurred in the sharecropped sector: here 
a fanega of maize from the medieros in Juriquilla cost only 34 cents, 
whilst that from the quinteros proved even cheaper at 26 cents, a 
mere third of the costs incurred in direct cultivation. 
Raso had argued that the hacienda needed to reduce its labour 
costs, and implied that this should be done by_way of raising 
productivity. The evidence on sharecropping in Juriquilla shows how 
···dramatic savings were made for the hacienda, since it was only 
involved in providing workers for its portion of the harvest. The· 
rest of the labour was provided by the sharecropper and his family. 
This system meant that the hacienda received a crop with very low 
production costs, but it did not entail any real changes in labour 
productivity. 
POPULATION, PRICES, AND PROFITABILITY 
~he preceding discussion has served to demonstrate the way in 
which sharecropping came to solve the dilemma of .the temporal lands 
by radically reducing the hacienda's labour costs of maize production. 
Profit-margins_thus created totally vindicated the·ente:r.prise. 
·In addition to this breakthrough there were other developments 
under way which also, improved the prospects of the maize sector. 
'(<) 
General population growth in the area, the rise of urban employment, 
and finally the spread of the railways, all contributed to an 
increase in the level of demand for maize. Price rises followed in 
I 
· their wake. (See Table 4. ) 
·The arri.v8.1 of such favourable conditions stimulated the extension 
of lands cultivated for maize. Over the years from 1840 to the 1880s. 
maize output rose from 624,880 fanegas in Queretaro to over a million, 
an increase· of some 62%. 65 .· By this time and thro~gh the 1890s ~ 
. . . 
government reports were full of wistful nostalgia for those lost 
decades when maize was "fabulously cheap" and could have been bought. 
. 66 for a peso th~ fanega. Prices of at least twice that were now: the· 
norm, and with the arrival of the railways in Queretaro in February 
1882, new-found access to other markets increased the pressure on 
local stocks of grain and hence its price. Rates of transport by raJl 
may not have been dramatically lower than those of the mule-trains 
they replaced, but there were clear advantages to having easier access 
to more lucrative markets. Thus by 1884 we find the maize produced 
by· sharecroppers in Juriquilla folloving the tracks north to the 
booming markets in Coahuila and Durango. 67 Prices in the north tended 
to be consiste~tly higher than in the_Baj1o, and with Coahuila and 
Durango offering 
last half of the 
an average value of 3.14 pesos per fanega over the 
188 68 f. t . . . J . .11 . . Os, gross pro J. -margJ.ns J.n ur1qu1. a ma1.ze rose 
to 2.88 pesos per fanega of grain produced, more than amply covering 
the rail costs incurred by the journey. 
Such a favourable combination of market opportunities and reduced 
unit-costs gave Juriquilla every reason to increase its production of 
maize. ·Average annual output from the sharecropped sector in 1388-95 
came out as a total product of 4166.5 fanegas, an increase on tPe 
earlier period of some six hundred per cent. Assuming average yi~lds 
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in Juriquilla to be around 720 kg the hectare, these ~igures give the 
strong impression that the entire area o~temporal in the hacienda, 
some 693 hectares, was in production during alternate years. 
i 
Production costs in the sector were covered by the sale of a mere 
300 fanegas, leaving a surplus of more than two thousand, plus ~our 
hundred ~anegas of beans. Small wonder then that Juriquilla' s 
erstwhile plainti~f ended his days the rich and contented owner of 
a thriving hacienda. 
SAN JOSE EL ALTO: TURNING THE POOREST TEMPORAL TO PROFIT 
Compared to Bernabe Loyola, Roman Veraza really did have cause 
· ~or complaint. Raised in the relatively wet and fertile lands of 
Ordeffa in the northern Spanish province of Vizcaya, don Roman had 
presumably come to Mexico to seek his fortune. Close to the end of 
his life he became the owner of San Jose el Alto in Queretaro. 
Confronted by the hacienda's 1418 hectares of rough and rocky lands, 
don Roman may well have rued the day he left the green coasts of 
northern Spain. The scale o~ his investment of around 6000 pesos 
would hardly have been a consolation to him, since many.people probably 
reckoned that .it was a risky venture. The lands' single asset was 
their proximity to the city; otherwise, there were only some 555.5 
hectares. of shallow temporal soils,. assessed as clearly inferior to 
those of Juriquilla with a value of less than 9 pesos each. ·such a 
valuation signified the'most inauspicious of prospects: comparable 
lands in Ap~seo el Alto with the same price were described.· as 
. " . bl f b . k d" 69 ~---,--------mountaJ.nous--but -capa e o .. e~ng wor e • 
The records left behind, however, suggest a different story and 
imply that don Roman's e~forts were well rewarded. 70 The key to his 
success lay in the use of sharecroppers in the temporal sector. 
_Although_ ~}1-~_S, ___ p:;-_~c_:t_;i(!e is _Ilot_~ctually mentioned in the accounts, it 
Q,.., 
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is clear that sharecroppers were responsible for the cultivation of 
maize, beans and barley. All the clues point to this conclusion. 
The hacienda maintained a herd of some 70 draught oxen, sufficient 
to cultivate perhaps 175 hectares of San Jose's inhospitable terrain, 
and yet the wage prpfiles show no sudden increase for the intense 
activity of ploughing and sowing in late March, or May-June. The only 
recorded costs against these crops are entries for the excise duty 
charged in the event of a ·Sale. Conclusive proof of the sharecroppi.ng 
system is finally found in the tell-tale introduction of a wage bill. 
during harvest. time, and in the subsequent reimbursement of a 
proportion of these immediately after, as required by the conventions 
of sharecropping agreements. 
Levels of production from this arrangement are harder to gauge, 
but there are firm indications that the annual share of maize accruing 
to the hacienda was·in the region of 750 fanegas. As suggested 
earlier, the hacendados' dependence on famine-inflated prices was by 
now a thing of the past. Market values had risen sufficiently to 
open up the possibility of 'futures' contracts in grain, where 
· agreements were reached between producer and corn-merchant on the 
basis of green maize, and advance payments were made on the promise 
of a specif'ic delivery. By the early years of the Porfiriato these 
contracts were relatively commonplace. The introduction of sharecropping 
into maize must have played an important part in this development: 
with costs of prod1~ction dramatically reduced hacendados could afford 
the option of taking their arable produce to market on a regular 
annual basis during the summer months following the harvest. It should 
be said, however, that whilst this practice of' selling 'green' Lta.y 
have reflected a degree of latitude not previously enjoyed by the 
hacendado, it was at the same time an option only adopted by the. most 
83 
vulnerable of production units, or by producers with severe problems 
of cash or credit shortage. Just such a set of problems confronted 
the tenant of Barrancas, Jose Mercado: his contract to sell 2000. 
i 
i 
fanegas of maize to the dealers Antonio Orozco y Guerrero was designed 
to raise money needed to "promote the business of his rural properties",. 
but the price he paid was to agree a sale specifically valued at 
"1 peso the carga less than the market price in the_following Ma.y."7l 
Fairly. regular attempts by Jose Mercado. to sell 'green' in.this way 
suggests that such an option was dangerously vulnerable to permanent 
endebtedness. 
Roman Veraza was similarly placed, beset by problems of owning 
a property hardly attractive to financiers and with no other ready 
source of credit. The extent to which he survived, and even thrived, 
can be attributed to the very reduced scale of his enterprise: Jose-
Mercado was running a. far larger operation, including a substantial 
sector of wheat where cash requirements were inelastic, but don Roman's 
··needs were minimal thanks to his adoption of sharecropping. Hence, in 
the summer of 1879 we find him selling maize at 1 peso the fanega, 
a price which previously might have deterred a sale, but here San Jose's 
sharecroppers have allowed don Roman to stay in production with very 
little cash in circulation and to then reap the rewards of almost 
680 pesos profit from a crop of only 760 fanegas. 72 
With the more favourable market conditions which prevailed in 
the follmving year, don Roman was able to accumulate still further, 
again thanks to the agency of sharecropping. The higher pri~es for 
maize, beans and barley provided the hacienda with very healthy 
returns of up to 2000 pesos, subject only to some 100 pesos deduction 
for excise. With equipped oxen representing 1377.25 pesos of 
invested capital and the entire area of temporal generously reckonr:d 
~- ----- ·- . - - -··:·---·------------,------------------ -
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to be worth a further 5000. pesos, the gross profits of 1900 pesos 
made from this sector in 1880 represents an almost 30%. return on 
capital, an astounding performance for such an unpromising operation. 73 
Clearly no sol~ tary swallow makes a summer, and we ·must be wary 
of drawing general conclusions from a single case. And yet the 
efforts of don Roman in San Jose el Alto indicate that by the early 
Porfiriato even the most meagre temporal lands were capable.of yielding 
a: profit fr0m cultivation, thanks to the agency of sharecropping. 
An additional feature of the system, also an advantage to the 
hacendado or ranchero, was that it helped to overcome the common 
problems of cash supply, since the vast amount of the work involved was 
achieved without any financial transactions. And finally, notwithstanding· 
the hazards of 'futures' contracts in green corn, sharecropping in 
the temporal lands gave hacendados and rancheros the chance of raising 
money in advance on the strength of their cultivation, and freed them . 
from an over-dependence on the market windfalls of famine conditions -
windfalls •rhich were costly in terms of storage and interim maintenance. 
AGUA AZUL 1885-89: THE EXTENSION OF SHARECROPPING AND THE INCREASE OF 
PROFITS 
The same tactical move away from the costlier demesne production 
can be observed in. the hacienda of Agua Azul. This was a property 
similar to Juriquilla, but situated in the state of Guanajuato near 
the tmm of Apaseo el Alto. Details of maize produ,c::_tionfor_ the . 
quinquennial 1885-89 still exist, and these show hm-r the hacendado 
reduced the size of the demesne interest after 1885 and exp~ded the 
sharecropped sector instead. This decision may well have been 
initially prompted by the shortage of equipped oxen. on the estate, 
since there were oniy 25 experienced beasts and 44 novices available 
to cope with all the various arable activities, but once the 
Or. 
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emphasis had been changed it is clear that the dec~sion took on a 
separate justification in terms of reduced costs and higher profits.74 
In any event th~ area under direct cultivation fell by some 40%, 
I 
and as a result, overall costs in the temporal maize sector declined 
by 45%. Disposable produce however, was bolstered by transfers from 
the sharecropped sector and rose by around 50%. In terms of the 
costs charged to the hacienda, this change of strategy meant that 
·each fanega of maize available for sale had incurred costs of around 
30 ·cents, instead of the 74 cents ·charged ori the demesne production 
of 1885. Profits followed suit, increasing on average by 125% on the 
1885 level from less than 3000 pesos to more than 6600. And once again 
there are indications that such a change in strategy produced an 
improvement in the level of productivity and resilience in the· face ~ 
of the Baj1o climate: in each of the five years 1885-89 on record the· 
hacienda of Agua Azul was able to register ample gross·revenues from 
its temporal lands. 75 
THE HACIENDA TRIUMPHANT IN THE TEMPORAL LANDS: CONCLUSION 
Earlier on we saw how the hacendado had been plague~ by the 
dilemma of what to do w~th the hacienda's temporal lands in order. to 
secure an acceptable return on the capital thus invested. Now we 
have witnessed the way in which success in this sector was achieved. 
The quality haciendas 
In the first place there were the quality haciendas like San 
Juanico. Favoured by fertile soils and close proximity to urban 
cultivation by the middle of the century. Fragmentary evidence for 
San Juanico during the Porfiriato suggests thatthe pattern or· 
production develo~ed in the 1850s remained largely unchanged until 
86 
after the Revolution. Just as before, thetemporal lands were 
dominated by direct cultivation: 459 man-days were invested in the· 
sowing stage of 10-15 July 1892, and the figures for.the.preparation 
of the land in March were much the same in 1896 (254 man-days per 
week) as in 1859 (running from 206 to 287). 76 Output was largely 
unchanged as well: in 1912 some 2500 fanegas were reckoned to be an 
average harvest for the temporal lands in San Juanico, comparedto 
the average annual output for 1857-61 of 2130 fanegas.77 
The essence of success in haciendas like San Juanico had iain in 
the tilting of the balance between production costs and market-demand 
in favour of the producer. In the 1850s this tilted balance had 
secured gro8s profits of over 1500. pesos a year; by the end of the· 
century the balance had tilted still further in favour of the hacienda. 
Increases in market.:..demand had meant higher prices,- but in the 
meantime wages had risen by as little as 6.6% in San Juanico, w:l.th 
daily rates for field workers moving from around 18 3/4 cents to 20 •. 
The effects of this. improved balance can be_appreciated.by looking 
again at the averages· reported in 1912: with prices reaching 3.63 
pesos the faneea, San Juanico was able to enjoy gross p~ofit margins 
· of 2.93 pesos on each fanega of grain produced, yielding gross 
revenues of' over 7000 pesos for the· year. Whilst it is true that 
these prices were linusually high, there had in any case been an 
overall rise in maize prices which made levels below 2 pesos the· 
··-- ·- -~- ·-
,. 
fanega fairly unusual. Under these conditions an anticipated gross 
profit from San Juanico's temporal maize of more than 3000 pesos was 
by no means unrealistic. 
87 
Mechanization and savings in labour costs 
Here it should be stressed that most of these gains were due to 
the more favourable market conditions. There may have been certain 
! 
advances in the technology of production, but in general the· cultivation 
of maize had remained beyond the reach of Raso~s reco.mmendation to 
mechanize.· By the early years of the twentieth century there were 
imported seed-drills available, called the 'Nueva Adelphi~, which were 
. . . • . 8 
reputed to be able to-sow-6 hectares in a day,7 but it is·clear 
from the 1909 invent9ry of San Juanico that there at least this task 
w.a.s still done by hand - 12 ' sembradorci tas para maiz , de mana~ were 
recorded, each worth on~y a peso. 79 The ploughs stocked, however, 
were probably an improvement on those of.earlier decades, with various 
imported products featured in 
Bradley, Stock, and Oliver of 
the inventory, including 'Matador~, 
80 South Bend, Indiana, some of which 
were capable of turning a furrow twelve inches deep. Texts for- the·. 
modernizing agriculturist were full of the advisability and means of 
reducing labour costs, but in terms of the·field tasks. there. was 
little in the way of labour-saving devi.ces: the discussion of traction 
tended to focus on the respective merits of oxen, horsesand mules,81 
and it is clear that the power born of steam was never satisfactorily 
adapted to the task of drawing field implements: the experience 
suffered by the hacienda Hueyapan in Hidalgo with steam-pow.eredploughs 
more than vindicated San Juanico's decision to limit such new. 
82 technology to the barn. Some small advantage was gained, however, 
in the task of shelling the maize cobs after the harvest, al~hough 
this had always been a somewhat marginal item in terms of production 
costs. Nonetheless,·with the ma.xl.m that 'time was money' ringing 
in their ears, many hacendados had been prepared to try and reduc~ 
labour at this stage of production by introducing some form of 
00 Vv 
mechanization.. We know from the letters of Jose Loyola that there 
were two machines. operating in Juriquilla in 1882,.apparentl:y- new: 
.and performing well, with300 fariegas of grain shelled daily. 83 
Of course, such an introduction in Juriquilla bore the hall mark of 
consummate rationality, since. the regime of sharecropping employed 
there meant that production cos.ts.for the hacienda.had been reduced 
to the tasks of harves.ting and shelling only, a,nd here was a means 
ot; making savings in the.latter. 
Later on these machines were presumably refined and adapted to 
the availability of steam· power •.. Such a purchase was made in Hueyapan 
in '1904, and it is clear from the inventory of San Juanico in 1909 
that similar investments had been made there: one item, presumably 
imported, 'the Cleveland 5B', was in poor repair and yet still valued 
at 150 pesos, the other El Triunfo was worth 176 pesos. 84 
Sharecropping:.the perfect adaptation 
So much, then, for the success achieved in the temporal by_ 
direct cultivation, impressive perhaps, but nonetheless limited to 
the quality haciendas. Elsewhere, in haciendas with poorer soils and 
less well placed f9r the market, the solution to the problem of the 
hazardous temporal lands was slower in com1ng. But when it was 
finally accomplished, the breakthrough for the landowner was to have 
the_appearance of perfection. 
Sharecropping must have been perceived as a heaven-sent-answer· 
to so many of the hacienda's problems, such that it is worth emphasising 
the system's features. The age-old risks of investing labour in a 
crop so vulnerable to the whims of the Baj1o weather were now squarely 
on the shoulders of the mediero; even in the case of the quintero 
the measure of risk on the part of the hacendado was limited to the 
allocation of beasts and ploughs, and in any case, this risk was 
89 
mitigated by the promise of an increased share of the·~~oduct Ln the 
event of a successful harvest.· In addition, the s:ystem:reduced 
production costs by more than half, and by way of the· incentives· 
I 
involved for the sharecropper, productivity was signi.ficantl:y 
. 85 . J.ncreased. Given the combination of these features, sharecrop:~,n.ng 
offered the hacienda every chance of extending production into lands 
which had previously been regarded as marginal, of increasing both 
the rate and the quantity of profit, and of reducing the pressUr-e oii 
the"B.lready stretched ·cash supply. 
A last question remains unanswered. We have seen how the practice 
had first appeared in the last decades of the Colonial period; 
sporadic appearances have also been noted for the years of depression 
following the Insurgency, and again in the 1850s. 86 It is clear from 
Bazant's work for San Luis Potos1 that there were sharecroppers on the 
.haciendas during this decade, but that the major proliferation of the 
system was delayed until the 1870s. 87 Other sources suggest an even 
. 88 later emergence. · The question then is why such a perfect solution 
to the problems of temporal land remained in the wings for so long. 
There are probably three main reasons for this delay. 
The first is that the system could not operate successfully for 
the hacienda unless it fell within the overall supervision of the 
demesne interests. 89 A minimum of control was essential to the 
successful transfer of the hacienda's share, which is ~my the 
.administration took responsibility for the actual harvesting of. the 
crop and for the previous stationing of regular vigilantes whilst the 
maize was ripening. Bazant has shown how damaging the anarchic 
proliferation of tenancies could be to the hacienda, and how there 
was considerable resistance to the conversion of·parcel tenants to 
. 90 
sharecroppers. . This was such a thorny problem that Bazant even 
90 
Bocas was to break the autonomy of the tenants and to subordinate 
. . . . . t" 91 them to the· author~ty of the adm~n~stra wn. Although he· argues 
that the· economic climate of the time,·. with rising prices and a 
decline in real wages, gave sharecroppers the edge over waged labour, 
it is also clear that the same conditions gave tenants everr reason 
to resist demotion to the status of sharecropper. In any case calcula-
. tions suggest that the average sharecropper. could hardly expect to . 
b.e left with a. substantial surplus once deductions had· been made for 
the hacienda's share and for his family's subsistence.92 
All the indiactions are then that the option was riot an attractive 
one for labour, least of all for tenants. Close control of the system 
was therefore essential. The probability is that such a regime fitted 
best with a reduced scale of enterprise where the owner took a close 
interest in the running of the hacienda, and even better, where the 
economy of the unit was sufficiently diversified to generate a demand 
for labour in lines other than maize. In this way the ethos of 
production did not deteriorate into an impersonal regime of subordination, 
and at the same time there was scope for sharecroppers to work as 
waged labourers during the months outside the seasons of.maize sowing 
and harvesting. 93 Such models of more deveioped production had been 
envisaged by Raso in the 1840s, but their emergence was clearly 
contingent upon the long-awaited economic revival: given the slow 
recovery and the subsequent further disruptions of the civil war, 
it is hardly surprising that the full-blown development of sharecropping 
·only occurred in the second half of the nineteenth century. 
Where haciendas were unable to offer labour the combined 
attractions of fairly regular employment with access to a shar~cropped 
parcel there were problems of a sufficient supply of takers. The 
proceeds from a sharecropped plot cannot have been a sufficiently 
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compelliRg incentive where there were choices open.to labour. It is 
likely therefore that the widest proliferation of the. practice 
awaited conditions of a labour surplus, conditions which ~gain we onl¥ 
I 
find for the second half of the century. Queretaro~ s economi.cally 
active population increased by.some 86% over the fifty years from 
1845 to 1895, and although emplo;yment in the rural sector more than 
trebled from around 21,000 to over 63,000, the registered number of 
people without work leapt dramatically from less than a thousan'd to 
more than 29,000. 94 Clearly the second half of the century wi tness.ed 
a growing problem of underemployment, a development noted by the·u.s. 
consul in the area as early as themiddle 1880s. 95 This surplus 
labour must have provided conditions conducive to a more or less 
unlimited application of the sharecropping solution. 
A final piece needs to be fitted into this pattern. We have 
seen how the system required close supervision, and how under optimum 
conditions, this was facilitated by a diversified economy and the 
overlap of sharecropping with waged employment. As the system became 
more widespread with the growing surplus of labour, so too must have 
the problems of supervision. A basic prerequisite would.have been 
a subdued work-force. Such complete subordination was only fully 
accomplished with the arrival of the Porfiriato's Rurales. In Raso 1 s 
day Queretaro's public security was maintained by a mere one hundred 
gendarmes, a quarter of whom were taken up by the needs of the city 
itself. The Porfiriato's Rurales increased in the late 1870s, and 
many recruits came from the rising unemployment around Queretaro, with 
-···-·-----the.Ba~H:o-in -general .supplying more than half their number.96 By 
1886 Queretaro was the· headquarters for the· 5th Corps , and in la.ter 
years took on detachments from five other Corps. 97 Their band was 
regularl:y- on display'in the main plaza of Queretaro, and one detachment 
of men; recently-re-issued with· two hundred new Mausers fresh from 
'· 
the German agent Henry Huber, had little trouble evicting inva.dip~ 
peons from haCienda lands outside the jmeblo Colon during the early 
days of the Revolution. 98 All of this gives one the firii). iJI1p:t:"ession 
that the strong state of Porfirio D1az was well in evidence in 
Queretaro, both 1n terms of the· Rurales and a further. thousand-
strong garrison of regUlar army troops,99 such that it would have 
taken a suicidal sharecropper to raise a voice or an a.rJll in protest~ 
Their fate had indeed been sealed, and with it:w:as secured the.haciendas1 
final success on the temporal.lands of Queretaro and of theBaj"l_a 
beyond. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE'ALTERNATIVE ROUTE: INVESTMENT AND IRRIGATED.WHEAT 
How the hacendado overcame the dilemma of the temporal lands is 
now clear - most i~portantly there had been no need to make any change 
or improvement in the actual techniques of production. But we have 
also seen how this resolution was in many cases delayed until well 
into the nineteenth century. Other well-endowed haciendas, like 
San Juanico, had been able to achieve this breakthrough earlier on.· 
This same type of prQperty had also been better placed to overcome.the 
problems of profitability by an alternative course. This strategy has · 
already been referred to; .successful production depended upon access to 
.a lucrative market- the growth of an Hispanic population in Mexico was 
generating a significant demand for non-indigenous produce reminiscent 
of the home-land, like wheat and chick-peas. Urban growth also 
created a demand for traditional Mexican. crops like chile and sweet-
potato. The Hispanic crops required different know-how from the 
traditional American crops of maize and beans, and different technology; 
but, more importantly, all of them needed irrigation. The hacendado 
strategy thus looked perfect in its simplicity: with a virtual monopoly 
over capital and water sources, it would be comparatively easy to 
dominate the production of these crops, and thus to secure substantial 
returns in what would be a relatively undersupplied market-place. 
IRRIGATION AND DI~RSIFICATION ON THE MESA CENTRAL 1750-1840 
Of course the apparent beauty of this solution had not.been lost 
on the hacendados during the century of greatest pressure, the eighteenth. 
To break out of the dead-lock of low prices and small-producers' 
competition· in maize production, many colonial haciendas b,egan to turn 
to the irrigated cr.ops. Mid-way through the century we find the m<.:.destly-
99 
sized Cuitzeo de los Naranjos in Guanajuato investin~ c:onsidera,ble SUillS 
in order to cultivate some 85 hectares of irrigated w:he~t:~ further. to the 
north, near Leon, the owners of the hacienda Jalpa were busy trans-
/ 
forming the countryside with four large dams and artificial lakesi and 
later in 1790 to the west of Queretaro towards Irapuato a dam was built 
by the Marques de Rayas at an estimated cost of 20,000. pesos. The: 
primary purpose of.these considerable investments was to reap the 
rewards Of the wheat market, although there vere other instances Of· 
chile, saffron, and sweet potato being produced in the Bajfo during the· 
last of the Colonial.years. 1 
Much the same developments had occurred in Queretaro - this much 
we know from Rasa's careful survey of the state's irrigation facilities. 
There were in the 1840s around 7000 hectares of irrigable lands, over 
80 per cent of which were to be found in some 32 of the state's 95 
haciendas, all located in the southern districts of Queretaro and 
San Juan del R1o - districts which covered a mere third of the entire 
·. st~te area. All 36 of the wells were also located in this same part, as 
were three-quarters-of the bordos and all but four of the· dams. 2 
Rasa put the value of these constructions at a minini~ of 700,000 
pesos, representing over 9 per cent of the total value of rural property 
and productive artifacts. 3 The detail of many of these works is· 
impressive, and serves to demonstrate the seriousness with which many 
hacendados had taken up the option of diversified production. The dam 
· of Santa Catarina in Montenegro fed water to two irrigation ducts which 
measured over 33,500 metres in length - a notable memorial to Francisco 
de Velasco, a man who had also been nominated for noble title by the 
ayuntamiento of Queretaro in l804. 4 Further to the south, on the other 
side of the capital, we come across.the hacienda Lodecasas: there the 
Spaniard Feliciano'Pando ~ad invested considerable sums by sinking a 
• ---·······-------- __ __! __________ --.------ • 
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bore-hole into a hillside, there to ta~ the subterranean stre~ of 
Hufmilpan, and to water four bordos on the hacienda. 5 
These are but two examples of the various -ways which. had been 
developed in Queretaro to trap, store, and channel water, all designed 
to provide the hacienda with the capacity to diversify. Up to the time 
of Rasa's survey the investment had been considerable but its effects 
were still limited: when he analysed the value_of art average year~s 
production, in 1840,.he found that almost half was produced.on the. temporal· 
lands in maize, beans and barley. These accounts excluded livestock 
products: of the rest, 10%. came from rents, 8 1/2% from such marginal 
resources as charcoal and maguey, and 5 1/2% was raised from fruit and 
vegetables. Without including this last item, irrigated ~reduce in the 
main but hardly field crops, roughly a quarter of the-total value was 
accounted for by chick-peas, sweet potato, some few peanuts, chile, but 
. . 6 
most 1mportantly, .wheat. 
WHEAT ON THE HACIENDA: PRODUCTION AND FERTILITY 
Wheat had come to Mexico with the Conquest. It was a crop which 
could cope with the altitude of the mesa central, but it produced iess 
grain per unit of land than the indigenous maize, and it did greater 
damage to the top-soil through its shallower root structure. 7 It was 
also less easy to cultivate: maize had been cultivated from time 
immemorial by.hand, but wheat required the plough and this meant draught-
. f 8 pmver and access1bly lat areas. 
Against these disadvantages, however, wheat had a different growing 
season to maize, and therefore did not conflict at least in·terms of 
cultivation with already-established iabour patterns. Maize was 
essentially a summer crop, sown in May and ripe by November. Wheat was 
sown in winter, October-November, germinated within tendays, flowered 
at the beginning of April, and matured ready for harvest in May-.:[une. 
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With some careful synchro~ization the two crops could be raised' on 
the hacienda as complements of one another. 
From a European perspective Mexican wheat also had the advantage 1 . 
i 
of appearing to be prodigiously high-yielding. This is what had 
excited Hlimboldt when he visited the Bajfo and Puebla during the l&st 
years of the Colony. . Many of the wheat fields had impressed. him deeply, 
though none more than those of the plain lands betvreen Queretaro and 
Leon. .He came away from the visit with the firm impression that yields 
ran on average between 35 and 40 to 1, and in some places even 50. and 
6o.to 1~ Back in Europe such high figures unsettled his confidence, 
but he was then further reassured by the Bishop-elect of Michoacan, · 
Manuel· A bad y Queipo. 
Wheat production in Europe at the time 
It should be remembered that these comments WeJ:"e made befa:r'e the· : 
dawn of the new agriculture in Europe. Except.in themost·untypical of 
cases, yields of arable crops in Humboldt 1 s Europe were ha.rdly. better· 
than those of medieyal production. 9 Dramatic improvements h~d.to ~w~it 
the introduction of the Norfolk rotations in place of.. the" tw:o-:-year cycle 
of production and fallow ... When Arthur Ymmg. toured what w:as. to become 
the vanguard of the agricultural revolution, the east and midlands of 
England, in the early 1770s, he found that yields were.nev~r higher 
than 12 to 1. 
-rn many areas of the Continent such lmv yields as these ,.,ere to 
10 
remain the rule until well into the Nineteenth century. ·Records 
·----·------gathered-in-England by Cropper Benson and Joseph Sandars reveal that 
sharp increases· only occurred after the widespread introduction of 
Norfolk rotations, and that these then worked out at about 1500.kg the 
hectare over the years 1815-40.11 Higher yields were produced in 
these a:r:~~~--1--~~~_!_"__i~ _ _:the centur-y _but only at the cost of an intens~.fied 
'· 
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regime of manuring, both with oilcake~enriched cattle dung and even 
P . 12 eruv1an guano. But these were exceptional: even in other progressive 
areas like the.Klundert of the Netherlands yields were of the order ot 
1500.kg thehectare in the middle of the nineteenth century}3 
Elsewhere, even with the time-honoured practice of heaVY manuri.ng, 
yields in Europe remained disastrously low. 
All of this provides us with a context for the comments made by 
Humboldt and Raso. • Cultivation of the rich valley bottoms had been 
beyond the New World's coa, leaving them to the arrival of the European· 
plough - the reserves then awaiting them must have been considerable. 
Variations in the quality of this soil around Queretaro were evened out 
by way of varying the density of sowing: rich soils were sown with as 
little as 15 kg the hectare, whilst the less prolific received 40 kg 
or more. In this way an average crop of around 1500 kg per hectare 
became. the norm- or so Raso and Humboldt would have us believe. 
Even if these estimates were a little exaggerated, the point remains 
that Mexican yields were as good as the very best in Europe, and that, 
more importantly, these yields were accomplished with relatively little 
trouble. The poor quality of European soils was such that heaVY 
manuring was essential - well into the nineteenth century the holding 
of stock was seen as a way of providing manure for the land. The Norfolk 
rotations may have been progressive, but such intensive methods also 
increased the high demands for manuring and fertilization. 14 Thus, 
whilst the most progressive farmers in England were nurturing their soils 
with every care and attention, the· Queretaro hacendado was appare.ntly 
able to scatter the seed, perhaps manure a little, irrigate a couple of 
times, and then reap.the rewards, and that year after year. Small 
wonder Humboldt was breathless with awe and .carried tales of a Ne'1 World 
cornucopia back to Europe. 
'· 
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WHEAT ON THE HACIENDA: PANACEA OR PROBLEMATIC 1770-1845 
What evidence is there that the hacendado was able to·turn these 
rich resources to his advantage? We do know that on the w~ste~n edge I . 
of the Baj1o, in Guadalajara, markets for wheat were beginning to 
stir with promise .before the end of Colonial. years. . Demand for w:heat 
flour in the city had increased seven to eight:...fold during the la!;;t six 
decades, and wheat had become '!the most dynamic component" of the 
. . . 15 
hacienda economy. Such a situation is revealed.in the accounts.of 
the hacienda Toluquilla for 1796-97, a well-endowed property situated 
convenientiy near Guadalajara in the direction of Lake Chapala. The 
records show. that on this hacienda wheat.had become. the single most 
important source of -revenue, accounting for 35% of total income. 
Toluquilla's profits 'also.worked out at the above~average level of a 
7 per cent return on capital- a figure which may have. been eyen higher 
since the year in question included expenses on tools, equipment, and 
· materials, of . an order. almost equivalent to the more. regular allocations 
. 16 
made for labour.. In any event, a return of 7 per cent would have been 
some 2 per centhigher than the average anticipated, and this must be 
attributed to the hacienda's wheat sector.17 
We get a slightiy different picture, however, from the case of the 
hacienda San Bartolome near Indaparapeo for the years 1775-78. This 
was a very considerable property, cultivating up to 3000 hectares of 
wheat, although of lower yields than some, and Morin has reckoned it 
to have been "one of the best haciendas" with gross annual incomes of 
. 18 
around 25,000 pesos. But according to Morin's calculations of the 
permanent work-force, annual labour costs may well have reached 17,000. 
pesos, even without accounting for the seasonal costs of hiring workers 
for the peak periods of sowing and harvesting. Further. to th:ls, 3an 
Bartolome was not conveniently placed like Toluquilla, and it needed to 
104 
transport the bulk of its wheat all the way to Mexico City, some 200 
k .l a· 19 1 ometres 1stance. 
The problem of transport 
Here was the snag. in the hacendados' scheme- the age-old Mexican 
bugbear of bad roads and high transport costs. Irrigated crops were 
not free from this problem; indeed, some of the more perishable products 
were particularly vulnerable. 
Humboldt's enthusiasm for the .. Baj :lo soils had .in the same way been 
somewhat countered by his despondency over the troubles of transport. 
He implied that prices in the hacienda were low, and that transport costs 
meant that these had more than doubled by the time the produce had 
reached the main markets in Mexico City. So critical were these 
problems that he reckoned that, once they were resolved, Mexican wheat 
would be found in the European grain markets of Bordeaux, Bremen, and 
Hamburg. 
This assessment was to find many an echo during the first years of 
Independence. At this time many European observers visited Mexico, free-
traders eager to plumb the potential of a.country so recently liberated 
from the constraints of Spanish mercantilism. They were of one voice 
on the untapped treasures of Mexican agriculture, but equally despondent 
over the actual state of affairs they encountered. Apparently optimum 
conditions for production were being hamstrung by transport problems. 
As a result, far .from finding markets in Europe, Me:J(ican wheat coUld 
barely command the domestic market. With the advantage of water-borne 
traffic down the Mississippi and across the Gulf, produce from the 
prairies of the United States could more than compete with Mexican 
wheat in the Veracruz markets, and this even after the former had been 
.subjected to an exacting tariff. 
lG) 
Small wonder then that Fanny Calderon de la Barca should come 
across a hacendado in the 1840s complaining that wheat production on 
his irrigated hacienda was rendered uneconomic by the transport charges 
I 
involved in marketing it in Mexico City, some 200 kilometres away. 
The wind had seemed to have set fair for the hacienda, but the passage 
still looked disturbingly unsettled. 
Prices for grain and refined flour 
The wheat markets may have been more secure for the hacienda thari 
had been the maize market, but it is clear that it was not without its 
problems. Provincial supply more or less met· the provincial demand, .and 
prices in Mexico City had to compensate for high freight charges. Wheat, 
too, wa.s apparently susceptible to seasonal fluctuations, such that 
Eric Van Young refers to them as "characteristically volatile" - as with 
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maize, wheat profits were contingent upon the time of sale. The 
secular trend in nial.ze prices' over the last decades cif the Colony had, 
however, been sharper than the case for wheat. According to the evidence 
provided by Humboldt, Van Young, and Morin it looks as though wheat 
prices fluctuated around a mean of 5 pesos the carga in ~he Baj1o 
. h"l t h" 10 t 12 . M . C~t 22 provJ.nces, w J. s reac J.ng . o pesos J.n exJ.co J. y. These prices 
were certainly better than those generally prevailing for maize, but 
against this there were considerations of higher production costs and 
heavy capital outlay - rents from irrigable lands were four times 
higher than those charged on the best of the temporal. 
The impression given by all this is that wheat did indeed provide 
.. __ the_ hacienda _JI:i th_ profi t_able _prospects, but that it was by rio means a 
. panacea. Profits were only forthcoming under certain circumstances, and 
there are indicatic;ms that a good portiop. of its potential lay ir1 the 
processing, distribution, and bread-baking. The tendency for the.best 
wheat haciendas to have their own mills, and the subsequent prolif~ration 
'· 
of these mills in the Baj1o and Guadalajara area, suggests that 
hacendados were under some pressure to move beyond the simple stage of 
production. 23 An analysis of the process of milling and its products 
. explains why hacendados were dra•m to this further investment. 
According to Morin, the costs of having wheat ground into flour 
24 
came to some 3 reals the carga. With the going rate for flour more 
or less double that for the unrefined product the incentives must have . 
been compelli~g. 25 There was of course some degree of waste involved in 
. . . 
the process and this should be accounted for. We know that mills of 
the period had the capacity to grind between 8 and 22 cargas of wheat a 
26 day. By the end of the nineteenth century such rates had been 
increased by the.improved technology of power, by which time processing 
entailed a waste factor of some 15-20% of the starting wieght in rejects 
and bran. 27 There is no reason to suppose that the earlier reduced 
scale of milling was any more wasteful, but assuming a slightly inferior 
performance, it is possible to infer that in the first decades of the 
century l 1/4 cargas of wheat grain produced l carga of flour. Using 
Morin's data on milling charges and prices for wheat and flour in 1799,28 
the above inferences suggest that 38 cents' outlay· on milling converted 
.. 
a carga of wheat worth 3.75 pesos 1nto three-quarters of a carga of flour, 
worth 5.16 pesos. This means that processing wheat into flour had the 
effect of increasing the net value of the grain by one peso per carga, 
or 20 per cent. In circumstances of relatively tight profit margins 
such a healthy increase must have looked attractive to the hacendado. 
MACHINES AND LABOUR IN NINETEENTH CENTURY WHEAT PRODUCTION . ~-
Thus far we have followed how hacendados invested money in raising 
the hacienda's productive capacity through the development of irrigation. 
It then seems that the combined problems of local supply exceeding demand 
and high transport costs undermined the potential of this strategy. To 
107 
resolve this dilemma efforts were made to increase the profit margins 
on the crop by moving into milling, but this was limited to the biggest 
producers and was regarded as only a partial remedy. Finally, a 
I 
prominent consideration was that wheat production involved higher labour 
inputs than maize, and as a result, the widespread complaints of the 
high costs of this factor applied.equally to this new venture. By the 
1840s Raso's diagnosis of the situation was that poor returns were due 
to disproportionately high iabour costs, and that improv~nie.rits could 
only come with mechanization. 29 
Much has been made of the backwardness of the Mexican hacienda and 
the way in which it was slow to take up advanced technology. Morin has 
even suggested tl1at eighteenth century increases in,production were 
entirely due to the. further toil and sweat of the supervised peon. 30 
Harsh conditions and dreadful exploitation were of course the lot of the 
Mexican peon, just as . else\vhere in the eighteenth and nineteenth century 
countryside. This much we can take for granted,· but what is of far 
greater importance is the degree to which landowners' strategies maximized 
th ff t f h . . l . t t . d d f . 1 t . 31 e e· ec o t 1s exp 01 a 1on,.an mae way or progress1ve accumu a 1on. 
This had been the essence of the strategy to sharecrop maize in the 
temporal sector, as we saw in the previous part of this work; "it is now 
time to examine the conditions and options facing the hacendado in the 
wheat sector. This must be preceded by a survey of the general 
relationships between labour and machinery in the cultivation and 
production of this crop. 
____________ La"Qour GOsts and mechanization in Europe and the USA 
The last years of the Colony and the first years of Independence 
in Mexico were times of great technical invention and applicatiou in 
Europe. Such strides forward also coincided with unprecedented high 
prices for agricult~ral produce, and a general shortage of labour, the 
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result of the Napoleonic wars. Everything in England had been ripe 
for a move into mechanization: the new machines promised to compensate 
for the loss of labour and to provide for the increased production 
demanded by the market. 
Progressive methods thus took off in those areas where these kinds 
of conditions prevailed, as in England and the prairie lands of the USA. 33 
Conditions elsewhere were not conducive to such changes: labour was 
cheap and abundant in the serf and slave dominated regions of Russia 
and the Deep South in the USA, and in other parts of Europe the pattern · 
of undercapitalized small-holdings and tenancies retarded the spread of 
mechanization until well into the nineteenth century. 34 
The point here is that the theoretical capacity to mechanize 
always precedes the actual development and application of such capacity: 
farmers only begin to take an active interest when· the factors of labour 
and capital give them an incentive to do s6. Even in the vanguard of 
new agricultural methods, the east of England, tools used at the end of 
the eighteenth century were more or less the same ·as those used by 
previous generations. Shrewd observers of that period such as the 
country parson James Woodforde and the agriculturaiist William Marshall 
bear witness to the continued use of the sickle, not even the scythe, 
in the wheat harvests of Norfolk during thel770s.and 1780s. 35 
Exact records such as those left by Woodforde and Marshall give 
us the opportunity of examining the practice and productivity of 
English labour at that time and under those technical conditions. Such 
information will provide a context within which to evaluate the complaints 
made by hacendados that labour in Mexico was too expensive, and the 
J 
exhortation made by,Raso to begin to mechanize production. 
The last decades of the eighteenth century in England were good 
years for agriculture with prices rising sharply and wages lagging far 
behind. Hardly conditions where we would expect to-find·the·highest 
,,.,,., 
.J..U;J 
levels of labour productivity, and yet we come across sickle harvesting 
in Norfolk accomplished at an astounding rate. One hectare of wheat 
was being harvested within 3 1/2 to 5 man-days, by workers apparently 
I 
so dedicated that they seemed to "work not a:s for their masters, but as 
36 for themselves". By all accounts, however, these men were the cream 
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of the labour force, and their equal was not to be found elsewhere. 
Nonetheless, not dissimilar rates were accomplished by scythe in the 
United States of 1800,38 and elsewhere in Engiaiid a tea.ni of five, 
headed by a good man with a scythe, was reportedly well capable of 
1 t . t ' . d 39 comp e 1ng a wo-acre area 1n a ay .. Converted into hectares, this 
means that the harvest of wheat, involving the separate tasks of cutting, 
gathering, binding, stooking, and raking, entailed the investment of 
six man-days of labour per hectare. 
Such work was done by seasonal labourers, hired by the day, who 
worked through from the summer·dawn to dark, and were paid in the 1790s 
at the rate of one.shilling and six pence a day without board. 40 
· Average production by this time in Norfolk had reached 24.75 bushels per 
acre, or the equivalent 1665 kg the hectare, yields comparable to the 
Baj fo and Queretaro • 7 The average price for wheat was 22' 1/2 shillings 
per coomb of four bushels: this meant that the Norfolk farmer was able 
to realise a little more than 139 shillings per acre. Under these 
circumstances.labour costs in the harvest amounted to less than 3% of 
the value of the crop; total labour costs on an arable acre were reported 
to be on average fourteen shillings and four pence for the 1790s, or only 
' 41 10 1/4% of the value of the wheat crop there produced. 
--------·----- --wit:hi~ fifte-~~-· yea:r=s lab-our had become considerably more expensive 
in England, and farmers, replete with the gaim; made under the E:arlier 
favourable conditions of _high prices and low wa&es, began to take an 
active interest in.· investing money in labour-saving machinery. ThP. 
'· 
110 
barnyard tasks of threshing and winnowing were more demanding of labour 
than anything else in the English work-cycle. The work was done during 
the winter and as such did not conflict with any other pressing 
activities. On family-worked small-holdings, the norm in continental 
Europe, there was little incentive to find ways of reducing the labour 
component of these processes, but once labour became scarcer and more 
expensive the .larger farms had good reason to take up labour-saving 
devices. The convergence of prior technical capacity with these 
incentives and the availability of capital was e-nough to hasten the 
development and spread of threshers in early nineteenth century England. 
By the 1830s the consequent displacement of labour had:reached dire 
proportions and provoked widespread Luddite reaction on the part of the 
42 
rural unemployed. For all its effective destruction this reaction had 
come too late to prevent that perfection of machinery born of prolonged 
experiment and use: from that time forward the threshing machine was to 
be a permanent feature of arable agriculture, and hence it comes as no 
surprise to find it at the centre of Rase's recommendations for Queretaro 
in 1845. 
Labour and machinery in Queretaro: threshing 
It is not clear from Rase's text that he made a distinction between 
the separate process~s of threshing and winnowing. He refers to the 
machinery installed by Jose Antonio Velasco de la Torre in the hacienda 
Tequisquiapan in 1821, and implies that costs of between 50 cents and 
- . . . 43 
1 peso per carga of wheat processed had been considerably reduced. 
The size of these co.sts suggests that he was talking about the joint 
process of threshing and winnowing, rather than just the latter. 
The 1859 wheat harvest in San Juanico was threshed and winncwed 
from the beginning of June through to the end of the year.· 900 ~;rgas 
of wheat were treated and the cost in labour came to at least 4ot~."!5 pesos, 
lll 
or 45 cents per carga. The larger harvest for the season of 1860-61 
cost less to thresh and . . . . t . 29 t 44 w1nnow w1th a per carga cost comlng o cen s. 
The same activity in Juriquilla in 1859 ran through from the end 
I 
of June to the second week in November, less time since the crop was 
smaller. Costs per carga here worked out at 30 cents, whilst for the 
following years of 1860, i862, and 1863, the levels were higher, at 
. 51 . 42 . 45 51 cents, . + cents, and cents respect1 vely. 
These six c()stings give us an average of almost. 42 cents the carga 
invested in threshing and winnowing. Wages at this time ran at one and 
a half reals per day, or 0.1875 pesos. Given this, it is fair to infer 
that threshing and winnowing in San Juanico and Juriquilla required 
labour at the rate of about 2 1/4 man-days per carga of wheat. It is 
difficult to make very much of this information. All we know is that 
threshing with the traditional flail in England coped with one quarter 
per day per man, or the equivalent of 0.8 of a man-day per carga of 
46 
wheat. If Mexican work rates were to compare with this, winnowing 
would have to consume considerably more labour time than threshing, 
indeed almost double. This seems rather unlikely. Such labour 
investments were also in conflict with demands for sowing· and weeding 
in maize temporal (demesne sector), and for ploughing ·and sowing for 
the subsequent. wheat crop. Further inferences are harder to make, and 
we must be content with the observation that such lessons on productivity . 
and crop conflict were possibly not lost on the owners of at least 
San Juanico: an inventory·drawn up in 1870 for the purposes of a lease 
to Patricia Garc1a listed two new machines for winnowing, and one 
- - ·- .. --
machine for threshing, 
. . 47 
. recorded as broken. 
each valued at 60 pesos although the latter lias 
·At the same time, however, it does not lcok as 
though there had been any great savings, since in the same year 
unprocessed wheat was costed at 1 peso less the carga than the clenn 
. 48 
gra1n~ ·· ·····-----------···--
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This is most probably a reflection of the primitive nature of such 
machines that had arrived in the area. Even in England.manual threshing 
by flail was common until the 1840s, and the first horse-powered threshers 
were only seven times more efficient in terms of daily output. The 
really dramatic increases in this daily rate were only to come with the 
arrival of steam. Then increases were of the order of sixty-fold on 
mariual flailing, but such machines as these were not available even in 
. . . . . 49 
England until after the mid-century years.· 
Harvesting on the Queretaro hacienda 
Threshing and winnmring, then, were particularly amenable to the 
process of mechanization. The same was not true for the job of 
harvesting. Although the most advanced agricultures, such as England 
and the USA, had produced reapers by the middle of the nineteenth century, 
like Bell's and McCormick's, progress in this area had been generally 
slow, and scythes and sickles were not finally elimiriateduntil the 
beginning of the twentieth century.50 
Given this slmr rate of technical development in the world's most 
advanced agrarian economies it is unlikely that changes would have 
occurred any faster in Mexico. The evidence is that the mid-century 
hacienda was in.fact using the same techniques of sickle and scythe, with 
gathering and stocking, which had prevailed in Norfolk fifty years earlier •. 
Surviving records of these tasks in San Juanico ru1d Juriquilla give us 
the chance of assessing the lament of low labour productivity by · 
51 
comparing work-rates there with those from Norfolk and the U.S.A. 
Harvesting took place in San Juanico in 1859 over the five weeks 
of May, with wages. amounting to 754.13 pesos. Daily rates of l l/2 
reals means that this sum covered a minimum of 1~022 man-days. Q-;•er 
28 l/4 . car gas had been sown: at·· 40 ·kg a hectare, this would have been 
sufficient for 116.6 hectares. On this basis each hectare required 
ll3 
34 1/2 man-days' labour. Such an excessive level may be partly 
explained by the blighted crop of that year, with yields down to 32 to 
1 - presumably the state of the crop under such conditions had made far 
i 
more difficult harvesting conditions. Further consideration might also 
be made for the possibility that seed densities were considerably 
lighter, and that all 203 of the hacienda's irrigable hectares had been 
in production: but even here the labour requirement per hectare of 
harvesting comes out at .20man;.:.days, at least three times the number 
needed in Norfolk and the USA sixty years ·earlier •. 
Little better news for labour productivity emerges from the same 
activity in Juriquilla. There some 65 hectares were sown with wheat, 
yielding quite well at 21 to 1 since these were inferior soils, and the 
harvest produced 332 cargas. Wages for the harvest, taking place in 
May and the first week of June, amounted to 194.40 pesos; the calculation 
here gives the figure of 1036.8 man-days, in total, or 15.95 per hectare. 
No mention·was made of the blight, and the yields indicate that there 
.had been none of this problem in Juriquilla, and yet here again the 
labour requirements are almost three times higher than those for Norfolk 
and the USA. 
Similar findings emerge from the anaiysis of other accounts for 
San Juanico and Juriquilla for the years 1861 and 1862. The figures for 
San Juanico suggest .. that labour requirements for these years varied 
between 20 and 25 man-days per hectare, whilst in the lower yielding 
. -
lands of Juriquilla the level for 1862 appears to be 20 man-days as 
opposed to 25 for the same year in San <Tuanico. A calculation made for 
shows a comparable c·ommitment of· 18.65 -man-days the hectare. 
None of this should lead us to infer that Mexican peons were better 
off than their English equivalents, though it is possible that their 
1
,, 
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working day, even at 12 hours, was shorter. Indeed, expressed as a 
proportion of the value of wheat, wages for seasonal labour in Mexico 
were lower than those paid to Norfolk labourers in the 1790s: daily 
rates in the latter case worked out at over 26 1/2% of the value of a 
bushel of wheat, whereas 'in Queretaro for the mid-century years the 
proportion was only a little more than 16 1/4%. These depressed 
conditions do not however mean that hacendados were commensurately 
enriched.. This is the nub: Mexican working conditions may have been 
. desperately bad, but the efficacy of this system of exploitation was· 
equally defective. 
Norfolk farmers in the 1790s may have got a,.,ay ,.,:l.th losing as 
little as 2 1/4% of the valueof their crops as payment for labour in 
the harvest; Queretaro hacendados in the 1850s and 1860s were likely to 
forfeit 6% or more. Further analysis is needed before this state of 
affairs can be fully explained, but it may well be that Morin has a 
point when he refers to the unsubdued and begrudging nature of the 
Mexican labour-force as. one of the causes behind the·hacianda's 
. . ff. . 53 t . 1 th h . d unl . k 1 t b k. 1ne· 1c1ency - cer a1n y e ac1en a peon was 1 e y o e wor 1ng 
"not as for their masters, but as for themselves" as was.the case 
. 54 
reported in Norfolk. 
Further account might be made for a possibly inferior diet producing 
less energy and for the conditions of the heat and the terrain in 
Queretaro - and moreover, for the quality of the tools used by the 
workers in the harvest. Unfortunately there are no surviving records of 
the tools held on the haciendas during these early years, but an 
inventory taken in November 1870.lists two imported scythes as well as 
two broken reaping machines - the inclusion of such items only ten years 
later than the origiri8:1 data on wheat harvesting suggests that th·~ 
technology available was certainly no worse than that used in Norfolk in 
115 
the 1790s. At the same time, however, it is clear from the amount of 
wages paid out that San Juanico may well have had as many as 225 men 
working on the harvest during the peak period in the middle of May. 55 
. i 
I 
The 1870 inventory listed only six sickles, each valued at 2 reaies, in 
addition to the scythes (3.5 pesos each): how such a large number of 
workers was able.to operate with so few tools remains a mystery, even 
if 80 per cent of them were engaged in the tasks of gathering, binding, 
. raking, stooking and carriage •. 
None of these considerations.can, however, detract from the main 
inference that labouron the Queretaro hacienda was less productive than 
had been the case in England and the USA. This had been our impression 
for maize production earlier, and again for the tasks of threshing and 
winnowing of wheat; now we have firm evidence of the same state of 
affairs in hand harvesting. 
Notions of blame or responsibility would be totally misplaced in 
this.context. What concerns us here is the hacienda's capacity for 
. accumulation. One aspect of that capacity is to be found in the 
particular combination of factors concentrated in the activity of work, 
factors ranging from.health and motivation to tool technology. 
Illiteracy has deprived us of a good part of.the explanation which lies 
behind this apparently low level of labour productivity. In the absence 
of the peon's story·we are left only with an.impression of its effect-
relatively higher.costs of production and tighter profit margins, both 
conducive to lower rates of accumulation. Such realities are occasionally 
found refracted in the words of the hacendados, for all their evident 
bias. One such case is the letter written in January 1865 by the 
administratorof San Juanico to the.hacienda's owner: he referred to 
the "excpetionally brilliant" wheat season of 1862-3 when 2139 ca:~gas 
had been produced from only 38with yields of 56 1/4 to 1. 56 But the 
main point of the letter was to emphasise how such yields could be 
further improved with better performances from the hacienda's labourers, 
and to complain that their current methods of harvesting were "wretched" 
and left "a quarter of the crop behind in the field". The crucial question 
is how these methods of harvesting, and of other tasks in wheat production, 
~ 
could have been improved: was the technology available to remedy the · 
defects, and if so, were the conditions in the hacienda economy conducive 
to such a basic change? 
WHEAT PRICES AND THE SPEED OF MECHANIZATION ON THE HACIENDA 
The context for change: means and motivation 
The discussion thus far has shown that the labour component in 
wheat production was relatively high on the Queretaro hacienda. To judge 
from the hacendado lament and from Rasa's analyses, this had been 
translated into costs, even if the Mexican peon appeared to be paid at 
a lower real rate than his English cousin. The major moVe into 
mechanization on the progressive English farm had taken place during the 
first decades of the nineteenth century, times which had been preceded 
by years of rising prices and relatively stagnant costs: sudden· labour 
shortages had then coincided with healthy accounts and good credit. 
ratings, thus giving the English farmer the means and motivation to 
invest in machinery. Later on in the century the position was to be 
reversed. From 1870 through to the years of the First World War, 
British agriculture suffered from the policies of free trade-and the 
import of cheap grain. The effects were probably not as devastating 
as has often been thought, since farmers were able to switch-their 
attentions from arable to livestock production. 57 Nonetheless they 
were subjected to tighter profit margins, and at the same time tbe 
bottom fell out of the grain market: under these conditions the trend 
towards the progressive refinement and application of machinery was 
ll7 
abruptly retarded, and very little was achieved in this area until the 
inter-war years. 58 
It is clear then that 
particular circumstances. 
the strategy to mechanize rested on very 
Raso's exhortation to follow th~ English 
lead of the early nineteenth century occurred in the midst of a very 
different set of conditions. Things may have begun to look favourable 
at the end of the seventeenth century, but the Insurgency and related 
depression had changed ·all that. Whilst it may have been true that 
hacendados needed. to reduce the siZe of their labour costs, it.was also 
the case that they faced real problems in their attempt to do.so. The 
depressed state of the market was one thing; scarcity of cash and credit 
another. Finally there was the problem of availability - if hacendados 
wanted to mechanize they had to look beyond the national borders for 
the machines to do so, and here once again they were hindered by the 
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country's appalling roads. Small wonder, then, that the famous 
Tequisquiapan winnower had been built on the hacienda, and that Raso 
recommended that every measure was taken to inspire domestic invention. 
Similarly, it is easy to understand the frustration felt on this count 
and by the same token, the degree of hope which was invested in the 
arrival of the railways. 
Prices and trading in Quereretaro wheat 
Under these less than favourable circumstances the market assumed 
crucial importance. If ~osts were more or less fixed, the only way out 
of the vicious circle lay in higher prices. All the indications we 
have from such sources as Humboldt, Morin and Van Young suggest that 
the wheat trade was.no straightforward option in the years before the 
Insurgency. The impression is that prices tended to cluster arotmd the 
5 peso mark, and that profits depended upon seasonal and regional 
fluctuations. 
--" 
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This picture of anxious producers does not seem to have changed 
much by the middle of the century. Harvest time in 1859 finds the 
administrator of San Juanico full of concern over the "serious drop in 
prices"; things clearly failed to improve over the summer, and by 
August he is referring to the situation as "a miserable business" and 
having to agree to prices of 6.50 the carga with a 13% reduction allowed 
for waste. Things locally were no better in 1863, when the market was 
apparently "non-:-existent 'i, and agair1 at the end of 1864 inopportune 
sales were forced by a shortage of cash. The drift of these· comments 
suggests that prices of around 7 pesos the carga were at least undesirable 
6o 
and only taken up as a last and reluctant resort. 
It should also be remembered that the crop was not without its 
natural hazards: prolonged drought threatened its production, and once 
planted it was vulnerable to frosts, hail-storms, and the blight 
Chahuixlte. Resultant fluctuations in the levels of production com~ounded 
seasonal and regional price variations, and also jeopardised .the hacienda's 
profit margins. The crop of 1868 in Juriquilla was a case in point: with 
production plummeting to a mere 130 cargas, the owner was provoked to 
write that "even if the price had been 25 pesos the carga, there would 
. . . . . . 61 
still have been no profit". 
Most of the clues available point to the fact that wheat production 
depended, like ~aize·, U:pon the hacendado's ab{lity to play the market. 
The prerequisites were information and transport. When, for instance, 
the market in Queretaro was apparently "non-existent" in the summer of 
1863, word reached San Juanico that prices were soaring in the Capital 
and had touched 18 pesos the carga. On the basis of this news the 
administrator wrote to his brother-in-law, Jose Carmona, a resident 
of a hacienda close to Mexico City, with the intention of exploit:~.ng 
these prices. Nothing in fact came of this attempt, since the chaos of 
119 
civil war and rife banditry had rendered trade too hazardous a risk. 
Things had, however, improved by the end of 1864 and the same .operation 
was again being contemplated in San Juanico. In January 1865 we find 
j 
I 
the hacienda's administrator weighing up the respective merits of 
marketing the wheat locally and in I~1exico City. In early December 
1864 the hacienda had been forced to sell locally at a low price. A 
month later values in the Capital were running at 15 pesos the carga, 
-but against. this' .freight cost a minimum.· of 3 pesos the carga. and more 
likely, almost 4 pesos. The incentives apparentl~ outweigh ted. the costs 
and hazards, and within a fortnight we find the hacienda despatching 
consignments of up to 100 cargas to the Molino de Saivador, the property 
of Manuel Cuevas. n1ese are maintained throughout the spring, but 
prices begin to waver and then to fall; freight costs on the other 
hand start to rise and reach 4 pesos the carga. All of this provokes 
- a restatement :from San Juanico_' s administrator of the old adage that 
"really solid profits in wheat are presupposed by the hacienda having 
·-·its own transport", and within a week of this he is to be found 
wringing his hands over the absence of muleteers '·Thilst prices continue 
to fall in the Capita1. 62 
All of this shows that there were good prices to be had, but at 
the cost of storage, risk and transport. At the same time, it looks as 
though there had been a secular rise in the normal level: prices in 
Queretaro at the turn of the century had been around 5 pesos the carga, 
whilst averages in San Juanico for the period 1856-60 were recorded at 
close to 8 pesos the carga, although the 1870 standard was put at 7.50. 
With wages unchanged since the colonial-years, such price rises meant 
that the hacienda was out of the post-Inusrgency \vood; as a result, the 
increased profits and more promising prospects encouraged hacende.dos to 
invest in irrigation and extend their cultivation of wheat. 
Crisis and redemption: overproduction and the railways 
But this respite was all too brief. The rush to extend production 
brought the inevitable rejoinder - a saturated market. Within a few 
short years of the normalization of trade~ established some time after 
the execution of Maximilian and the restoration of the Republic in 
1867~ the Governor of Queretaro is to be found in a state of public 
anguish . over the surplus in the j::;upply of w11eat and the haciendas' 
bursting granaries •. Hisanxiety is unsurprisingly accompani~d by the 
familiar lainent upon the nation's inadequate c'ommunications ~ and in ·the 
absence of any alternative, he exhorts the hacendados to turn away from 
wheat and start afresh with flax. 63 
Within this context of economic impasse~ the arrival of the 
railways in Queretaro in February 1882 takes on a new and formidable 
significance. The entire edifice of arable farming was under severe 
pressure~ with profits squeezed by the combined agencies of high 
production costs and production were yromised by the introduction of 
.· machinery, but this was contingent upon easier access to its supply 
and upon healthier hacienda balances. The.key to all this lay in the 
railways: their arrival would open up lucrative markets for the haciendas' 
surplus arable produce and also help to reduce the costs involved in. 
transport; higher incomes could then facilitate the serious beginnings 
of mechanization~ itself rendered possible by the delivery of machinery 
from the north and from the coast, all thanks to the railroad. 
This, in any event, was the vision, and as such, it comes as no 
surprise to find the Queretaro hacendados welcoming the railways as 
though a redeeming new dawn for their. fortunes. By the same token it 
is small .wonder that some of their number should have committed both 
talent and scarce capital to help secure their timely arrival. Even 
if actual transport costs took a little time to fall below those of 
1 ..... , C.L 
th 1 t . 64 h. . . d t h emu e- ra1ns, t 1s v1s1on turne out o ave been close to the 
truth, and efforts expended on its realisation were soon to be 
vindicated. 
i 
Well before the end of the decade the highly-prized Queretaro wheat 
had accomplished a local stability of around 10 pesos the carga;65 
early in the 1890s wheat from Juriquilla was rolling north to the· 
agencies of Ricardo.Hornedo in Coahuila and Durango, and local prices 
were creeping up towards 12 pesos the carga. 66 vlith labour costs well 
below commensurate ievels ~f increase' the 1880s and 1890s must have'. 
had all the appearances of a boom period for the hacienda economy. vTe 
·now need to examine thehacendados disposition and response within this 
new favourable context. 
Hacendado outlook: improvements and investment 
Before .the arrival of the railways in Queretaro hacendados had 
been somewhat constrained in what theY:" ~ere able to modernize on. the 
hacienda. As a result the majority of projects undertaken involved a 
minimum of technical equipment, and tended instead to make the most of 
the cheapest and most abundant resource - labour. 
This is the impression we get from the surviving letters and 
accounts of the haciendas San Juanico and Juriquilla. On these estates 
during the mid-century years the main activity in terms of hacienda 
improvements revolved around construction. Lima was quarried, bricks 
and tiles were fired, fences were erected, buildings were repaired, and 
dams and aquaducts constructed. In Juriquilla, for example, the year 
--···-- _l8.Q2 . .§J:!.W .. .QY~-~-- 670. peso.s _spent on labour. involved in preparing the 
foundations to a dam, the equivalent of over 3500 man-days. Similar 
commitments were made in the subsequent two years, and yet only 25 pesos 
was spent on materials for this project - significantly on gunpowder 
and candles, items which suggest that the job underway was no smalJ. 
- --·-- -- -----------------·--·--- ----------·----
. 67 
venture. '· 
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The great preoccupation during those years was clearly the 
extension of irrigation. Information given earlier· showed that the 
efforts in this sphere had been considerable; Such an impression is 
further supported by the mid-century activities and interests in San 
·Juanico. These even included, in December 1864, the idea of sinking an 
artesian well on the hacienda: a certain senor ~ane was engaged to draw 
up estimates for the costs involved, and they were duly presented to 
the hacienda Is administrator. However' w:i.t:ti tubes costing '1000 pesos 
. . 
and the initial perforation com1ng to a further 3000 pesos, it was 
decided to postpone such a venture; after all, these were year~ of 
civil chaos and collapsed markets, and it was reckoned that the hacienda's 
"balance demanded a reduction in expenses". Even so, senor Pane was 
asked to report back to the hacienda as soon as he had completed his 
current geological researches in the Baj1o. 68 . 
Investment in machinery was lower, s1nce it was clearly limited by 
the general problems of availability and freight, and also by the sti~l 
precarious nature of the hacienda economy. The letters for the years 
from 1858 to 1867 are rife with the lament of the hazards of agricultural 
business- the haciendas were plagued by "a multitude of bandits", 
. . . . . . . - . 
drained by perpetual and mounting requisitions, hamstrung by the 
desertion of the best labour for fear of conscription, all of which were 
compounded by the collapse of the market, the paralysis of trade, and 
. the scarcity of currency. Such adverse conditions were sufficient to 
provoke regular remarks along the lines of "things couldn't be worse" 
and the observation. that many local haciendas were reduced to running 
at a loss. 
Relative stability returned with the Restoration of the Republic; 
and the outlook for the hacienda must have improved. There are 
indications that hacendados felt sufficiently secure to begin to invest 
' 
123 
albeit tentatively in machinery. By 1870 there were small machines on 
San Juanico to thresh wheat, to grind maize, and even to reap. Some 
ten years later a neighbouring hacienda, Castillo y San Nicolas, 
' 
' inventoried machinery separately and to the value of 1215 'pesos, and in 
1881 Juriquilla brought in a brand new winnower. 69 
The chances are, however, that these developments were very limited. 
Probablyonly the smallest implements were involved. Earlier interest 
had often been qualified by the .stipulation that the equipment was 
small-scale, as for instance in the case of the maize·grinder, trade-
marked Marshall and Co. from England and advertised in Sigle XIX. These 
limi tatioris were largely due to the persistent problems of t-ransport. 
It was difficult enough to move bulky commodities like wheat, but at 
least they could be bagged up and made amenable to mules. It must have 
been very hard to do the same for inflexible metal constructions, and 
in any case cost was still prohibitive - in August 1881 freight to 
Mexico City was running at 4.50 pesos the carga of wheat. It is very 
likely that such conditions delayed moves towards mechanization, even 
though a genuine interest seemed to be underway: in 1881 the owner of 
Juriqul.lla ordered the catalogue issued by the retailers Stoddard and 
Dreyer of Leon, and in the. following year we find his son sugge-sting 
that a new thresher is purchased, since the old one regularly caused up 
. 70 
to 40 mares to miscarry every year. 
By this time of course the Queretaro hacendados were able to 
anticipate the arrival of the railways in their city. The mood of 
relief and optimism was reflected in the letters of the period: in the 
an enthusiastic reference.on the imminent arrival of the railroad-
which is depicted as heralding a new epoch of progress and prosperity 
for the agriculturalist. 71 
,_ 
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The railroad: boom and mechanization 
The opening of the railway gave Queretaro access at first to 
Mexico City and then later to the north; both routes were to become 
life-lines for the regional econorni. A measure of their importance is 
reflected by the growth of revenue accumulated by the local station, 
primarily on account of the business of freight. Opening in 1882, 
income.had reached close to 500,000 pesos a year by 1890,. and almost 
. 72 < • 1,500,000 by 1909. Ivlarket access meant higher profits and their 
subsequent investment·inmachinery, now more readily available • 
. Within two years of the railway's arrival in Queretaro a local 
tenant called Cirilio Vazquez had brought in a 'Champion:Fireproof' 
steam-engine from Brantford in Canada, and was thus attracting a great 
deal of interest and emulation. 73 Not long afterwards there must have 
been a similar machine driving the thresher in San Juanico, since there 
is a record of an engineer or vaporista working alongside 55 peons in 
the week of 18 July 1892. 74 . An inventory drawn up in the following year 
. . . ~ . ""' for the hac1enda TroJes, property of Jul1o Obregon, shows that such a 
purchase had already been made there, an.d was now valued at 1500 pesos. 75 
Mechanization appears to have been. underway. The eXtent of this 
process is hard to quaritif'y' but we do have clues of its intensity. 
Take for instance the comparison of the inventory for San Juanico drrun1 
up 1n 1870 with that for 1909. 76 In the first· case what little machinery 
there was on the hacienda.was included within the general concept of 
aperos, or tools and implements: there were only four items classified 
as mechanical, two of which were valued at 6o pesos each, whilst the 
others were registered as broken. By 1909 machinery was granted a 
separate section: 38 different items were listed, the most expensive 
being the two threshing-machines, trade-marked Robey and Champion, and 
the total value reach{ng the substantial sum of 10,226.50 pesos, or over 
'· 
8% of the value of property as opposed to a mere 1/8% represented in 
the 1870 inventory. 
Further evidence of this process can be gleaned from reports made 
I 
on the state's agriculture during the period. A case in point is the 
survey conducted by the hacendado Lie. Manuel de la Pena from neighbouring 
state of Mexico for the publication La Voz de Queretaro. According to 
de la Pena progress during the decade 1885-95 had been dramatic and 
showed that "the sons of Queretaro were far from conservative,. but. 
rather dedicated enthusiasts of progress"~ He concedes that some of.the 
better lands were still worked by the lugubrious oxen and archaic 
Egyptian plough, but that this was a practice fast giving way to mule-
drawn implements of such imported brands as Oliver, and even including 
a number of the most-up-to-date steam-ploughs with twelve shares. Other 
modern implernents were also in widespread use - seed-drills brand-marked 
Avery and Osborn; new types.of harrows; McCorurick balers; Deering 
reapers; and the virtually universal use of steam-threshers on the 
d ~ d R' 77 ·flatlan s around Queretaro an San .Juan de], 10. Clearly it was 
amongst these most profitable and creditable haciendas, like San Juanico 
and.others mentioned such as La Llave, Tequisquiapan, Balvanera, and 
El Jacal, which progressed fastest. But others with medium quality 
resources, like Juriquilla, were eventually able to follow suit - in 
the 1908 inventory this estate was able to register the possession of 
78 
a steam-powered.thresher valued at 1800 pesos. 
All.of this had been accomplished within a boom period for local 
agriculture. Basic improvements had been made in the land itself, 
marshlands had been reclaimed for the plough, previously rough terrain 
·had been levelled for irrigation,. and waters "stolen from the jc:alously 
guarded depths" now spread across the landscape in irrigation ditches 
and lakes. De la Pena's report may sound as though he had been ca~ried 
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away by his owh prose, but there must have been somethin.g there to 
inspire him in the first place - an inference which is c6nf~rmed by 
other accounts in La Sombra de Arteaga, the government weekly bulletin. 
Such reports should of course be treated with caution, but it is the 
case that earlier accounts of the state 1 s agriculture had been far less 
laudatory, and contemporary versions of the textile interests in the area 
were downright gloomj. We can be.sure that such reports contain at 
least a part of the truth • 
. Extra evidence can be found elsewhere~ Daily transport from the 
city's commercial houses to the railway station, registering with the 
municipal treasury, leapt-up from 8 to 42 carts during the decade of 
the 1890s, and by the beginning of the twentieth century there were 
four newly constructed markets in Queretaro, . the largest, Pedro Escobedo, -· 
measuring 4000 squar~ metres and built from an iron framework, costing 
a total of 41,000 pesos. 79 Banking facilities had also developed, and 
by this time there were branches of the Banks of London, of San Luis 
Potos1, of the National, and of Guanajuato.all in the city, rrith 
Queretaro's own bank about to be inaugurated. Rural properties were.in 
the van of this boo_m: in 1874 the fiscal value of the Qu~ret.aro district's 
estates had been put at around 1. 8 millio~ pes~~; by 1897 this figure 
had more than doubled to almost 3.9, and in 1903. it was reported to be 
. . t"l h 80 r1s1ng s 1 1 furt er. Such rapid increases in property values had 
also inspired a high rate of turnover: according to the tax on sales of 
property, transactions during the twelve months from the end of June 
1901 to the first of July 1902. involved values almost exceeding one 
million pesos. All of this is ample evidence that things in Queretaro 
were indeed flourishing, and·that haciendas, at least in the districts 
of the capital city and of San Juan del R1o, were establishing themselves 
as viable enterprises with solid credit ratings. 
'· 
SURVIVAL AND PROSPERITY: WHEAT PRODUCTION AND PROFITABILITY 1840-1910 
The preceding discussion has attempted to set out a number of 
themes important to the economic development of the area. The situation 
I 
on the hacienda had been a confusion of strengths and weaknesses. 
Predominant amongst the former was the natural bounty of the Baj1o 
soils; set against this asset there were the counter weights of 
difficult market access and high transport .costs. Until the arrival of 
the railways these .conditions were-more or less-fixed- strategic 
changes of direction on the part of the hacendado could do little to 
mitigate their effects. In this way a baleful eye had been turned on 
the quality of Mexican labour: if profit margins were to be extended, 
then exploitation of labour would have to be made more effective. This 
was the essence of Raso's charge and exhortation. And yet, at the same 
time it was difficult for hacendados to achieve this - we have seen how· 
the process of mechanization anywhere depended upon certain contingencies, 
and how the hacendado had been impeded by lovr capital reserves and the 
-virtually insuperable, problems of securing a supply of such machinery 
that was already available elsewhere. Compounding all of these 
difficulties had been the additional damage inflicted by chronic 
political inst~bility and the presence of requisitioning armies and 
subversive banditry. 
Within this context we now need to examine the evidence which 
remains on the component costs of wheat production and the resultant 
profit margins; we need to assess the effectiveness of the alternative 
strategy, at first in terms of its contribution to the survival of the 
·hacienda, and latterly in terms of its progressive productivity and its 
capacity to provide for accumulation. 
'· 
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Wheat in San Juanico 1856-65 
During this period there were some 200 hectares of irrigable land 
on San Juanico, watered by the rivers of Queretaro and Pueblito. These 
were in fact streams rather than rivers, and they often dried up during 
. . 
the recurrent Baj1o droughts. This happened in the summers of both 
1859 and 1863: in both cases the land was prepared in the hope of a 
reprieve .. in September, but the letters of .the period show that 
conditions· ot· parched bordos and dried river-beds finally forced the 
hacienda to curtail production. As a result, these two years recorded 
the lowest quantities of seed sown, with figures well down on the norm. 
Given these circumstances, it is clear that even the best endowed 
haciendas occasionally had trouble raising a full crop of wheat: small 
wonder then that the possibility of artesian wells attracted.such 
interest. Despite these uncertainties, however, the hacienda could 
rely on wheat in a way that would have been "quite impossible for maize, 
at least before the introduction of sharecropping •. Such relative 
security of income is borne out by surviving records·for production 
over the years 1856-64. (Table 5.) 
These statistics are most revealing. Average annual sm·rings were 
of the order of 43 1/4 cargas:. at 40 kg the hectare this means that some 
178.45 hectares of land were on average cultivated for wheat, or close 
to 90 per cent of the area so designated in the administrator's notes 
of t-'larch 1861. Average yields worked out at about 32 1/4 to 1, not far 
short of the Raso estimate of 35-40 to l, and thus average levels of 
production amounted to almost 1400 cargas. This figure would have 
represented average returns per hectare of close to 1300 kg., comparable 
to levels achieved in progressive areas of the Netherlands at the time. 81 
Costs given only included seed and labour. By making a deduction 
of 260 pesos for the average seed requirement, expenditure on labour 
TABLE 5: Wheat Production in San Juanico: Account.s for 1856-64 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Cgas Cgas Total Sale Gross Cost per .Cost per Average 
Year sown · Harvested Yield Costs . Value Profits · Cga SO"-'Il Cga produced. price per 
C a 
1: $ $ $ $ $ $ 
1856a 52.68 1,743.00 32.9 3,232.69 13,561.84 10,329.15 61.37 1.86 7.78 
1857 32.98 1,393.00 42.21 3,165.66 9,716.78 6,551.12 96.00 2.27 6.98 
1858b ' 28.28 900.00 32.35 3,140.25 6,114.89 2,374.64 132.26 4.16 6.79 
1859a 25.00 1,406.00 56.24 2,467.44 11,937.22 9,469.78 98.69 1.76 8.49 
186oc 50.78 1,638.58 32.72 3,349.03 14,502.11 11,153.08 65.95 2.04 8.85 
' d 1861 64.51 1, 521.80 23.59 3,408.62 10,131.31 6,122.69 52.84 2.24 6.41 1-" f') 
1862a 38.10 2,139.00 56.28 3,140.90 24,810.76 
. d 
82.44 . 1.47 
\0 
21,669.86 10.57 
1863 23~57 823.73 34.80 1,762.00 12,377.50 d 10,615.50 . 74.76 2.14 12.80 
1864 73.12 1,016,86 13.91 . 4,295.94 8,387.36 
. d 
4,091.42 58.75 4.23 6.96 
Totals 389.02 12,581.97 
-
28,562.35 111,539.46 82,976.93 
Averages 43.22 1,398.00 32.35 3,i73.63 12,393.27 9.219.66 73.42 2.27 8.41 
Columns 1 and 2 are in cargas; 4-9 inc. are in pesos and centavos. 
a regarded as good years 
b year in which wheat was blighted by chahuixtle 
I 
c average year improved by maize shortages 
d included revenue on sale of straw of $376.20, $2191.20, $1795.75, $1310.00 respectively 
Source: ASJ/LC 1856-1864 
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worked out at a rate of 2931.61 per year, or 16.43 pesos per hectare. 
Wages ran at l l/2 reals the day, which means that each hectare of 
wheat required some 87.6 man-days from start to finish. Whilst it is 
true that these labour requirements were higher than they were elsewhere 
under similar technical circumstances, it is also the case that wages 
paid for this labour were generally lower. In any event, as the figures 
above show, wheat thus produced was able to render. the hacienda a 
considerable prof;i.t, on ave:rage close to 9,500 pesos. 
As mentl.oned eariier, much of this profit relied upon the astute 
exploitation of market fluctuations, of season and region. We do not 
have a detailed breakdown of the times and locations of all sales from 
San Juanico, but it is clear from the average price earned, 9.82 pesos 
the carga, that a good proportion of the crop was successfully marketed 
under the optimum conditions. We do know that 300 cargas w·ere despatched 
to the firm of Domingo Zelaay Araujo in eight consignments during August, 
September and October of 1861, thereby fulfilling a contract· agreed in 
. h . 82 Aprll at t e pr1ce of ll pesos the carga. 
Raso had reported that a good part of the Queretaro wheat was 
consumed locally, and that the surplus was then shipped off to Mexico 
City. We get the same impression from the fragments of information 
left in the archives of San Juanico. Considerable repairs and improvements 
had been done to the La Canada mill of San Antonio by Cayetano Rubio 
during the l84os as part and parcel of the development of the famous 
textile factory Hercules. As a result of these investments the new 
water-powered San Antonio was able to monopolise the local grain trade, 
no doubt helped by the power of the Rubio family as the leading 
financiers in the area. As a consequence, the mill in San Juanico, 
previously valued at 7385.25 pesos, had fallen into disuse, and the 
hacienda was having to sell its wheat to.theRubios or in Mexico City. 83 
'· 
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There is a fair amount of evidence in the correspondence of .the period 
that the former option \-laS rife with problems, but the alternative of 
sending wheat to Mexico was also troublesome, given bandit~y and transport 
I 
costs. 
The compromise appears to have been to do a little of each. The 
majority of the 1858-59 crop, for example, was so~d to Rubio at 6 pesos 
the carga, whereas at least a quarter of the 1864-65 produce was sent · 
to Mexico City, to be rapidly pursued by a further 530 cargasin 18 
consignments from the following year's freshly harvested crop. These 
lucrative sales have had the effect of distorting the overall appearance 
of the sector's profitability. The average value for the sale of wheat 
undoubtedly incorporates the higher capital city prices, but the costs 
do not include the money spent on transport. In 1861 freight charges 
were running at 3.61~ pesos the carga to Mexico City; by 1864 the rate 
had apparently slipped slightly to 3.50 pesos; 1865 saw it lift once 
again to 3.75 pesos, and by May of that year a scarcity of muleteers 
84 had pushed prices right up to 4 pesos the carga. Charges were paid to 
mUleteers half in advance, with the deficit being paid when the 
consignment was delivered - these latter costs were then debited from 
the hacienda's account. Thus San Juanico had to pay out over 1000 pesos 
in cash over the summer months of 1865 as part of the overall transport 
bill of 2122.52 - no small amount. 
All of this is hard to quantify in terms of the eventual net profits 
for wheat in San Juanico, since \ve do not knmr exactly how much of the . 
produce was marketed in Mexico City. It is clear, however, ~hat the 
balances are less wealthy than they appear to be. The minimum we can be 
sure of.is that unit production costs for seed and labour averaged out 
at 2.27 pesos the carga for the years 1856-64. With local prices 
running at 6 and 7 pesos the carga, gross profits were assuredly 
1.32 
substantial; similarly, Mexico City rates of from 11 to 15 pesos 
provided profit-margins quite large enough to cover the high fre.ight 
charges and still leave a substantial net revenue. 
Here, then, is firm evidence that the better endowed haciendas 
like San Juanico were well served by demesne wheat production. Rase 
had suggested that production costs might be held down to 100 pesos per 
fanega of 5.3488 hectares, .. 4o for seed and labour, 50 for rent, and 10 
.. 85 
for oxen, or 18.69 pesos per hectare. The data for San Juanico shows 
that costs for seed and labour alone ran on average at some 73.36 pesos 
per carga of wheat sown. If we assume that the land was sown at 40 kg 
the hectare, this figure can be reformulated at 17.78 pesos per hectare, 
more than 10 pesos above the Rase recommendation. In defence of San 
Juanico it should be said that Rase does not make it clear if his costs 
refer to mere cultivation of the land plus harvesting, or to the entire 
process of winnowing and threshing as well. In any case the calculations 
below demonstrate that even with such inflated costs as these San 
Juanico's wheat was able to offer the hacienda a very comfortable return 
on invested capital •.. There is every indication that net profits were 
quite high enough to .sustain the hacienda during the lean periods; once 
other sectors had been brought into line, as for instance .the temporal 
mai:z,e under sharecropping, the hacienda capacity for apcumulation must 
have looked considerable. 
'· 
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TABLE 6: Calculated net profits in San Juanico wheat 1856-64 
Average annual gross profits ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 9,476.87 
Deductions for freight, 
assuming 1/4 crop moved to Mexico City at 
3.75 pesos the carga x 350 cargas ••••• ~ ••••••••••••• 1,312.50 
Deductions for rent, at 40 pesos the fanega, 
assuming average annual. area to be 180 hectares, 
or 33.65 fanegas x 40 pesos ••••••••••••••• ~ ••••••••• 1,346.10 . 
Deductions for oxen at 10 pesos the fanega, 
. or 33.65 x 10 p~sos ••••.••••••••••••••••••••••• ~···· 336.50 
Total deductions~ •••••••• 2,995.10 
Balance and net profit ••• 6 ,481. 77 
Inventories value of estate, implements and livestock $132,000.00 pesos. 
Annual average net profit from wheat as % of this - l~. 9% 
Wheat in San Juanico 1892-1918 
Thus far we have shown how wheat produc~ion secured survival and 
even promised prosperity for the likes of San Juanico. Others, with less 
·· -yielding soils and loJ?.ger journeys to the provincial markets, must have 
been under greater pressure, and perhaps felt a more urgent need to 
follow Rasa Is recommendation to mechanize. This' in any "event' happened 
in'San Juanico, as has been mentioned already. Although the evidence is 
somewhat fragmentary it is possible to.put together a part of the picture 
of production under the new regime of the machine and to gauge the 
weight of its benefits. 
The seasons of 1910-11 and 1911-12 were both below average on San 
Juanico with yields of only 17 and 24 to 1; shortage of l-Tater had meant 
-------·--------- ---------·-··-----·· ---- -- ·-· 
that half of the area cultivated had been irrigated only once instead 
of the normal twice. Records of seed sown, of 161 and 150 tercios, 
suggest that this area had been increased since the mid-nineteenth· 
century, an increase most probably due to the incorporation of a ~ITther 
'· 
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annex, La Comunidad. The result was that, even in poor years, the 
administrator expected crops of 1800 cargas, an increase of some 400 
. 86 
cargas on prev1ous averages. 
Remnants of working practices ahd costs remain. We know that the 
job of threshing and winnowing was considerably speeded up: whereas 
in the earlier period this task ran right through to ·the·end of the year 
and beyond, it was now completed within a couple of months of harvesting. 
In addition to this there are indications that overall labour costs 
had been reduced. The calendar year of 1859 had involved work on the 
wheat fields and harvest of the 1858 sowing, and on the cultivation and 
planting of the 1859 crop; the f~rmer had in~urred wages of 1520.15 
pesos, the latter 1135.90 pesos, a total for the calendar year of 
2656.05. It should be noted t.hat both 'years' involved reduced.areas, 
perhaps of no more than 115 hectares. Areas cultivated during the years 
of the twentieth century, however, must have been of the order of 300 · 
hectares and more. But total wage bills for the calendar years of 1912 
·and 1916 were not commensurate with such increases. The year 1912 
incurred wage costs of up to 2249.51 pesos by 14 December: 1416.8 
cargas of wheat had been produced as opposed to the 900 ·.of 1859, and on 
top of this there had been some marginal increases in ••ages - skilled 
man-power on the steam-engines were paid 31 cents and 25 cents a day as 
early as 1892, and the general level of unskilled wages had also increased 
87 to 20 cents a day. Increases in wage rates and in the area under 
cultivation shollld have been reflected in commensurate increases in 
overall wage bills: the fact that the year 1912 probably incurred less 
monetary labour costs than 1859 stro~gly suggests that the hacienda had 
· achieved considerable· savings of labour..,.power through. mechaniso.tion. 
Such an inference is further supported by the data for the year 1916: 
entire costs on labour during the year came to 5434.03pesos, something 
more than double the 1912 level. Wage-rates had in the meantime, rowever, 
'· 
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increased by more or less the same proportion: skilled workers were now 
being paid 74 cents instead of 31 to 37, and unskilled field workers now 
earned from 30 to 40 cents in place of 20. Inflation in wage-rates 
i 
would thus more than account for the difference between the 1912 and 
1916 labour costs: actual labour employed in the ,.,heat sector looks as 
though it remained unchanged. Gross revenue from the anticipated 1800 
cargas produced in 1912 was put at 27,000 pesos, suggesting gross profits 
of as much as 24,500 pesos, two and a half times as high as the average 
for 1856-64. 
Here then, is an indication of the hacienda's eventual and consUmmate 
breakthrough. Actual labour requirements had been reduced through 
mechanization such that labour costs had not kept check with wage 
inflation, itself only a b~lated development. With the railways opening 
up distant markets, and prices in any case on an upward surge, the 
hacienda was surely. well placed to yield good profits and to provide for. · 
accumulation. A provisional measure of this potential can be had by 
· calculating the rough net return from wheat in San Juanico as a percentage 
of invested capital. Let us assume that gross profits were of the order 
of 24,500 pesos on the 1912 crop - prices of 15 pesos the carga were not 
excessive for the period. According to evidence available for a nearby 
and comparable hacienda, La Capilla, the rental value of irrigated wheat 
. 88 
lands was in the region of 40 pesos the hectare. Making a generous 
assumption of 350 hectares of land cultivated in l9ll this translates 
into a deductable cost to the hacienda of 14,000 pesos. Without further 
precise evidence on the internal running of the hacienda it is impossible 
to assess other costs of administration and machine and stock maintenance;· 
to compensate for this the provisional net figure of.l0,500 pesos for 
wheat in 1911-12 is held against the entire inventoried value of ~state 
as assessed in 1909 - 206,500 pesos. The net wheat profits then e:.1erge 
as- a -5% return---=.--a:--more--than ample ievei when it is appreciated that 
'·. 
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wheat interests in San Juanico represented only a third of gross annual 
revenues. 
Wheat production in Juriquilla: 1856-64 and 1887-94 
Juriquilla was a very different proposition, as we have already 
mentioned. Precipitous terrain may have favoured the property with 
abundant water but this was hardly sufficient compensation for the rough 
I 
and stoney soils. 
During the earlier period Juriquilla was run as an adjunct to San 
Juanico and was somewhat neglected. As a result its wheat sector was 
relatively small and undeveloped, with at most only a third of San 
Juanico's average area under cultivation. With the poorer quality soils 
demanding higher seed densities it is possible that the area urider 
cultivation in Juriquilla fell below 50 hectares. Yields were also lower 
than in San Juanico with averages of only 20 to 1. Smaller harvests and 
mOre seed per unit of land meant apparentlylower costs in Jur{quilla 
than San Juanico (see Table 7 below) - according to the traditional 
con,rention of costing production in terms of the seed sown, Juriquilla 
emerges with a per.carga cost of69.36 pesos, four less than in San 
Juanico. But in reality labour requirements were higher, as we would 
expect for poorer soils and less negotiable terrain. Each car~a of grain, 
produced in Juruquilla cost 3.46 pesos, 50% up on the San Juanico figure 
and a significant cut into the hacienda's profit margins. Once again 
we are made aware of the advantages of the better endowed-hacienda •. 
TABLE 7: Wheat Production in Juriquilla: Accounts for 1858;_64 
' 
I 
I 4 6 8 il 2 3 5 7 9 I. 
Ggas Cgas Total Sale Gross Cost per · Cost per Cga Average 
.Year· s'own Produced Yield Costs Value Profits Cga sown ·Produced Price 
Per C a 
1: $ $ $ $ $ $ 
1858 15.8 332.2 21.00 1,207.00 1,962.50 755.50 76.39 3.63 5.91 
I 
1859 20.31 :422.9 21.00 . 1,456.25 2,245.50 789.25 71.70 3.44 5.31 
1860 16.74 :466.27 27.85 l ,641. 23 3,086.50 1,445.17 98.00 .. 3.52 6.62 
1861 11.40 259.56 22.77 870.00 1,922.00 1,052.00 76.32 3.35 7.40 
1862a '5 .27 1 93.42 17.73 4oo.oo .l ,415. 50 1,015.50 75.90 4.28 15.15 
1863a: I 8.88 239.45 26.97 731.00 2,603.70 1,872.70 82.32 3.05 10.87 
1864 25.6 271.18 10.59 . 1,262.90 1,949.19 686.29 49.33 4.66 7.19 
Totals 104.00 2,084.98 7,568.48 15,184.89 7,616.41 
Averages 14.86 297.85 20.00 1,081.21 2,169.27 1,088.06 72.77b 3.63 7.28 
Columns l and 2 are in cargas; 4~9 inc. are. given in pesos and centavos. 
a Scale of production probably reduced on account of collapsed market (BLC). . 
b Average figure for costs per carga sown probably biased downwards by 1864 combination of high area 
under cultivation and poor yields·: calculation made for 1858-63 only may represent a more typical 
level, $6305.58 + 78.4, or $80.43 rather than $72.77 (per carga costs (produced), similarly become 
$3. 48 per ega) • 
Source: ASJ/LC 1858-64. 
' 
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Harvests during this early period were naturally small, with 
annual averages at less than 300 cargas. Most of this grain seems to 
have been sold in Queretaro, since the overall average price recorded is 
only 7.41 pesos, but it is clear that some was occasionally sent to 
Mexico City - as, for instance, in 1865 when 173 cargas were despatched 
at a freight charge of 3.75 pesos the carga. 89 Gross profits were thus 
fairly meagre, averaging only.ll76.94 per year, but these would have. 
been subjected to low·er costs for t·ransport and rent than had been the 
case in SanJuanico. 10 fanegas de sembradura may have been rented for 
300. pesos, and transport into Queretaro, only some 15 kilometres distance, 
could hardly have· cost jnore than 50 cents the carga. On this basis net 
profits in Juriquilla fall to a mere 726.911 pesos per year - as a return 
on the estate's value, plus implements and oxen, around 78,500 pesos, 
this comes out at less than 1% and a far cry from the position in San 
Juanico. Small wonder Bernabe Loyola spoke of the hacienda with 
trepidation when he took it over in 1868 - a year of disaster in wheat, 
provoking don Bernabe to remark that "even if we'd been paid $25 the 
carga, there would still have been no profit".90 
Figures for the later period (see table 8 below), however, show 
that. he was finally undeterred by Juriquilla's lack of easy promise. 
In the longer term quite substan~ial investments were made in machinery -
in the 1908 inventory a steam-driven thresher was listed at 1800 pesos 
but it looks as though the earlier years were characterised by small-
scale mechanization and, primarily, by the clearing and levelling· of 
land for wheat production. As a result, average seed weights moved up 
from 11~.86 for 1856-64 to 39.24 for the later period, a jump of two and 
two-thirds. The trend during the years 1887-94 suggests that this was 
the time of early expansion. in Juriquilla wheat: 1887, the first :rear, 
registered a sowing that was barely higher than the earlier average and 
'· 
TABLE 8: Wheat Production in Juriquilla: Accounts for 1887~94 
i 
' 
' 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Cgas Cgas Total Total Gross Cost per Cost per Average 
Sown Produced Yield Costs Sale Value Profits Cga sown Cga price per 
Year 
., J2roduced Cga ' 
$ $ $ $ $ $ 
1887 19.73 252.61 12.80 1,652.78 2,864.01 1,211.23 63.77 6.54 11.34 
1888 30.46 413 .• 02 13.56 2,347.11 4,558.63 2 ,311. 52 77.06 5.68 11.28 
1889 32.90 ,981. 30 29.83 2,140.02 8,888.86 6,748.84 65.05 2.18 9.06 
1890 36.88 629,98 · 1 T.oo 2,817.95 7,336.62 4,518.67 76.41 4.47 11.65 
1891 63.82 656.54 10.29 2,957.75 7,966.73 5,008.98 46.35 . 4. 51 12.13 
1892 39.27 '572. 31 14.57 2,263.81 7,300.24 5,063.43 57.65 3.96 12.76 1--' L·J 
1893 42.72 1,043.96 24.44 3,517.38 7,030.24 3,512,86 82.34 3.37 6.73 
\j) 
1894 . 48.12 979.88 20.36 2,616.91 9,882.48 7,265.57 54.38 2.67 10.09 
Totals 313.9 5,529.6 
-
20,313.71 55,92'7.81 35,641.10 
Averages 39.24 691.2 1[.62 2,539,21 6,990.98 4,455.14 64.71 3.67 10.11 
Columns 1 and 2 are given in cargas; 4-9 are given in pesos and centavos. 
Profit ·per Cga produced = $6.45 per Cga sown $113~54 
Source: AJ/CC July 1896. 
I 
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in fact lower than the specific sewings of 1859 and 1864. Aver.age 
weights for the later period, 1891-94, however, come close to 48.5 
cargas, a figure which suggests that the area under wheat had been 
increased some threefold or more. 
Such a pattern of expansion fits within what we already know of 
the period. Saturated markets during the late 1870s would have hardly 
encouraged continued expansion, especially in haciendas of high produc-
. . . . 
tion costs. The arrival of the railways in 1882, however, must have 
promised redemption, and the same year Jose Loyola •vrote of the need to 
extend the.irrigable area on Juriquilla. 91 Further references to 
clearance and levelling during the last two decades of the century 
indicate that circumstances now favoured expansion, and we know that by 
1908. the area under irrigation had in fact reached 245 hectares, even 
if it was classified as 'mala clase'. 92 Recorded sales during the 
early 1890s in both the Capital and the north, in Coahuila and Durango, 
provide us with further evidence of the hacienda responding to the new 
f bl d •t• 93 avoura e con 1 1ons. 
Expansion of production there may have been; improvements in the 
form of that production were probably more limited, at least during the 
years under consideration here~ We know that certain machines were 
introduced during this period: a new winnower arrived at the hacienda 
in l88l,·and the same year finds Jose Loyola suggesting the purchase of 
a new thresher, but it is clear from the letter than this would still 
. 94 have been horse-powered. 
It is hard to assess the impact of this limited introduction of 
machinery. Yields were on average lower during this period than they 
had been in 1858-64, at.only 17.65 to l- but this may well reflect the 
extension of cUltivation into more marginal lands, and the fact that one 
of the years in the second sequence, 1891, was afflicted by the blight 
'· 
, ), , 
.1-~r...L 
chahuixtle. Average production costs are slightly higher during this 
second period: each carga of wheat produced in 1858-64 cost 3.46 pesos, now 
they cost 3.67. Such an increase, nowever small, implies that labour 
: 
I 
requirements for the crop had not been reduced, but here we are on 
uncertain ground since it was during this period that wage-rates became 
more differentiated and were marginally raised. It is therefore possible 
that the costs incurred in production conceal slightly higher rates _of 
pay, and thus an actual reduction:ih thelevel-of labour requirements. 
There are far safer inferences to be made in the area of marketing: 
profits may not have been increased at the expense of labour, but they 
certainly were at that of the consumer. By the late 1880s Queretaro 
wheat was gaining a national reputation, challenging the products of 
Atlixco and San Martin Texmelucan in Puebla and areas in Sonora for 
national primacy, and local prices had thus risen to around 10 pesos the 
carga. By the early 1890s these had increased again to around 12 pesos. 95 
Profit-margins per unit of grain produced in Juriquilla enjoyed a 
-- _ commensurate increase:- the earlier average price of 7. 41 pesos the carga 
rose to 10.11 pesos for 1887-94, and registered profits per carga 
increased some 63.5% to 6.46 pesos. Given the rise in the volume of 
production, these more favourable market conditions gave the hacienda 
the chance of making considerably larger gross profits from wheat that 
it had done previously. During the years 1858~64 gross revenues had 
barely exceeded 1000 pesos - now they were almost seven times that 
amount, at virtually 7000 pesos, and ample reward for don Bernabe's 
·perseverance. 
--------- --r-t--18" most" unfortunate-that we do not have information on 
production during the later years in Juriquilla, since this would have 
shown the extent to which more progressive mechanization, exemplified 
by the steam-powered thresher of the 1908 inventory, had affected levels 
of labour requirements and profitability. Nonethe~ess, the case has 
unmistakeable significance, since it shows how investments in land 
improvements were swiftly vindicated by higher returns from an expanding 
market, and it equally sets up the importance in this development of 
the arrival of the railways. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE GOLDEN AGE OF THE HACIENDA AND THE RISE OF MIXED FARMING 
LIVEST0,9K ON THE HACIENDA: PURPOSES AND PROFITABILITY 1850-1912 
During the early years of the Colony agricultural production in 
the Bajfo had been biased towards livestock products, ~uch as meat, 
1 leather, and wool. Changes in the population and the economy soon 
altered this focus. Meat prices may have risen cons1derably with 
these trends during the latter part of the eighteenth century, but the 
overall growth of this market was limited. 2 Expansion in demand for the 
cheaper commodities of the popular diet, such as maize and wheat flour, 
had no limitations of this kind and thus promised to continue growing. 
In the wake of these changes in market-demand the Bajfo hacienda 
turned increasingly away from livestock production and towards more · 
intensive cultivation; sources for the traditional products shifted 
northwards to Nueva Le6n and Coahuila. By the end of the Colonial 
· · period the region 1 s transformation was more or less complete, and in 
most cases the primary purpose of hacienda livestock was not to provide 
direct revenue through production for the market, but rather to act as 
a means to profits through the provision of traction and transport. 3 
This shift of production was not, however, all plain sailing. 
The hacienda had met the increases in demand by extending the area of 
land under cultivation rather than by raising levels of productivity. 4 
As a result considerably more draught animals were required to do the 
work, and this entailed investment.· More important than thi_s, however, 
was the fact that increased numbers of animals demanded larger pastures -
this a{ the very time that pastures were being reduced_ by the extension 
of cultivation. Given the nature of the Bajfo climate such a sqt.o.eeze 
on resources was bound to be hazardous for all but the largest of 
'· 
estates, and there are indications that hacienda pastures were becoming 
saturated with working livestock and unable to accommodate the 
periodic years of drought. 1785 is a case in point - during this year 
of drought one hacienda near Queretaro reported that it had lost over 
140 of its 200 oxen, and there is no reason to think that this was a 
. . 5 
un1que exper1ence. 
In any. event there are firm indications that there was a gro,ving _ 
imbalance between stock levels and pasture resources by the middle 
decades of the nineteenth century, and these latter were, after all, 
regarded as comparable to the last years of the Colony in terms of 
economic activity and levels of production. According to a popular 
adage of the 1780s oxen required pasture at a rate of three times the 
t.h t th b . 6 . area a ey were a le to cult1vate. Each yoke of oxen 1n the 
Queretaro area was reckoned to be able to cultivate up to 6 hectares, 
thus g1ving us a figure for the area of required pasture per beast of 
. 7 9 hectares. 
Let us now turn to Rasa's survey for the state in the 1840s. 
According to his assessment of the lands held by the Queretaro haciendas 
8 .. 
there were some 447;000 hectares of pasture available. At the same 
time he counted 26,035 oxen as the total number maintained on the 
haciendas, giving each beast an area of pasture of around 17 hectares. 
On this basis there would have been no real pressure on the state's 
pasture stocks, but there were, however, a considerable number of other 
animals on the haciendas, all of which must have had access to some of 
these grasslands. Once this number 1s taken into account the picture 
is very different. The adult stock alone, all of which played a part 
in the internal economy of the hacienda, and included horses, bulls, 
milch-cows, donkeys and mules, amounted to over 85,000 head. On top of 
this there were some 2624 bullocks tagged for slaughter, and over ·260,000 
head of sheep and goats,-these presumably-able to survive-on the mo~t 
'· 
marginal of pastures. 9 On these estimates the adult working stock 
alone had to manage on a per-beast pasture ratio of 1 to 5.25 hectares -
figures which suggest that conditions were indeed precariously poised. 
i 
I 
Livestock in the mid-century: traction, meat and milk 
It is clear from Raso's data that the changes in hacienda 
production had put remaining pasture lands under considerable pressure. 
In the barren northern parts of the state this was .probably of little 
consequence; but in the southern valleys of Queretaro and. San Juan del 
Rio the situation may well have been dangerously stretched. In any 
event it is unlikely that haciendas in these areas conformed to the 
general depiction of neglect and wasteful underutilization. 
Take the_ case of San Juanico during these years. From the table 
below it is clear that some 200 oxen were maintained on the hacienda. 
We know from the records of the administrator that annual levels of 
cultivation settled at around 785 hectares. One hundred yoke of oxen 
could manage only 600 hectares, but it should be remembered that San 
Juanico cultivated a variety of crops and that the work schedule was 
thus staggered over the year. The point is that the hacienda's arable 
sector certainly demanded a herd of at least 200 oxen, and that these 
would ideally have had access to some 1800 hectares of pasture. In 
fact the hacienda had only around 535 hectares, and this area had also 
to provide for the considerable number of other animals held on San 
Juanico. 
Efforts were clearly made to relieve this situation. Fat-stock 
--·-··------interes-ts had already- been discontinued, and revenue from the sector had 
been limited to the sale of oxen and cows, presumably as and when age 
and pasture-stocks demanded, and to the production of milk.and cheese. 
In addition to these measures:· it is also clear that pastures lvere 
Sl,lPP~eiilep.1:;~_9:_:t?y __ ~E.E:!. PJ:'O~uctio:rl ... of.. fodder. Given the_ system of acc::>unting 
'· 
s 
1859 255 
1860 294 
1861 "396 
1862 409 
1863 295 
1864 129 
1865 91 
1866 151~ 
1867 165 
1868 76 
Total: '61 
Sold '65 390 
, C:f'\ 
-'-/'-' 
TABLE 9: Livestock in San Juanico 1859-68 
Adult Bull Yearling 2 year- · Mature 
cows calves bulls old bulls bulls 
d s d s d s d ·s d 
76 79 32 10 
81 68 34 
13 64 61 67' 3 
109 53 9 170 .18 41 6 84 3 
.277. 1~4 1 151 11. 35 3 81 8 
78 65 2 75 7 25 6 27 5 i 
34 41 30 5 1 1 3 
26 
89 
$4150.05 1 $10 1 $15 ' 
s Stock on first day of the year: net increases due to. 
to births and maturation of stock on the hacienda, § 
or transfers from Juriquilla (114 oxen in total). 
d Animals sold, died,' lost or requisitioned 
during the year, but excluding transfers rn!:lde 
on account of upgrading within hacienda, eg. 
from yearling to 2 year olds. · 
Novices and Heifer 
Oxen calves 
s d s .d 
234 68 
230 
250 27 58 4 
310 45 ·511 6 
265 5l.j. 48 2 
294 203 55 4 
. 202 51 44 
153 
167 $2528.42 
:·tJ't r. 
·:.r 
Yearling 2 year old Total· no. Total revenue 
heifers heifers sold in year from sales 
s d s d 
75 51 
68 77 
99 62 1 8 $ .122.55 
160 5 83 3 39 $ 496.00 
155 7 81 27 290 $2832.25 
77·. 4 31 3 169 $2192.42 
69 .2 1 :. 21 98 $1450.25 
I 
1 $11.50 44 $:318.50 6o4 $7093.47 
employed on the hacienda the extent of this supplementary feeding is 
hard to quantify, but we do know that barley was smm every year along 
with the maize temporal, and that it was occasionally purchased on the 
open matket during the worst periods of.drought ~as, for example, in 
June 1862, when 57 fanega~ were bought. Again in 1865 we find regular 
consignlents being made over as 'pastures', starting out at a low of. 
I 2.65 fan.egas per week and rising to a peak in the driest and hottest 
. I . 10 
month o:f May to 45 fanegas. Maize was also regularly feel to the 
I livestock. . 
I . 
Here, then, is evidence of the attempts made to alleviate the 
pressur1s on available pastures in the hacienda. These efforts amount 
J . . f .·t t d f t k b . to the ueg1nn1ngs o an 1n egra e system o s oc - reed1ng and arable 
I . 
Production, but the records show how even these were often confounded I . 
by the Bajfo climate. Late in 1858 there was reportedly no grass.left 
I . . 
on the hac1enda as a result of a drought, and that consequently stock 
1 . 
was very thin. A mere three years later in 1862 drought struck again, 
. I 
reducing August pastures to the expected poverty of May, and as a result 
the hacienda lost 62 oxen. ~1e following September things again 
deteriorated, grasslands were parched and beasts were dylng from 
. . .. . . 11 
starvation and disease-prone debilitation. 
All of this gives us the impression that the smaller, well-
endmved properties like San Juanico were operating at the limit of 
their resources, and were consequently particularly vulnerable to the 
natural hazards of the Bajfo rains. Arable profits were such that 
cultivation was maximised and this occurred at the expense of reserve 
pastures. The point is further emphasised by referring to the hacienda's 
transport provision. It will be remembered that San Juanico sent 
considerable quantities of wheat to Mexico City in 1865 - transport was 
hired and cost the hacienda dearly. The failure to provide freight from 
within the hacienda was not a case of miscalculation or oversight, since 
the letters of the period emphasise the paramount importance of such 
self-sufficiency. It rather suggests that San Juanico's capacity to 
J 
i 
hold further animals had been exhausted, and that mule~trains had been 
regarded as the least indispensable sector of the stock. 
Oxen were of prime necessity since they were essential to the 
arable production. These were bred on the hacienda, as was the time-
honoured practice, and the table shows how some revenue was raised from 
various sales and set 'against the considerable costs involved.· Milch-· 
cows were on the hacienda primarily for the purpose of breeding bull 
calves, thereafter destined for castration and the yoke after their 
fourth year. This prime necessity was then diversified and a separate 
side-line was developed round the production of milk and cheese to be 
marketed in Queretaro. 
We do not know exactly when San Juanico began to produce milk 
commercially, but it certainly went back as far as January 1858, when 
12 
-purchases were made of ·soap and candles for the cmvshed. It was from 
the roof of this building that Bernabe Loyola observed the manouevres 
of the Liberal and Conservative armies in the dalv.n.of a November day in 
1859. Earlier that year, in March, he had offer~d a Gabriel Caro the-
job of taking charge of the milking operation, at 20 pesos a month wages 
to be supplemented by a weekly ration of half fanega of maize and 
access' to a fanega of land suitable for maize temporal. It is unknown 
if Caro took up the offer or not; but the accounts show that the enter-
prise was well underway throughout the year, and that a contract was 
_____ , _______ :r:~ac-i~ed--in-Jilly ~ith Jo~e G. -Urrutia._ The arrangement was that Urrutia 
would take the entire supply,· from both cows and goats, and that. prices 
would be cheaper during the rainy season from July 15 through to 
October 15, at 7 cuartillos per real - thereafter, one real would 'buy 
only 6 cuartillos. 13 
On the basis of these prices it is possible to calculate that the 
1859 production from San Juanico was in the region of 35,000 litres 
from a herd of some 255 head. Assuming a milking period of around 
300 days per year, daily production per cow com~s out at 0.45 of a 
·. 14 litre. This takes no account of the contribution made by the goats, 
so per-head production could have fallen even further. On the other 
hand it should be remembered that milk was of secondary i~portance, 
subordinate to the main activity of breeding, and it is unlikeiy that 
all the cows were brought to. the dairy for milking - in March 1863, 
for instance, 77 cows with their suckling calves were dispatched to 
Salitrillo, a nearby hacienda with more pasture available than San 
J . 15 uanJ.co. 
In addition to this consideration there is also the fact that the 
market demand for milk during these years would hardly have justified 
a more concerted effort. As it was by July 1860 the administrator 
·· ··reported that there was a surfeit of milk in Queretaro and consequently 
work was started to convert the old tienda on the hacienda into a 
cheesery. This was not; of course, the first time that the hacienda 
had produced cheese - there are records of sales from the earliest of 
the documents available, September 1858 - so we might conclude that this 
conversion signified a more systematic approach to the whole business of 
. d t• 16 da11-y pro uc J.on. 
Further evidence for this trend is to be found within a couple of 
years of the conversion, when the hacienda undertook to lay down an 
area of alfalfa to feed to the dairy stock. Costs of production and 
maintenance were spread over three.years and totalled a little short of 
400 pesos. 271 lbs. had been sown in the last week of 1862 after work 
had been done on manuring and levelling the land appointed for the 
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production. A further 175 lbs were then sown in 1864, probably to 
. 17 
replenish the planted area. There are no details available on the 
amount of fodder taken from this plot, but there are indications that 
i 
the experiment was a success. In March of 1865 there is a note of the 
good condition of the stock, and this is connected with the feeding 
of alfalfa. Then again, it can be seen from the accounts of milk 
production that the hacienda received a steady income from it, and that 
revenues began to rise slightly in 1865 and 1866. Although there is no 
hard evidence that this rise was due to the feeding of alfalfa, it is 
perhaps worth noting that the number of milch-cows available for 
milking on the hacienda, at least in 1865, was considerably down on the 
earlier numbers (see Table 9). 
Milk was highly perishable in the Bajfo heat, and was therefore a 
very difficult product to market successfully. Such hazards were 
compounded during the years in question by the dangers of banditry and 
military campaigns - during times such as these the delivery of fresh 
milk to Queretaro was suspended and cheese was produced instead, seliing 
later at the rate of 1 1/2 reales per pound. Other measures were taken 
to alleviate this problem of milk's perishability. Most importantly, 
haciendas appear to have made hard arrangements with retailers in the 
city, presumably in order to achieve some kind of equilibrium between 
supply and demand. 1859 appears to have been the first year of regular 
production in San Juanico, and by July an arrangement had been made 
·with Jose G. Urrutia. We find the same occurrence ten years later on 
Juriquilla: a small amount of milk was being produced there.~n 1869 
. . . 18 
and almost 1mmed1ately a contract was taken.out W1th Juan del Campo. 
Similar arrangemeni(s also seem to have operated a.t the end of the 1870s 
in San Jose el Alto, although in this case the agent in question ·;-ras 
the Queretaro-based wife of the owner of the hacienda. 19 
'· 
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FR0!-1 i'JfEAT TO MILK ON THE HACIENDA 1850-1912 
It is clear from the production accounts of San Juanico's milk 
that it was becoming a profitable enterprise even during the turbulent 
years of the mid-century. Once the virtues of alfalfa had been· appreciated 
it was a perfect side-line to the main livestock purpose of providing 
for traction and transport. Further improvements in production methods 
began to appear during the Porfiriato, such as the stabling of stock 
and the attempt to improve the genetic quality of the animals. By the 
1890s the valley basins of Queretaro and San Juan del Rio were renowned 
for milk production, and e.ven some of the more remote properties, such 
as Amascala to the north of the city, were beginning to feature as 
20 
examples of progressive methods in the government press. 
The option to produce milk was," of course, open to the less well-
endowed haciendas as well as those of the quality of San Juanico. All 
that was needed was stabling and a guaranteed supply of fodder, preferably 
alfalfa. .l!:ven so, as in other aspects of development, it probably took 
these less favoured properties longer to move into systematic production. 
Juriquilla is a case in point. It -vrill be recalled that this 
hacienda had previously been run as an adjunct to the more prosperous 
San Juanico complex. Under this regime income had largely been limited 
to the renting out of land and to the raising of stock. The.attempt to 
sell the estate in January 1860 had claimed that the ha~ienda.had the 
capacity to hold 800 head of cattle, mules, horses and donkeys, the 
majority of which would have been cattle. The claim went on to aver 
that this herd would provide an annual production ·of 150 head of fat-
stock ready for sale at 20 pesos each, yielding revenue of 3000.pesos. 
Figures for the recorded profits from Juriquilla 's livestock fm· 1859 
to 1864 show that average gross returns came to 1763.17 pesos, app~ently 
a reasonable sum. The probability, however, is that this is an illusion 
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born of the accounting system used at the time. It is not surprising 
that the claim was made that sales could reach 150 head, since this 
had indeed occurred i~ the year in question. Late in 1859,the administrator 
I 
had recorded that the stock was in fine fettle, and that he vTas as a 
result looking for a market for at least 200 head. This proved very 
difficult, and a contract for the sale of 200 from a local meat merchant 
. at 200 pesos the head was only reluctantly agreed to, and even then not 
until efforts had been made to find a better price in Mexico City 
through the agencies of his brother-in-law, Jose Carmona. 21 
We are left with the impression that this was probably the only 
major sale of fat-stock during this period. 1860, the year of the sale, 
stands out as unusually profitable. In addition to this, the schematic 
accounts for the gross profits recorded for 1859 suggest that the figures 
reached were largely reflections of the theoretical gains made in the 
hacienda as a resUlt of births and maturation - less than 200 pesos were 
22 labelled as revenue from the sale of meat. 
All of this suggests that even on the poorer estates, those with 
wider spaces useless for cultivation, the decline of fat-stock production 
was well advanced. However,· as suggested earlier, a full substitute 
for this activity was not quick to emerge. Daily production of milk 
may have been of the order of three-quarters of a barrel a day as early 
as 1869, but it was clearly some time before milk production on 
Juriquilla became more than an incidental side-line to the main job of 
producing work-stock. In September 1880, for instance, there were 110 
milch-cows available for dairy production, but the daily flo~ of milk 
2 . 23 had fallen as low as 5 l1tres. 
As noted earlier, more modern production methods had been introduced 
amongst the better haciendas during this same decade of the 1880s. 
Similar steps were not taken in Juriquilla until the opening of tha 
'· 
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twentieth century. It was only in March of 1900 that Jose Loyola took 
the initial step of separating the better milch-cows, some 25, from 
the others, and stabling them. The rest were despatched to Solana, 
a somewhat arid ranch at the edge of the main property. The stabled 
cows were then fed with alfalfa and given more careful treatment. 
These efforts were immediately rewarded: within a week production had 
more than doubled to 39 litres a day, and by June daily production had. 
reached the point where 35 litres could be put aside for skimming, to 
make cream and curd cheese. By 6 August it is clear that the efforts 
· have been totally vindicated with daily produce of between 100 and 110 
litres, implying perhaps as much as 4 or more litres per cow per day 
compared to the 0.64 litres recorded at the beginning of the change of 
. 24 
reg1me. 
We do not have information on the sales and profitability in . this 
newly managed sector, which is unfort1mate. But is it surely safe· to 
assume that they were an improvement on earlier levels. These, in turn, 
whatever the inefficiencies of the old system, had not been inconsiderable. 
Sales in 1892, for instance, had in all probability reached close to 
2000 pesos. Costs were limited to wages,.ranging from 3.18 to 3.94 
pesos weekly, and implying employment of perhaps 3 men, plus occasional 
purchases for the dairy and of alfalfa, totalling less than 250 pesos 
for the whole year. Gross profits thus.recorded amounted to 1760.40. 
pesos, a useful complement to the hacienda's burgeoning revenues from 
the arable sectors. A review of the hacienda 1 s use of the road through 
neighbouring hacienda Jurica onto the city of Queretaro during the 
years 1895-7 suggests that a daily delivery was made from the Juriquilla 
dairy, and so there is every likelihood that revenues.were of the same 
25 
order in subsequent years. 
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Further proof that the poorer haciendas were able to profit f~om 
what was an apparently growing demand for dairy produce comes from the· 
case of San Jose el Alto.· It will be remembered that this 1was a most 
I 
unfortunate estate endowed with shallow, stoney soils and no irrigation. 
It was however situated close to the city of Queretaro, a boon in terms 
of marketing and of access .to supply of fodder. Ingenuity made up for 
'the rest. In this way Roman Veraza stocked San Jose el Alto with 55 
milch-cows in May 1879 and turned them loose on the sparse pastures of 
his new property. He also owned a plot in Queretaro whiGh was.irrigable-
there he grew alfalfa, feed for his cows and for fattening pigs. He 
also milked.goats, presumably more at home on the biblical stoniness of 
the San Jose hillsides. 
Records remain for the sixty weeks on the hacienda from 13 May 1879 
through to 4 July the following year. Milk and cheese were produced 
regularly, and registered on a monthly basis in the accounts; as 
mentioned earlier, the entire supply was sent to Roman's wife ~ho 
presumably acted as a·retailer in her own right. Total revenue for 
cow's milk over this period amounted to 695.50 pesos, and for goats' 
·-·--. 
172.25, . or 867.75 in all. ·Goat's milk had been valued at 0. 02 pesos 
per litre in Juriquiiia in 1881, and was normally priced at about half 
the value of cows' milk. Assuming the latter .was priced at $o.o4., over 
19.250 litres were produced over the period at a rough average rate of 
26 
one litre per.day per cow. There is no doubt that these yields were 
poor by comparison with European yields eighty years earlier, but as an 
ancillary enterprise on an estate as impoverished as San Jose el Alto 
it was a source of income not without significance. Above all, it 
. . 
represented the·rewards of ingenuity and enterprise rather than idle 
exploitation of natural bounty. 
Meanwhile on the better estates milk production was taking on -a new . 
degree of importance. On the eve of the Revolution San Juanico had 
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reduced its stock of dairy cattle to a mere 69,.with224.goa,ts, b.ut 
these were of a higher quality. 33 of the cows had been imported and 
were valued at 120 pesos each, with thetotal inventory reaching 4860 
pesos. 27 Production during the week of 8 to 11~ December amounted to 
2268 litres ·from the cows and 499 from the goats, rendering average 
per-head, per-day production of 4~7 litres for cows, and 0.32 for goats. 
In mid-June ·1910 there had been a total of 18 men •m~king on this sector 
in San Juanico with a daily average wage of 33 cents; six of these were 
dairymen earning the slightly higher than average wage of 37 cents a 
day. By 14 December 1912 the year's wage bill in this sector had reached 
2669.50 pesos: from this it is possible to calculate that for the total 
year wages might have come to around 2850 pesos. In April of the same 
year a· report had been made out by the hacienda's· administrator, Miguel 
Sobreya, and this had put the average annual gross income.from milk 
production in San Juanico at 12,000 pesos. 28 We can calculate that 
gross profits, once wages had been deducted, would have been in the 
region of 9150 pesos. Without making any allmrance for the effects of,' 
inflation, tl1is figure represents an increase on the 1859-66 average of 
over 570%. This is certain evidence that milk production had become a 
crucial element in the hacienda economy, at least amongst those close 
enough to urban centres to take advantage·of growing demand. The fact 
of this potential fund had not been lost on Miguel Sobreya either, since 
in his 1912 report he noted that further gains could be made with the 
introduction of 50 more imported cattle from the USA and of 300 goats, 
thereby raising the annual revenue to 15,000 pesos. 29 
Some sixty years earlier milk had started out as a minor side-line 
to the primary task of providing the hacienda with its.required work-
stock for arable production. By the eve of the Revolution it had 
established itself as one of the hacienda's most profitable enterprises. 
lbU 
According to the 1909 inventory San Juanico maintained a total of 
1362 head of livestock, including 263 oxen, and valued in total at 
33,370.50 pesos. Many of these, the oxen, mules and horses for example,_ 
I 
earned income indirectly by working the land or transporting its 
produce. According to the 1910 wage-bill a total of 40 men were employed 
to care for this range of stock. A further four men contributed to the 
successful care of this stock, two as caretakers of the drinking wells·, 
and two as guardians of the alfalfa plots. . Based ori the wage ·levels of 
the times, these 44 men would have cost the hacienda a maximum of 
5000.pesos a year. Gross revenue.from milk sales in San Juani.co, let 
.· . 
alone incidental gains from the occasional sale of stock, amounted to 
some 7000. pesos in excess of this total wage-bill. In other word.s, 
milk production in San Juanico had been made so effective that the 
entire costs. of maintaining and caring for all branches of livestock em 
the hacienda had been more than covered by this· one aspect, their 
utility. Surely this is firm evidence of the emergence, at least in 
San Juanico, of a fully integrated relationship between the arable and 
livestock interests within the hacienda economy. Finally, there is no 
reason for us to regard the case of San Juanico as unique; indeed, in 
the government surveys of the last two decades before the Revolution, 
San Juanico was never singled out as a notable case of dairy production, 
but rather for other aspects of its economy - other estates, such as 
Jacal, La Llave, and Montenegro, were apparently more remarkable for 
. 30 
their modern dairies and systematic breeding for milk production. 
INDIGENOUS CROPS OF HIGH COST AND HIGH RETURNS: CHILE AND. CAMOTE 
A pattern to the development of the hacienda economy. in the· eastern 
.. 
Bajlo is now beginning to emerge. The way in which the milk .production 
rose to importance in the cases just discussed in fact foresh~dowed 
some of the key elements in the more recent developments of theregion~s 
agrarian economy. 
Central to all these has been the constraints of nature, the 
Baj 1o' s limited amount of fertile land and the hazards of its unreliable 
rainfall. There is no need to reiterate the role played by irrigation 
in overcoming some of these problems, but it should be remembered that 
there was a limit to the area amenable to this as long as methods relied 
on the gathering of rainfall and river waters. The problem of the 
temporal lands had been largely resolved by the introduction of 
sharecropping, but profits in wheat depended upon at least a fairly 
extensive area open to irrigation. The profits made from this crop in 
San.Juanico and Juriquilla came from cultivating more than 200 hectares •. 
This was by no means an inconsiderable area: some haciendas like 
La Llave in San Juan del Rl:o were able to boast of very much more, but 
it is worth noting that the average area of irrigable la~d in the 
districts of Queretaro and San Juan del Rfo, the main locations of such 
facilities, came to less than 60 hectares per hacienda in Rasa's day. 31 
By the time of the first post-Revolutionary survey in 1929-30.this 
figure had risen to some 165 hectares, but we must assume that some of 
this increase had been accomplished in the decade preceding the survey. 32 
In any event it is clear that even with sharecropping in maize temporal 
and the development of profits from irrigated wheat, haciendas without 
extensive areas of irrigable lands were still somewhat caught up an the 
horns of the original dilemma. 
Milk had provided a glimmer of hope for these haciendas: quit,~ 
small areas of irrigated lands planted with alfalfa could provide 
'· 
important supplementary feed for dairy livestock, and given a 
convenient outlet, the enterprise could be made to be profitable. 
Similar prospects were held out to haciendas by two traditional 
I 
products, chile and camote. Both required irrigation, but both could 
also yield high per unit-area returns, certainly in excess of those of 
wheat • 
. Chile in San ~Tuanico, Juriquilla and Agua Azul 
There are many varieties of chile. indigenous to Mexico; those 
most usually grown on the Queretaro haciendas were Pasilla, Mulat~, 
Ancho Colorado, and Trompillo. It was not a straightforward crop to 
produce: Miguel Sobreya had commented that it required great care and 
had many enemies, thus making yields hard to predict, and Jose Loyola 
had remarked tl1at successful production depended upon a very intensive 
working and reworking of soil prior to planting out. Plants were 
started out from seed in the nursery during November and December -
the impression left by the accounts for Agua Azul in 1885 suggests that 
this was intensive work, with 1160 peon-days invested on behalf of 12 
. 33 
cuartillos of seed. The plants were then transplanted. in March, at a 
time when they were less vulnerable, as for instance to frost- in 1894 
the hacienda Mayorazgo lost 800 plants in this way, and Juriquilla only 
survived the same low temperatures of March 21-22 by virtue of Jose 
Loyola's precaution of covering them with protective sacking. 34 The next 
tasks were weeding, which took place in April and June, followed by 
irrigation in May and late June as required. Harvesting started in 
- ·--- ---·. -Augus.t and often .ran through .. September. 
All this intensive care made chile an expensive crop to produce; 
Rasa reckoned that it incurred more than 16 times the costs of l~bour 
needed for maize, and more than 12 times those of wheat. 35 It would be 
unwise ~s> .. _:t_g __ ~l1~ __ C:S..}:~u-~ate yields and costs on the basis of unit-·:treas, 
since we have little hard evidence to go on, but there are strong 
indications that one hectare of irrigated land could well have 
36 
accommodated more than 5000 plants. Miguel Sobreya reckoned that 
a plantation such as this would produce between 2500 and 3000 arrobas, 
each one 25 lbs. 37 If other haciendas could manage as well as San 
· Juanico such yields would have given them perhaps as much as 75,000. 
pounds of chile per hectare of land planted out. As with other products, 
the market value for chile varied, not just according to the quantity 
of the region's annual harvest but also acco"rding to the quality of 
product - by 1913 chile pasilla produced in San Juanico was being 
sorted into six different grades. 38 But, according to all the· evidence 
at our disposal for the years of the Porfiriato, prices were normally 
sufficient to justify sale, and, barring disasters such as occurred in 
Mayorazgo in 189l1, our impression is that the crop was progressively 
more profitable. 
Perhaps this had not always been the case. The·earliest record 
for production in San Juanico is 1858- 1506 plants·were raised in the 
nursery during the last months of 1857 at a cost of 183.75 pesos, or 
about 12cents each. Labour costs in working the soil arid in tending 
the growing crop brought the total costs, including the harvest,·to 
542.16 pesos. The vast majority of the produce was sold green during 
· . July and August, the rest being marketed once it had dried during 
November and December. Total sales yielded some 550.38 pesos, barely 
sufficient to cover the costs of production; and as a result it looks 
h th . . d. t . d 39 A 1 t .. as thoug e exper1ment was J.scon 1nue • . t some a er po1.nt, 
however, production was resumed. We do.not know when or why, but it 
is probably safe to assume that it coincided with more stable t1·ading 
conditions and the development of improved techniques. 
Fragments of information suggest that the sector was well 
established in San Juanico by the 1890s - during the week of 22-28 ~ay -
'· 
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1892 there had been a total of 474 peon-days committed to the· sector 
at a cost of 88.49 pesos; and in 1896 during the time for planting-out 
from the nursery, 15-21 March, the labour commitment reached 1210 peon-
40 days, at the cost of 217.96 pesos. 
It had been during the 1880s that production had been developed in 
Juriquilla, although substantial investments were not risked there 
until the 1890s (see table 10). The evidence is somewhat fragmentary 
but it looks as though yields were lower in Juriquilla than in San 
Juanico, something which we would in any case have expected: in the 
latter hacienda yields per plant were unlikely to fall below· 12 l/2 lbs, 
whereas this may hav-e been the optimum level achieved in Juriquilla. 
Given an inferior level of performance, it is. quite likely that 
Juriquilla delayed production whilst the fertile San Juanico had picked 
up considerably earlier. 
Such an inference is supported by the evidence we have for the 
production of chile in Agua Azul, a hacienda near to Apaseo el Alto in 
Guanajuato. This was a property which fell between the quality 
differences of San Juanico and Jurl.quilla, and it is clear from the 
records left for the hacienda's activities during the years 1885-90 
that chile production was an important component of the estate's 
profitability. Costs there were always higher than the peak year for 
Juriquilla, and indeed came close to those of San Juanico for 1910 'vhen 
wages had reached higher levels. 
Accounting eccentricities in Agua Azul make it difficult for us to 
put an exact figure on the profits achieved from chile during the years 
1885-90. · The two most profitable crops raised on the hacienda were 
bought up by the more active of the two partners who owned the property. 
Wheat and chile were thus transferred without precise record of their 
amounts. In the opening year of the partnership, however, this pr."i.ctice 
had not been introduced, and so we are able to glean some idea of chile's 
profitability. 
Costs in chile production for 1886-7 were sp~ead across the·months 
from October 1886 to December 1887, taking in labour commitments from 
the nursery stage through to the completion of harvesting and packaging. 
The total sum reached 2014.73 pesos. Some small and insignificant 
.sales were clearly made_ on the hacienda during the weeks after the· 
harvest, but the huge bulk of the produce was bought outright by the 
active partner of the enterprise, Alfonso Veraia, on 7 January 1888. · 
He paid 8021.38 pesos for this produce, bringing total revenue to 
8197,53, and it·may be fair to assume that this amount did not fully 
reflect the market value of the crop, since it is likely that don 
Alfonso was reserving at least a part of the marginal value. as a reward 
for his entrepreneurial activities. In any event, thetransaction gave 
the hacienda an ample figure for gross profits from the sector of 
6092.80,. three times.the amount incurred as costs in production. It is 
unfortunate that we do not have more explicit evidence for the subsequent 
years' production, since this would put the matter beyond doubt; 
instead, it must suffice to point to tpe high profits of .. the initial 
year's enterprise, and to reflect that the sustained levels of costs, 
including those incurred during the harvest season, ·do not in any way 
suggest that the hacienda's interest had been blunted by a run of 
disastrous years or a decline in revenue. ·And certainly the trading 
account of our active partner Alfonso Veraza remained brim full and 
vigorous. 
Juriquilla's profits give the appearance of having been more 
modest. This.is to be expected since production had been limited to a 
more reduced scale. But even here the apparent trend was towards a 
larger and considerably more lucrative sector, as the statistics for 
'· 
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the years from 1892 demonstrate. During the last two decades before 
. . . d . . h . 41 . the Revolut~on the value of ch~le tende to r~se qu~ te s arply; . g~ ven 
this stimulus and the confidence born of the three pr.ogre~sive successes 
i 
' 
in 1892-94, there is good reason to assume that the hacienda's interest 
in the crop was at least sustained and very likely extended. 
TABLE 10: Chile Production in Juriquilla, 1887-94 
Year Costs Production . Sales . Profit 
1887 254.81 100.45 - 154.36 
1888 605.35 149.91 - 455.44 
1889 4lt4.74 532.93 + 88.19 
1890 387.30 270.00 667.74 + 28o;44 
1891_. 542.28 . 405.00 . 973.75 + 431.47 
1892 877.13 780.00 2298.54 . +1421.41 
1893 1505.09 1206.13 4488.19 +2983.10 
1891• 1635.44 1287.00 3763.76 +2128.32 
Costs, sales and profits are given in pesos and centavos. 
Production. is given in·arrobas and pounds. 
Source: AJ/CC July 1896. 
Events on the other side of the city' in San Juanico would have · 
confirmed any optimistic outlook. · Data already referred to on wages 
paid in 1892 and i896 provide solid indications that the chile sector 
· there was well underway. On the eve of the Revolution, during September 
-- -- ----
to December 1909, considerable consignments of three grades of chile 
pasilla, colorado, and mulato were made to the company of Angel·Pelayo 
-----·- ·---- --i'ii- ·Quer-etaro:· Tlies·e suggest- that the harvest of 1909 was a bumper one 
of more than 6000. arrobas. ·.Less 'substantial but still healthy 'lUantities 
were delivered to the separate companies of Carlos Ortiz and Florencio 
Sanchez, both of Mexico City, during the early years of the Revolution, 
-with-prices- for -:the best grades of pasilla and trompillo reaching .30 cents 
1 /'~ Uf 
and 90 cents the kilo respectively. Given this flourishing state of 
production it seems legitimate to take the estimates made by 
administrator Miguel.Sobreya in 1912 as erring on the side of the 
conservative. He reckoned a crop production of 2500 arrobas, pricing 
it at 6 pesos the arroba, the equivalent of an average value of 53 cents 
the kilo, and therefore registering the sector with gross revenues of 
15,000. pesos. Wage lists up to the middle of December 1912 provide us 
with solid grounds for assuming crop costs to have been at most 3000 
pesos; further income of 1500 pesos was to be had from the sale of 
chile trompillo whilst still green, thus rendering a balance for gross 
profits in the region of 13,500 pesos. 42 It is hard to argue with 
figures as bountiful as these and we are left with the distinct impression 
that chile had become highly remunerative to the hacienda. · On the 
bases of chile, sharecropped maize,.irrigated wheat, and dairy 
production, the hacienda had emerged as a triumphantly profitable 
enterprise. 
Camote in San Juanico, 1857-65 
So far we have examined the way. 1n which the hacienda moved 
forward over the period from 1840 to the outbreak of the Revolution. 
Its progress and emergence into a fully-fledged commercial enterprise 
has thus been linked to a number of different crops and to the method 
of their production - sharecropped maize temporal, irrigated wheat, 
alfalfa-supported dairy production, and ultimately,-chile of-various 
types. Each of these aspects of the hacienda economy tended to grow in 
importance, both in terms of output and profitability, over·the period 
in question. There were, hmvever, other products which had a different 
history. These, like camote, played an important part in their time 
by contributing profitable returns to the hacienda, but then declined 
in importance, becoming finally marginal to the overall economy of the 
hacienda. 
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. Camote, or sweet-potato, was, like chile and maize, indigenous to 
the New World. It required well-worked and deep, sandy. soils with an 
abundance of water - which possibly explains why it had been cultivated 
1 
on only a reduced scale during the times of ' 43 Raso s survey. Ploughing 
and harrowing had to penetrate as deeply as possible, a task done during 
January and February, ana· then furrm-rs and ridges were made as in the 
practice for garden potatoes in England. Seed camotes were then planted 
along the tops of the furrows in the middle_ of April. . The plot wa.s 
irrigated and weeded intensively in June and July, and again in August. 
The tubers were ready for digging by the beginning of October, and sold 
by the piece, known as .'macho' - according to the little information 
available to us, the machos varied in price according to size, and in 
44 1865 they were selling for 3, 2 1/2, and 2 reales each. 
The table below (Table 11) shows how this line of production was 
indeed fruitful in its time. It looks as though the initial years from 
1857 were tentative, but that the area was increased as the resUlts 
proved that the crop was profitable. By 1860 the piece cultivated had 
reached the size of 4 fanegas de sembradura, over 21 hectares of the 
most valuable land on the hacienda and given the value of 3200.pesos in 
1861. 
Although the table shows that the crop was indeed profitable, it 
is also clear that camote was not \vi thout its problems. The 1861 crop 
was a total vri te-off due to blight, and in 1865 a good part of the 
harvest was lost owing to flooding - the need to irrigate profusely 
meant that part of the crop was planted alongside the river Queretaro, 
and although this vas normally an asset, just once in a wh1le it exposed 
the fields to flood damage. However, despite these occasional hazards, 
the crop worked well for San Juanico, vindicating the early experiments 
by returning average g~oss profits over the nine years in question of 
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TABLE 11: Crunote (Sweet-Potato) Production in San Juanico 1857-65 
Year Cost of Sale price Gross 
Production of produce Profits 
1857 $ 859.81 $ 1,274.73 $ 414.92 
1858 $ 931.53 $ 2,167.31 $1235.78 
1859 $1260.41 $ 3,323.30 $2062.89 ·. 
1860 $1232.82 $ '2 ,303. 55 $1070.73 
. 186i $ 926.00 $ 944.95 $ 18.95 
Totals $5210.57 $10,013.84 $4803.27 
Averages $1042.1i $ 2 ,602. 7T $ 960.65 
(9100 'machos') 
1862 $ 699.69 $ 2,399.75 $1700.06 
1863 $ 801.40 $ 3,127~55 $2326.15 
1864 $ 764.00. $ 5 ,lf38. 59 $4671~. 59 
1865 $ 708.76 $ 1,861.23 $1152.47 
Totals $8175.42 $22, 8l~o. 96 $14665.54 
Averages $ 908.38 $ 2,537~88 $ 1629.50 
Apart from this monetary contribution to the hacienda camote was 
also important as a stage in crop rotation. The land used to raise 
this crop was also used to produce half-irrigat.~~fmaize;. The camote 
machos were lifted late in one year and the land 'O·TaS then prepared for 
half-irrigated maize at the beginning of the next. Towards the end of 
April the land was irrigated and then sown in May. Here there was the 
ad1·antage that the hacienda did not have to wait for the onset of the 
rains before planting as 'O·Tas the case in the temporal sector. vleeding 
.. 
was performed in late May and mid-June, and in the case of drought or 
delayed rains, further irrigation in June. Some of the crop was 
harvested green as o~ote at the end of July, and then the main h~rvest 
took place at the end of S8ptember and the beginning of October. The 
sale of olote was often lucrative, as in 1865 throughout June, Jul~-' and 
1 '7A 
. .L I v 
August, when revenue reached more than 1370 pesos, and in general the· 
45 
sector performed well. There are no exact details of production for 
the years 1856-60, but we know from comments made by Bernabe Loyola 
! 
that the crop did well over these years with average costs of 632·.63 
pesos and profits of 1104.69 pesos. 
Fully irrigated maize was by contrast most disappointing. In this 
case. the cycle was embarked upon earlier with irrigation and sowing 
taking place in February and March.· For some reason or other ·the. crop 
was especially susceptibie to blight and as a result the experiment was 
abandoned. early on. It should perhaps be noted in conclusion that the· 
success of half-irrigated maize might have been due in part to the 
system of rotation with camote and also to the treating of the land 
concerned with manure from the cowshed, although wehave no hard evidence_ 
on the extent and regularity of this practice. 
THE HACIENDA TRIUMPHANT: PROFITABILITY AND ACCUMULATION 
The arg1nnent this far has concentrated on the four main products 
of the emergent hacienda economy - maize, irrigated wheat, chile, and 
milk and cheese. An attempt has been made to examine each of these 
within the context of a variety of conditions. The purpose of this 
design has been to demonstrate how these profitable lines of production 
were open to a number of hacendados in the region and not just to those 
for which we have evidence. The time has now come to look at these 
specific cases in the round, and to assess their individual progress and 
profitability. 
'· 
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The problem of 'gastos generales' 
I 
Systems of accounting during the nineteenth century have made it 
difficult for us to assess the precise capacity of the hacienda to be 
profitable and to accumulate. This is because no real distinction was 
made between the transactions of the hacienda as productive enterprise 
.and those of the hacienda as domestic household. The confusion was 
invariably focused under the concept of 'gastos generales' or general 
costs. 
In San Jose el Alto these.costs were sometimes listed as specific 
items, as for instance the shoeing of the household horses, the purchase 
of hats, the payment of excise duties or alcabalas, and the gi vi.ng of 
alms; at other times the entries were of a general nature, such as 
'purchases' , 'household expenditure' and 'costs of ·the children' •. 46 
A similar practice was to be found at work in the large and 
profitable hacienda of Chichimequillas, once the property of the 
Carmelites. The diary for 1904 survives, and this shows a number of 
·Specific costs listed against the general concept of 'gastos generales', 
including the fees paid to the priest and the sacristan for conducting 
masses, candles for the Church, stamps used in the issue· ·or invoices, 
notebooks for the office, wages for the household maids, and transport 
costs on 20 bags of salt delivered by the National rail company - a 
veritable multitude of petty costs. Other more general entries were 
more.substantial, however, such as 'out-of-pocket expenses of Remigio 
Noriega' (the hacendado), and 'for various items brought from the tienda 
for the house'. The most significant of all were the wages and rations 
covered by this concept on a regular basis, although bimestrial payment 
of 'contribuciones' exceeded these. 47 
Further examination of the accounts for . 'gastos. generales' in 
San Juanico and Juriquilla confirms this general impression. It is 
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important to appreciate that quite substantial deductions were made 
from hacienda profitsto provide for household routine, since such 
subtractions tended to conceal the full abstract profitability of the i . 
' 
enterprise. But it is also important in a further respect, in that 
these domestic expenses show that residence on the estate was a more 
frequent practice than had been previously the case. 
Domestic expenses may have biased the image of the hacienda's 
profitability, but it should be emphasised that a good part of the 
concept of the 'gastos generales' in fact concerned the hacienda as a 
productive enterprise. As already mentioned, it contained the important 
costs involved in transport, and ~lso all payments made as taxes to the 
state and as interest incurred by mortgages and loans. Nor were the 
wages, rations and fodder covered by this concept irrelevant to the 
running of the haCienda economy. 
The tendency was to include most permanent staff under this heading. 
During the 1860s on San Juanico this included the salary. of Bernabe 
··Loyola, then the administrator, as well as many other workers employ~d 
on an annual basis. As the years progressed and the economy became 
diversified the number of people listed under 'gastos generales' 
increased. Reference to a wage-bill drawn up on the eve of the Revolution 
in San Juanico shows the extent of this increase. By this time they 
numbered some 27 employees, costing for the week close to 100 pesos in 
wages alone. The list included the administrator, the book-keeper, 
the wages-clerk, three majordomos (one in charge of the carts), three 
watchmen (two for the hacienda's outreaches, one for the barns), two 
well-keepers, two porters, one night-:watchman, six menser-vants, two 
carpenters~ one crier, one dam-keeper, and three entrusted with the care 
of the ploughs and harvesting tools. The most highly paid was the 
administrator with a weekly wage of 20 pesos, followedby.thebook-keeper 
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and wages-clerk with 9 and 8 pesos respectively. The major.domos· made 
6 pesos a week, whilst the rest received considerably less at an aver_age 
. . 48 
of only 2.27 pesos a week. 
Profitability in San Juanico and Juriquilla 1859-66 
The more precise data given during these later years helps us to 
assess the earlier profitability of San Juanico. Wages paid out during 
the years from 1910 to 1916 under the heading of 'gastos generales', 
including those of the blacksmiths and saddlers, do not appear to have 
exceeded 5,500 pesos for the year. 49 The total sums for 'gastos 
generales' registered in the accounts for 1858-66 were~ however, very 
much more substantial, as revealed in the table below. On this basis 
we must assume that labour costs included in the concept during these 
earlier years accounted for only a proportion of the total deduction. 
There is no way in which we can discover the full detail of the· expenditure 
charged against the gross revenue yielded by the San Juanico enterprise, 
and so it is impossible to lnake an exact assessment of the amount which 
was extraneous to the actual business of running the hacienda as a 
productive concern. Even so, a review of the.data :for San Juanico and 
Juriquilla, set out below·, is enough to suggest that such figures .omit.· 
a good part of the story. 
On the face of it, these figures belie most of what we know of the 
haciendas concerned. According to these annual net balances, Juriquilla 
was a more profitable property than San Juanico, with average net profits 
of over 4250 pesos as against only 2353.54 pesos. Juriquilla also 
appears to be considerably more reliable - something which we would not 
expect for. a property almost totally dependent on temporal production. 
Juriquilla registered a net deficit in only one year, the disast1·ous 
1862, whereas San Juanico registered three instances of loss. 
' 
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TABLE 12: Annual Accounts in San Juanico (SJ) and 
Juriquilla (JQ), 1859-66 
Year Gross Revenues Total Deductions 
SJ 1859 
JQ 1859 
SJ 1860 
JQ . 1860 
SJ . 1861 
JQ 1861 
SJ 1862 
JQ 1862 
SJ 1863 
JQ 1863 
SJ 1864 
JQ 1864 
SJ 1865 
JQ 1865 
SJ 1866 
JQ 1866 
TOTALS 
SJ 
JQ 
Annual Averages 
SJ 
JQ 
$ 
9,835.44 
7,085.80 
- 16,021.56" 
12,084.23 
6,590.00 
12,198.47 
15,843.00. 
4,195.75 
10 ,8!~9. 46 
8,042.67 
39,746.1+8 
6,0h5.80 
22,760.07. 
11,719.56 
16,9!~3.56 
7,768.62 
138,599.57 
69,140.90 
17,324.95 
8,642.61 
All figures are in pesos. 
Source: ASJ/LC 1859-66. 
$ 
9,631.10 
3,552.00-
9,075.00 
4,408.95 
14,061.00 
5,021.38 
17,381.42 
5,532.30 
16,126.64 
4,863.36 
29,084.08 
5,745.53 
12,631.07 
2 '701.03 
11,780.97 
3,284.12 
119 '771.28 
35,108.67 
14,971.41 
4,388.58 
$ 
+ 204.34 
+ 3,553.80 
+ 6,946.56 
+ 7,675.28 
- 7,471.00 
+ 7,177 .09. 
- 1,538.42 
- 1,336.55 
- 5,277.18 
+ 3,179.31 
+10,672.40 
+ 300.27 
+10,129.00. 
+ 9,081. 53 
. + 5,1_62.59 
+ 4,484.50 
+18,828.29 
+34,032.23 
+ .. 2 ,353. 54 
+ 4,254.03 
The key to this puzzle is to be found in the figures for the total 
deductions, which were on average over three times as high in San 
---- · -- -·Juanic-6-·as Jiidq:Jiilla: -More -importantly, they were also considerably 
higher than the figUres given for San Juanico in.the years from 1910 to 
1916. Further research into the hacienda's accounts revealed that the 
enterprise was burdened with substantial costs quite extraneous to the 
routine functioning of the property. The largest of these 1-rere as follows: 
'· 
1861, family expenses.. • • • • • • • • • • • • • $ 4, 780.00 .. 
requisitioned by armies ••••••• $ 4,480. 00 .. 
1862, household expenses ••• ~.~~ ••• ~~ $ 6,624.56 
1863, . trip to Guanajuato ••••• ~ ~ ~.... $ 2,999. 06. 
1864, family expenses~.. • • • • • • • • • • • • $16,971.67 
fire damage to city property •• $ 4,961.88 
Totalling ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ~ $40,817.1750 
There were also many other entries of more trifling sums relating 
to the steady toll of requisitions inflicted on San Juanico by both the 
Liberal and the Conservative army. Additional losses were incurred as 
a result of various attacks made on the hacienda by gangs of bandits. 
The cmnbination of these attacks and the incursions of both armies 
eventually forced a reluctant Bernabe Loyola to abandon the casco of 
San Juanico for the comparative security of the city of Queretaro. 
There he was compelled to remain from the summer of 1860 to the middle 
of August 1863. Early on in this exile the casco of San Juanico was 
badly damaged by either soldiers or bandits, or both, and the subsequent 
repairs cost the hacienda dear in ti~e and money. 51 
It is almost certain that all these var1.ous costs were charged to 
the hacienda. This was a legitimate practice since they were in fact 
borne by the enterprise, but it does provide us with a distorted view· · 
of the hacienda's essential profitability. Extraneous costs over the 
period 1859-63 were clearly unusually high, both in terms of family 
expenses and losses due to the political upheavals. Burdensome interest 
payments on outstanding mortgages had been discontinued after the 
Liberal Reforms of 1856, and, apart from wages, the only significant 
cost was that of transport. When trade between Queretaro and :t-1extco 
City was resumed towards the end of 1864 this cost was once again 
'· 
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significant - over the months from December 1864 to August 1865 some 
830 cargas of wheat were delivered to the capital and cost the. haCienda 
almost 3250 pesos in freight charges. 52 
All of this gives us a more accurate picture of San Juanico's 
profitability. The combined total of the wages of the permanent 
wo~kers, the costs of transport and excise taxes, and the domestic 
budget, carefully managed, was probably less than ten thousand pesos 
.· 53 
a year. On the basis of this estimate San Juanico would have provided 
a regular net profit of around 7,500 pesos. In 1861 the value of the 
capital assets of the hacienda was put at 87,814.75 pesos54 - this rate 
.. . 
of profit thus represented a return of some 8 1/2% on the capital 
invested, a figure which fits with don Bernabe's comment at the time 
that "agricultural properties did not in general yield more than i0%-". 55 . 
Much of this reasoning remains unfortunately impressionistic, but 
there does seem to be the basis for assuming that at least some haciendas 
were emerging as sound commercial enterprises with the capacity to 
·offer investors attractive rates of return on capital. Even the less 
well-endowed Juriquilla managed to present a facade of profitability. 
According to the recorded net profits for the period 1859-66 the average 
expectation was in the region of 4250 pesos. The value of the hacienda's 
land, buildings, and stock did not exceed 80,000 pesos at this time, and 
the rate of return thus came to over 5%. 56 
Profitability during the Porfiriato 
We do not have such detailed figures for the later period, but 
--------·-·there-is- every indication that the conditions of production became 
increasingly favourable for the hacienda. Markets increased for both 
traditional and new products, whilst costs lagged behind, especially 
in the sphere of wages. Given this background and the successful 
. intr<;>dll.c~}()!l __ ():f.: -~!!.~r_ee:r:<?.PPing ... ~_nto -the maize temporal sector, ther'~ is 
'· 
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every reason to believe that hacienda profitability increased.w:ith the 
years up to the Revolution. 
According to the information remaining for 1892 (regarded as a 
disastrous year for agricultural production), Juriquilla was making 
substantial profits from sharecropped maize, irrigated wheat, dairy 
produce and chile. Other less remunerative interests made further 
contributions whilst losses and general costs barely exceeded 2000.pesos. 
The net profit accruing to the hacienda that y~ar came to 11, 78.9.85. 57 · 
It is difficult to assess this figure as a percentage return on capital-
since we have no updated record of the hacienda's value. The figures 
cited in the 1908 will of Bernabe Loyola, however, serve to give us 
some idea· of the hacienda's restructured potential. The land and buildings 
were probably undervalued, as was the practice at the time, and 
assessed at some thirty four thousand pesos; livestock, machiner,y, farm 
implements, and office and chapel furnishings combined to give some 
eleven thousand pesos more· - the total value of the estate thus came to 
around forty-five thousand pesos. 58 On this estimate the 1892 profits 
represent an excellent return on capital of more than twenty-five per 
cent. Even if some consideration is made for ;the underestimate of the 
hacienda's basic value 1ve are still left with the impression that 
Juriquilla was a flourishing and highly profitable enterprise. 59 
We can be more accurate in the case of San Juanico. In 1912 the 
administrator Miguel Sobreyra drew up a careful assessment of the 
hacienda's production, costs,_ sales, and profits. By this time ·san 
Juanico had developed a number of different interests -wheat, chile, 
maize, beans, tomatoes, sweet-potato, marrows, lentils, melon, vegetables 
and milk. By far the most important of these -were wheat, chile, maize 
and milk - together they accounted for close to ninety per cent of the 
total revenues of 76,740 pesos. Deductions for wages and ta.Xes caine to 
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some 30,000. pesos, leaving a net profit of about 46,740.pesos. 60 ·The 
Sobreyra assessment thus represented a rate of return on capital invested 
of more than 22 1/2%. We are unlikely to come across.a more resounding 
I . . 
I 
proof of the hacienda's final triumph over its earlier hazards and 
shortcomings. 
'· 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CLASSES, SOCIAL TENSIONS, AND.THE REVOLUTION 
THE HACIENDA AND IMPROVING INVESTMENT 
When Raso reviewed the prospects for the hacienda in the 1840s he 
·identified three areas of crucial i¥tportance, the high costs of labour, 
the paucity of capital investment, and the poor quality of hacendado 
management. 
The preceding chapters have demonstrated how the hacienda fin~lly 
triumphed. Markets expanded and a revitalized hacienda met the higher 
demands. In Juriquilla·maize production leapt up sevenfold between the 
1860s and 1890s. We discovered similar increases for wheat in San Juanico 
\ 
arid·Agua Azul, and also uncovered the beginnings of lucrative lines in 
chile and milk. Figures for the state of Queretaro confirm this trend: 
b~tween the· 18llOs and the 1880s wheat production rose by over 500%, 
beans by 300%, and chile by more than 160%.1 Such increases doubtless 
·continued during·the last two decades prior to the outbreak of the 
Revolution in 1910. 
These increases had followed a general rise in prices. The most 
sustained trend picked up from the beginning of the 1870s. Rural property 
I 
values doubled between 1874 and 1900, and increased~ further 86% by· 
1910;2 only some of this was due to investments in buildings and irrigation. 
Maize meanwhile more or less trebled in price, and wheat came close to 
doubling. All other commodities follmved this upward trend, with the 
singular exception of labour. 3 
This had been the key to the hacienda's success. Svme progress had 
probably been made in the reduction of labour costs through the 
introduction of more efficient and mechru1ized methods, but by far the 
most important source of profits was the sustained decline in real 
labour co-sts-~-4-·--on.··the ··one hand· daily rates had. remained much the sa11e 
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for over a hundred years, from the 1770s. to the 1890s~ and on the other, 
the hacienda had made great savings through the introduction of share-
cropping in maize temporal. 
With markets booming and labour costs depressed, the triumph of the 
haciendawas assured.· Profit margins increased and investment in the 
hacienda became bothpossible·and attractive •. Some of this occurred in 
the immediate train of the growth in market demand. Increases in wheat 
output, for example, could only occur after lands had been levelled and 
irrigation extended. Quite significant amounts of money were thus spent 
relatively early on: 12,000 pesos for instance in San Juanico between 
1846 and 1860, and over 4,500pesos in the construction of a dam in 
Juriquilla during the turbulent years of 1859-63. 5 
Nearly all of the money invested in these kinds of improvements, 
including the construction of hacienda buildings and fences, came from 
labour costs. Outlay on materials was insignificant, and quite often 
the hacienda could provide for itself, as for timber and masonry. 
Elaborate schemes to extend the area's irrigation continued into the. 
twentieth century, as in the cases of the valley projects of Tequisquiapan 
. ~ 6 . , 
and San Juan del R1o. A further example was that of Batan in the 
district of Pueblito.· Records of this project have survived to give us 
an idea of the investment involved. Over the first year of the work, 
from February 1905 to February 1906, almost 2500 metres of aquaduct were 
completed, one metre in width and seventy centimetre=_~ in _depth. The work 
force varied in composition but it seldom comprised less than 15 masons 
and 100 helpers. Total costs over the year reached some 18 ,}21. 52 pesos, 
a very considerable sum to spend on a-property of only 1240 hectares even 
if it did include a flour and paper mi11. 7 
The other main point of investment, as we have already seen in 
San Juanico, Juriquilla and others, was in the purchase of more up'to date 
'· 
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machinery. Much of this came from abroad, Europe and the United States • 
. Within this context the hacienda's renaissance appears less healthy. 
The overall increases in profitability had not been signif~cantly 
i 
undermined by price inflation in Mexico itself, but the global picture 
was rather different. 
Credit and devaluation of the peso 
Up to around 1872 the purchasing capacity of the Mexican peso was 
fairly sound, but after this .date its value. began to decline along with 
the world depreciation of silver. The peso thus suffered a devaluation 
as an international currency, and over the years 1870-1912 it fell at 
least 60% against the dollar. 8 Haciendas producing crops for the 
export market of course benefitted somewhat fro:r_n this devaluation, but 
the arable enterprises of the mesa central received no such. consolation. 
The effects may, on the contrary, have been adverse and far reaching, 
especially to those hacendados most inclined to modernize their properties, 
since the imports they required in machinery and livestock thereby cost 
them more. 
The situation was not eased by Mexico'schronic inability to provide 
ready agrarian credit. An efficient banking system was slow to develop, 
and even then it was heavily biased towards investments in Mexico City, 
and some considerable distance behind, towards the northern states.9 
It is reckoned that only a very limited number of enterprises had access 
to sufficient long-term·· credit to be able to embark upon a radical course 
. 10 
of technical development. The majority were left to get by on the 
--------------traditional· sources of public foundation and private short-term loans. 
By this late stage, of course, the most available traditional source 
had been put out of the running - the Church and the lay orders. All 
mortgages and loans from this source had been effectively redeemeo by 
the_+i!:>e!_~;I;.--~~~~~!:_~s_ of_the R~forma in 1856. These were notorious~.y 
'· 
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substantial - according to Raso, more than 20% of Queretaro's agricult-
ural properties, by value, were thus encumbered; by the mid-1850s this 
proportion had no doubt increased. 11 
The weight of these debts had undoubtedly taken their toll of 
h . d f. . . 12 ac 1.en a pro 1. tab1.l1. ty. · Even more burdensome had been the demands of 
the Church tithes, which Raso had.put at two and a half times as high as 
the interest repayments accruing from mortgages and loans.13 The spread 
of these burdens was probably uneven, _with some properties considerably 
laden and others relatively free. 1~is is borne out by what we know of 
· San Juanico and Juriquilla. The former was heavily endebted to both 
the Convent of Santa Clara - with which the hacienda had an ancient 
connection- and the Congregaci6n de Nuestra Senora de Guadalupe. ·These 
two debts amounted to 48,569.75 pesos, with interest payments at 5% 
coming to 21~28. 49 pesos, whilst outstanding debts on Juriquilla were only 
of the order of some 6,000 pesos, owing to the Colegio de Santa Rosa. 
The San Juanico accounts of these loans and their subsequent redemption 
by way of the Ley Lerdo are somewhat confused, and so it is difficult 
to assess their precise effect on routine profitability. There are, 
however, strong indications that a good part of the interest payments 
had not been paid, perhaps to the tune of up to 9405.66 pesos. In any 
event it is clear that San Juanico's position was considerably helped 
by the cancellation of these debts, and that the way was now open for 
. . f . 1 . 14 the hac1.enda to develop 1.nto a ully commerc1.a enterpr1.se. 
Within a couple of decades the hacienda economy was, as we have 
already documented, on the threshold of a period of expansion and 
diversification. Recent improvements in overall profitability had 
provided for some latitude for investment, but there have been 
suggestions that the hacienda was once again becoming.heavily endebted. 
The evidence for this state of affairs in Queretaro is inconclusilfe. 
'· 
.L86 
The compiled list of recorded mortgages is undoubtedly incomplete but 
·it does not suggest that the hacienda was becoming crippled by a further 
outbreak of mortgaging. 1 5 
In the first place the size of the loans accumulated during the 
· last decades of the nineteenth century do not appear to be excessive, 
especially within the context of the overall rise in rural property 
values. Secondly, despite the increase in the rate of inter~st charged 
. . 
on these loans, and the shorter duration of a good number of them, there 
. . 16· 
is evidence that many were successfully redeemed. There is also the 
suggestion that a fair proportion of them emerged as a result of a 
property transaction - either through inheritance or by way of a sale 
on the open market. ~1ere was nothing new about this, but what is 
significant is that these rarelyended in legal proceedings or 
bankruptcy. 
Chichimequillas: Fel1u bankruptcy and Noriega's fortune 
The single most obvious case of catastrophic endebtedness is that 
of Ram6n Feli u' s mmership of the ex-Carmeli te property of Chichimequillas. 
The Feliu family were Chilean and based in Mexico City. _Ram6n's father, 
Hermenegildo, bought the hacienda in 1872 and by 1876 it was reported 
to be encumbered by a mortgage of 75,000 pesos - repayable over 5 years 
at an interest rate of 8% per year. 17 By this time Ram6n was in charge 
of the, hacienda's administration, something which turned out to be 
18 .. 
somewhat disastrous. ··In May 1877 the government press reported 
"serious differences between the owner and the workers on Chichimequillas", 
_____ --· .. and .by .May .1882 Jose Loyola was writing of the "poor administration of 
. . 
Chichimequillas", and reported that it had gone from.bad: to worse under 
the regime of Ram6n Feliu,- such that the whole property was teetering 
' . . 19 
on the edge of breakdown and enforced fragmentat1on. · The same year 
a case was brought to court by the hacienda's sharecroppers, prote:;ting 
against a breach of contract instigated by the owner Ramon Feliu. and 
enacted by his administrators, Francisco Correa and Marcelino Muiioz·. 20 
Feliu survived these threatening times, but was still in difficulties 
during the late 1880s, forcing him to auction off the annexe Hacienda 
de San Vicente for 35,000 pesos. By the beginning of the 1890s the 
crisis had forced Feliu into the courts in Mexico City. Initially this 
simply entailed the cession of certain rights to one of the family's 
largest creditors, Trinidad Rivera. But this merely postponed the final 
dissolution - by 1893 the level of debts and demands had reached the sum 
of 231,600 pesos, and as a result of a legal adjudication in Mexico City, 
the family's hold on Chichimequillas was ceded to its creditors, headed 
. 21 by one Joaqufn J. de Arauz. 
The subsequent history of this hacienda suggests that this sorry 
tale of disaster was due almost exclusively to the labour policies and 
mismanagement of Ramon Feliu and his administrators. In 1898 
Chichimequillas was sold to Remigio Noriega for 250,000 pesos, 
150,000 casli down, and the balance by way of a loan from the National 
22 Bank, repayable over only four years at 6%. In fact Noriega managed 
to renegotiate the terms of the loan:, and then transferred it in 1909 
to the Caja de Prestamos para las Obras de Irrigacion y Fomento de la 
Agricultura. The outstanding mortgage on Chichimequillas then stood at 
200,000 pesos, repayable over 15 years at 6%. In 1912 this was further 
increased to amount to half a million pesos, and the duration extended 
23 to 25 years. 
Chichimequillas then remained in the hands of the Noriega family 
until the impact of the Agrarian Reform programme. A digest of the 
hacienda's performance was produced by the family in 1927, giving a 
breakdown of the property's range of products' their costs' and t:·:J.e 
resultant levels of average profitability. Prices given for such 
'· 
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commodities as maize, wheat and beans do not differ markedly from those 
current at the time of the second increase in the mortgage, undertaken 
in 1912. It is also clear that the depiction of the hacienda's economy 
I 
drawn up in 1927 falls within the duration of the loan's period of 
repayment. It is thus legitimate to use this depiction as a measure of 
the hacienda's caj;>aci ty to withstand the weight of this huge mortgage, 
by far the largest on record for the state of Queretaro. 
According to the data presented by the 1927 review of the hacienda, 
annual net income came to the princely sum of 238,000 pesos, predominantiy 
the result of arable products, but also of fat-stock production, pulque, 
and the leasing of pasture lands~ Interest at 6% on half a million 
pesos would have cost Chichimequillas an annual charge of 30,000. 
208,000 pesos would then have remained. The size of this surplus would 
suggest that the hacienda did indeed possess the capacity to support 
such a mammoth mortgage and probably to pay it off within the period 
24 
conceded •. 
The hacienda's capacity to pay 
Two other cases of apparently high endebtedness fall in line with 
these inferences. By 1912 San-Juanico and La Comunidad were oWned by. 
the de Mota. family, having been purchased by Juan de Dios de Mota in 
1888. It was valued at 260,000 pesos and declared to be mortgaged to 
the tune of 130,000 pesos. We know from the accounts drawn up by the 
administrator Miguel Sobreya that an average year's net income came to 
46,740 pesos. Interest at 6% on the outstanding debt would have cut 
----····-------this .. amount .. by 7,800 pesos, thereby leaving a surplus -of 38,940 pesos. 
As in the previous case of Chichimequillas, we are left with the distinct 
impression that the hacienda had by no means over-reached itself and 
. bt 25 
,was clearly not cr1ppled by de s. 
, On 
.1-V;/ 
El Cerrito had been part of the San Juanico complex during the years 
of Bernabe Loyola's administration. During the early 1890s it was run 
within.a partnership between the owner Timoteo Fernandez de Juaregui 
and one Andres Arias. In November 1895 Arias bought the property for 
44,000 pesos, 30,000 of which remained outstanding. In 1906 the 
hacienda bore a debt of 45,000 pesos, extended a further 5000 in 1910 . 
26 by the Banco de Londres. We have no direct evidence of the property's 
profits during these years, but we do have evidence of the gross 
returns on the hacienda's wheat harvest in 1898. Some 242 tons were 
produced and sold to the flouring mill of Batan at an average price of 
some 9 pesos tlie carga. Gross receipts thus came to 13,360.57 pesos. 27 
Unless the hacienda's management failed to keep production costs down 
to the levels prevalent in neighbouring San Juanico at the time,_ annual 
profits should have exceeded 10,000 pesos. Here we enter the realm of 
speculation and should be extremely tentative in our inferences. Even 
so, the impression is that El Cerrito's mortgage fell within the 
productive capacity of the property. 8% on 50,000 pesos cost the 
hacienda 4,000 pesos a year; with estimated profits at around 10,000 
Andres Arias should have been left with a comfortable surplus. Support 
for this contention comes from the condition of his estate when it was 
divided in 1918: its total value exceeded 250,000 pesos, 155,000 of these 
were attributed to El Cerrito, and there was a marked absence of any 
28 
remaining mortgages. 
This has been a schematic review of the .hacienda's later tendencies 
to become endebted. The evidence is therefore hardly conclusive. 
Nonetheless it seems enough to lend support to the hypothesis that 
properties were by no means excessively burdened with mortgages, and 
that a large proportion of the capital .thus raised in Queretaro came from 
.private r~ther than banking sources. It would be premature to comment 
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on whether or not these sources were sufficient to·meet the demand for 
credit and capitalization. 
BOURGEOIS MANAGEMENT AND HACIENDA PROFITABILITY 
The sorry case of Chichimequillas' bankruptcy.under the regime of 
Ramon Feliu and its apparent success 1n the subsequent hands of Remigio 
Noriega serves to highlight tlie last of Rase's key factors of hacienda · 
profitability - management. 
The image of the Mexican hacendado as absentee seigneur has had 
many subscribers, both before and after the publication of its most 
strident depiction in Andres Molina Enrfquez's Los Grandes Problemas 
Nacionales. Management practices, such as the proclivity to maximize 
self-sufficiency and the introduction of sharecropping in maize temporal, 
have thus been interpreted within the same mould and designated anachron-
istic or 'feudal'. Recent research has challenged this long-standing 
assumption, even if it has also served to emphasise the crucial importance 
of management·within the hacienda economy- hence the responsibility 
assigned to hacendado neglect in the explanation of the hacienda's 
failures found in Morin's account of eighteenth century Greater 
Michoacan. 29 
Mexico's immense regional diversity, in terms of history, culture, 
and natural.environment, has always made it difficult and hazardous to 
talk in generalities. It is now becoming clear that this problem was 
further compounded by the importance and great variety of hacienda 
management. 30 Once-successful enterprises were ruined in the hands of 
______________ an_incompet.ent, whilst, _as in the case of Chichimequillas, a· period of 
disaster and bankruptcy could be reversed by a regime of efficient and 
enterprising management. Studies of Jesuit propertie's have helped to 
demonstrate-the value of systematic supervision as ~eil_as the adYantages 
of easier access to capital and a nationwide network for the purpol~es 
k . 31 of mar et1ng. '· 
This factor of management was probably particularly crucial when 
the hacienda was beset by extreme difficulties. Such was the case for 
the Le6n hacienda Duarte, which was kept going throughout the turbulent 
years of the Insurgency, whilst others, like the adjacent Otates and 
the nearby Sauz, buckled under the impact and only operated at well 
b 1 . 32 e. ow capacJ.ty. The dislocation of the mid-century years was less 
profound, but even then there were casualties. The haciendas of Jacai 
Grande and Lociecasas were both amongst the better endowed properties of 
the district of Que:r:etaro. They had been bought during the 1840s by · 
Estevan de la Madrid from the heirs of General Julian Juvera, with part 
of the purchase price remaining outstanding as a loan from the vendors. 
Apparently de la Madrid defaulted on the payments "as a result of the 
depradations of the war and the Empire".· One~ peace had been restored 
the creditors applied for the outstanding remittances, de la Madrid 
failed to raise them, and the property was duly seized and auctioned. 33 
~1e case of San Marcos in southern Jalisco 
We cannot surmise that this failure was due to poor management. 
1~ere are, however, cases ~here hacendados survived this difficult 
period intact, and even_succeeded in expanding their production. One 
of these involved the Queretaro family of Figueroa, although the 
property in question, San Marcos.; was :situated far to the west of the 
state, on the borders of Jalisco and Colima. Within the context of 
. . . h th . .· . t" 34 thJ.s dJ.scussJ.on of management, owever, e case J.s--J.nstruc J.Ve.· · 
San Marcos was predominantly a sugar-producing hacienda. Yields 
from its cane-fields were as good as those of the more renowned areas 
of Morelos and Veracruz, but its location in respect of markets was 
far less favourable. The best that could be said for it was that it 
straddled the road linking the Pacific port of Manzanillo with the 
regional capital of Guadalajara. But even here there were problems: as 
192 
we have already noted, Mexican roads were in general ver¥ bad, and the 
one in question was not raised to the minimal standard of a main trunk 
road (camino troncal) until the end of the 1860s. Poor surfaces were 
' I 
. ' 
compounded by problems of distance between San Marcos and the.most 
accessible urban markets, as demonstrated by the table below. 
Urban centre 
Colima 
Zapotlan 
Guadalajara 
Guanajuato 
Aguascalientes 
Zacatecas 
TABLE 13 
Distance from 
·san Marcos 
30 km. 
75 km. 
200 km. 
450 km. 
475 km. 
6oo km. 
Population 
30,000 
15,000 
73,000 
69,000 
41,000 
22,500 
Source: Simon Miller: "Social Dislocation and· 
Bourgeois Production on the Mexican 
Hacienda: Queretaro and Jalisco" 
Bulletin of Latin American Research, 
Vo1;2, no.l, October 1982. 
The problems of these distances were in turn accentuated by the 
period's lawlessness and military campaigns. The letters of the owner, 
Pres. Jose Francisco Figueroa are full of references to these hazards, 
with especially bitter complaints directed at the Indian risings in the 
area in 1852 and 1857, and at the sweeping depradations of the'.infa.mous 
soldier-brigand Colonel Rojas. 35 
.. 
Ali. of this adds up:to :an inauspicious set of circumstances for 
San Marcos. And yet the record of the period's administration belies 
this. The hacienda had been part of the estate of Colonel Jose 
···~~------ --·- -------------·----·-- --·· ---- ~ .. - . ---
Francisco Figueroa, a native and once. Governor of the state of Queretaro. 
. . 
At his death in 1850 the property had passed to his children - the 
eldest, the ordained Jose Francisco, then began to administer the 
hacienda on behalf of himself and his four sisters. His first act was 
.... 
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to abandon the relatively civilized enrironment of the- city of 
Queretaro and to install himself in the casco of San Marcos. - There he 
remained, taking direct responsibility for the direction of the enterprise, 
and only left to deal with related concerns in other places. In every 
aspect of his business regime Pres. Figueroa showed great meticulousness, 
regularly soliciting accounts from his employees, consistently pursuing 
tardy debtors - including relatives, and even writing business letters 
. - - - 36 
on Chr1stmus Day. 
The record of his regime fully vindicated his efforts. Over the 
period from 1850 to 1863 he managed to sustain and even increase levels 
of output of sugar and aguardiente. In marketing these products he was 
no less enterprising. The case of 1856 shows how the problems of San 
Marcos' remoteness were to some extent mitigated. 
Production in 1856 was around 18,000 arrobas of sugar and some 850 
barrels of aguardiente. 10% of the sugar and almost 30% of the aguardiente 
was sold on the hacienda premises. A further 45% of both products was 
transferred to a subsidiary agency in Zapotlan el Grande - this was then 
retailed by an employee called Jose Dolores Perez. The remaining 
amounts of sugar and aguardiente were then transported considerable 
distances to be marketed through commissioned agencies. The wide 
distribution of these latter sales points up the enterprising nature of 
Figueroa's system: 13% of the sugar sales took place in Colima, 63% 
travelled some 200 km. up the road to Guadalajara, and the remainder was 
taken to the port of Manzanillo and shipped north to Mazatlan, some 
650 run. away. Of the aguardiente, 112 barrels were sold in Colima, 10 
in Guadalajara, and 80 followed the sea route to Mazatlan, from there 
to Zacatecas beyond; a further 130 even ended up in far-off Guru1ajuato, 
which Figueroa had already reckoned to be within the marketing ccmpass 
of the Morelos producers. 37 
Freight charges during this period would have rendered such 
distances uneconomic, or would certainly have given Figueroa second 
thoughts. These in the event were not necessary since San Marcos was 
able to provide for its own transport. The 1851 inventory shows that 
the.hacienda had no less than 196 mules equipped for transport and 
spread over six teams. Each team was supplied with supplementary 
beasts, saddled for riders and ready to carry fodder, such that the 
total nwnber of animals involved in this sector of the enterprise came 
. . . . 
_to 264 with an inventoried value of 7250 pesos. Given that each transport 
mule carried a load of 300 lbs., and covered a maximum distance every 
I 
I . day of 30 km., it is possible to calculate that San Marcos' stock was 
able to provide for the wide compass of its marketing - a conclusion 
supported by the occasional entry for the hiring out of its mules to 
less well stocked haciendas. The hacienda made an allowance for freight 
of around 1.50 pesos per load carried over 75 km, and this was included 
in the retail price current in Zapotlan. Such pricing levels coincide 
with the rates paid by San Juanico during the 1860s, and so we can safely 
assume their accuracy. Under these conditions freight charges for 
San Marcos, in even a low year, would have exceeded 3,500 pesos, a sum 
which is close to half of the total capital value of the mule trains -
. . . 38 
sure proof of the v1rtues of self-suff1c1ency. 
Here, then, is an example of sustained production and enterprising 
marketing during times of commercial dislocation and widespread 
lawlessness. Such policies were more than vindicated by the levels of 
profits - in 1856 these amounted to 35,000 pesos and represented a 22 1/2% 
----- -;~t~~~-- ;~-th~---1851- ~~pi t-al ~aiue. 39 Part of this successful performance 
must be attributed to the management and direction of the owner, Jose 
Francisco Figueroa. Not only did he take care to supervise the r•mning 
of San Marcos from day to day, but he also had an eye for innovation 
and ·rati-onali-zation.;-- The marketing successes are proof enough of this, 
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but more importantly, he was also engaged in attempting to raise profit-
margins by way of improved production. During the years of his 
administration irrigation facilities were extended to make way for 
greater areas of cane-fields, and measures were also taken to reduce the 
levels of field-labour required. In addition to these efforts Figueroa 
also demonstrated his commitment to the project by introducing more 
efficient means of extraction and refining, by way of machinery .imported 
from the United States in 1852 and worth over 30,000 pesos •. Between 
1851 and 1863 the inventor:led value of San Marcos increased by 90%. 40 
San Marcos was sold in December 1869 to a neighbouring hacendado 
called Mauricio Gomez for 203,000 pesos, 87,661 pesos of which were 
credited to two of the unmarried Figueroa sisters at 6% per annum. 41 The very 
substantial fortune of the Figueroa family then accompanied its member~ 
back to Queretaro, there to reappear as such attractive prospects were 
snapped up in matrimony. 
Berbabe Loyola: aspirant farmer and entrepreneur 
A further case in point is that of Bernabe Loyola, once administrator 
of San Juanico and later owner of Juriquilla. His origins are obscure. 
All we know is that he was born in Tlalpujahua in f.:!ichoacan, and may 
well have been illegitimate, since he made no mention of his parentage 
in his will. He had a sister, Margarita, who was married to a Jose 
Carmona, briefly administrator. of Juriquilla during don Bernabe's days 
in San Juanico. His first work seems to have been with Antonio :Mendez 
and Company of Mexico City, apparently some kind of import agency, 
since in 1849-50 Bernabe was ·in Paris and London buying up Copeland 
china and Dc;tguerotypes. 42 All the indications are that the family 
was impoverished - Margarita was lodged with a Senora Ignacia Suarez de 
Sanchez, and Bernabe wrote from Paris in Novemberl849 that he had 
"nothing in the world other than his little sister" •. ·This may well have 
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·been sentimental rhetoric, a lonely Mexican voice in themetropolitan 
capital of France, but it probably reflected Bernabe's material 
existence as well. By 1852 he was back in Mexico and returned to his 
.native Michoacan in an attempt to start up as a tenant farmer. He 
leased a small property near Zinapecauro but within a year or so he had 
. been forced to abandon it - apparently for lack of sufficient workers. 
From this setback he went to administer the hacienda Enyega near Zamora, 
and then in September 1857 took up the post of administrator for 
Timoteo Fernandez de Juaregui in San J~anico. 43 
We have already seen how his years in San Juanico were successful. 
Towards the end of his time there, in January 1865, he wrote a letter 
to his employer-cum-partner and reflected on the previous years' 
. experience • He started out by d\velling whimsically on his own earlier 
failures and then remarked that he had turned out to be "no bad prophet" 
when predicting "a brilliant future" for San Juanico. With no false show 
of modesty he averred that it had been a wise move putting him in charge 
of the business, and pointed to the healthy state of the hacienda's 
accounts, even after years of "the most adverse of political circumstances". 44 
Don Bernabe had in fact exhibited all the characteristics of an 
efficient and modernizing agriculturalist. He lived on the hacienda 
. and only left with great reluctance when the contending armies and 
endemic banditry forced him into the city of Quetetaro towards the end 
of 1859. Throughout the troublesome years of mid-century Bernabe 
maintained production in San Juanico, and showed great enterprise and 
determination in his policies of investment and diversification. 
This enterprise also reached his private life, since in January 
1859 he made the astute move of marrying don Timoteo's eldest daughter 
Catalina. His success in San Juanico had probably given him some 
savings, but here was a chance to gain eventual access to his wife's 
'· 
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maternal inheritance, the hacienda Juriquilla. As noted earlier, this 
was no San Juanico, something don Bernabe was :fully aware_ of. Within 
a few weeks of his arrival there in 1869 he wrote to his patron, 
-General Felipe Berriobazal, and described Juriquilla as having "malas 
tierras". Even so, he remained optimistic, and went on to point to the 
hacienda's asset of abundant water - given this, he reckoned that "(he) 
would be able to make enough to support (his) faril.ily and even to improve 
(his) position little by little". 'rhis was contingent, however, upon 
their living with great economy, and as a result da"n Bernabe did riot 
feel able to invite the General to visit, as he vrould have liked. 45 
This thrifty attitude had emerged earlier in the correspondence 
between don Timoteo- and Bernabe. There were a number of occasions when 
--Bernabe had chided his senior partner- on his excessive spending, and 
on one occasion even made the firm suggestion that Timoteo's daily 
46 
_expenses in Europe be limited to 5 pesos. This thriftiness probably 
served him well slnce there were real problems 111 making ends meet over 
---the first years of his ownership of Juriquilla - in the early 1870s the 
property was running at a loss and don Bernabe was tempted to give it 
4 
all up. 7 
Within a few years of his arrival in Juriquilla Bernabe's first 
wife died. In January 1877 he married her considerably younger sister, 
Dolores Fernandez de Juaregui. ~1is was another astute move since it 
gave Bernabe access to a second part of the inheritance left by his 
wives' mother, Dolores Septien. In this case the property was the 
adjacent hacienda, Santa Rosa de la Solana, valued in 1877 at slightly 
under 30,000 pesos. This date probably marked the beginnings of easier 
times for don Bernabe and.Juriquilla, and we know from the accounts that 
things had really taken a turn for the better by the end of the 1880s. 
- By the time of his death in March 1908 Bernabe Loyola had helped various 
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of his sons establish themselves in agriculture, on such properties as 
La Era and La Providencia in Queretaro, and Santa Rosa Jaripeo in 
Michoacan. Quite apart from these, his own inventoried e~tate totalled 
more than 150,000 pesos, and profits recorded over the years 1877-1908. 
48 
amounted to no less than 105,445.75 pesos. 
A .large part of this success was due to the. favourable circumstances 
of the times - of the rising demand and depressed labour costs' as 
already emphasised. But Bernabe's regime of enterprise and economy 
also played an important part. .The whole regional trend towards more 
intensive and diversified production had entailed a different brand of 
management. Successful sharecropping depended upon close supervision; 
the other lucrative products of milk, chile, and wheat all required 
greater care and attention. Strategies of rotation and irrigation 
demanded that the owner took a close interest in the affairs of the 
hacienda. 
All of these emergent conditions show up in the letters of Bernabe 
and his sons. The hacienda office in Juriquilla was full of books on 
relevant themes -technology, veterinary medicine, forestry, topography, 
irrigation, as well as several more general texts on agriculture and 
estate management. And as early as 1881 don Bernabe had written to the 
Director of the National School of Agriculture; Gustavo Ruiz Sandoval, 
to ask for·a complete set of the school's journals, and also to offer 
. 49 Juriquilla's lands as a testing-ground for various new crops and strains. 
These new measures worked more efficiently with the active coopera-
tion of labour. How the haciendas' labour force responded t9 the wider 
variety of tasks is hard to gauge, but there are a few indications that 
the Loyola regime took some account of these considerations. As far 
back as the 1860s, when he was still in San Juanico, Bernabe had advised 
his brother-in-law, Jose Carmona, to treat his workers with firrnneus, 
'· 
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but also with honour; he also advocated that thehaCienda store sell 
only the basic essentials, never pulque or other alcohol, and that the 
50 
workers' wives receive a part of the wages. The letters of this 
period and of those written by Jose Francisco Figueroa from San ~arcos 
are full ofreferences to the problems of finding weekly cash supplies 
to pay the workers - and they also stress the essential need that these 
. t• 51 payments were.made on 1me. 
Other practices may also have contributed to the more efficient 
use of hacienda labour. Bernabe and his sons were clearly not office-
bound, let alone absentee seigneurs. Don Bernabe had observed the 
1859 battle of La Estancia from the dairy roof at dawn, and there are 
a number of other references to one or the other of the Loyolas rising 
in tl1e early hours to be alongside the workers in the dairy, or in the 
fields, or in.the lime quarries and kilns. The virtues of such close 
and active supervision were not lost on the Loyolas - in August 1882 
Jose wrote that he had kept in close contact with the ploughmen workine; 
in the wheat fields, and that as a result the standard of work was much 
improved- he ended the letter with an enthusiastic prediction that the 
harvest would make them."thousands of pesos". 52 
A side effect of these practices was that the hacendado became more 
familiar ,.,i th his workers, or at least knew their names. . In San Juan:lco 
and Juriquilla workers received advances to coyer the costs. of important 
church occasions like marriage and burial. There is also- evidence that 
hacendados were prepared to act on behalf of the workers_ - as, for 
·.instance, in the case of Bernabe's defence of a quintero Ireneo Oldalde 
who was in some kind of trouble vri th the local priest -after a minor 
premarital misdemeanour with his novia. Don Bernabe vouched for the 
man's good character and gave his word that the sharecropper would. 
marry the girl as soon as the maize harvest had been gath~red in.~3 
,_ 
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All of this provides the backcloth to a theine of limited UJ?ward 
mobility. In the case of Bernabe Loyola, a combination of astute 
marriages with progressive management supported a move from imJ?overish .... · 
i 
ment to comfortable wealth. There are numerous other cases of similar 
mobility. The key may well have been the owner's commitment to the· 
development of his property. funado de Mota, for example, lived on his 
hacienda of El Lobo throughout his life, from around 1810 to 1885 • 
. The last few years were the most profitable, as the previous analysis 
would suggest. Increased profits were invested in ·other pro.perties -
before his death funado had bought and improved the hacienda Miranda, 
and made a surplus on it of 34,000 pesos. His only heir was an illegitimate 
son, amusingly called Juan de Dios. His son's efforts w:ere no less 
prodigious, and. when it came to divide his estate in 1907, it numbered· 
no less than six haciendas, including San Juanico, Santa Mar1a Hagdalena, 
. . 54 
and La Comunidad, and was valued at 528,868.56 pesos. 
Haciendas and social mobility: the Veraza family 
A further case has already been touched upon - that of Roman Veraza 
and his forbidding property of San Jose el _Alto. He had been married 
to. one Juana Dominguez, and they had started their life together with 
no capital. By 1876 their estate was still modest, but .it did include 
the hacienda of San. Jose el Alto and two irrigated plots in Queretaro 
producing alfalfa. After Roman's death San Jose el Alto.was held intact 
and run by the eldest of his eight children, Alfonso. . It. formed the 
cornerstone of the family's enterprise and was only sold.in February 
·-·-- _____ J,9J,2 .J~()_ B?::fa~l MoralP.s for 39., 000 pesos, five times what it had cost 
. don Roman in 1872. 5? 
Alfonso was .clearly no less enterprising than Bernabe Loyol<.• .• 
Within a few years of his father's death he had entered a partnership 
with Porfirio Navarrete, who was representing his young daughter }lqria 
'· 
\ 
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Navarrete Munoz Ledo. She was the owner of the Apaseo hacienda of 
Agua Azul, which we have already mentioned. On the basis of credit 
raised from the Hospital in Queretaro and from a Manuel Mesa, Alfonso 
Veraza bought himself a half-share in the hacienda, and then, in 1885, 
began to set it on its feet. To help this 20,000 pe3os were loaned 
from the Junta Vergara in Queretaro, and within a short space of time 
there were thriving sectors of wheat, chile, and sharecropped maize. 56 
In 1890 Alfonso completed the project.by buying out the minor Maria 
Navarrete. Four years later he sold up to Francisco Urquiza for 
160,000. pesos, only 35,000 of which were earmarked for the redemption 
of outstanding mortgqges. Don Alfonso left Urquiza with a mortgage of 
100,000 pesos, to be paid off over a nine year period at an interest 
rate of 6%. Within a year 30,000 pesos had been redeemed, and the 
remainder was guaranteed by the profitable hacienda of Jurica, since 
1877 the. pr<:•perty of Dolores Figueroa, beneficiary of the San Marcos 
estate and also wife of Francisco Urquiza. 57 
Alfonso's career never looked back. He maintained his interest in 
agriculture, making handsome profits from the wheat-producing hacienda 
of Capilla, leased from 1904 to 1916, and plunging considerable sums 
into the development of the water resources of the hacienda Batao from 
1905. He also ran a thriving business from this same hacienda in 
grinding wheat flour, .and was involved in a number of other commercial 
. 58 
ventures. 
The Veraza story followed the same lines as that of Bernabe Loyola. 
Success had come as a result of favourable economic conditio~s, and 
enterprising flair for their exploitation, and an astute marriage. In 
the midst of this it is possible to appreciate the extent to which the 
Queretaro oligarchy both cohered and renewed itself by way .of mar;.:iage. 
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One of the most powerful families in Queretaro had been that of 
Cayetano Rubio~ owner of one of the most advanced textile plants in 
Mexico~ called Hercules~ and also leading financier, whose clients 
.i 
! 
had included the Imperial Government of Maximilian. Cayetano's Queretaro 
interests included another textile mill and also one for grindi.ng 
flour. Various brothers assisted him with these operations, two of ~hom, 
Manuel and Jose I-1ar1a~ also owned the nearby hacienda of Castillo •. Each . 
of these had consolidated his fortune by marrying a daughter of Colonel 
Jose Francisco Figueroa, Manuel to Carlota and Jose Maria to Carmen. 
Jose Marfa and Carmen had four children, the second of whom was 
·1 d ·1· 60 ca le Em1 1a. It was this well-connected heiress that Alfonso Veraza 
married some time before his partnership in the running of Agua Azul. 
When he sold this hacienda in 1894 the man who bought it, Francisco 
Urquiza, was married to his wife's aunt. The case reveals a pattern of 
consolidation.and regeneration. The established wealth of the Rubios~ 
the Figueroas, and the Septien-Fernandez de Jwfreguis~ to name but 
three of the Queretaro dynasties~ was maintained by intermarriage, but 
the families also opened the door to the energy and enterprise of such 
new arrivals as the Loyolas, the Verazas, and the Urquizas. 
A case of decline: Bravo and the Acevedos 
There·were of course other contrasting cases of decline and 
dissipation~ or at least of the disappearance of certain families as 
established landowners·.· Perhaps the most dramatic instance of this 
was of the family Acevedo. The Acevedos were one of the apparently 
·-·-----few- ~f'a111i-lies----to transcend the impact of the Insurgencia. 61 ·The man 
responsible for theirpreeminencewas a Colonel Pedro Antonio Acevedo. 
. / 
He had owned the unusually extensive haciendas of Bravo and San ,Toaquln 
de la Cueva, adjacent .prop·erties lying to the south of Queretaro in the 
districts of Pueblito and Amealco. Bravo measured over 20,000 hectares 
'· 
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and La Cueva almost 7,000. The former at least was owned by the 
Colonel in the 1760s, since we know that he was in dispute with the· 
Jesuits, owners of the adjacent hacienda of La Barranca. By the beginning 
of the nineteenth century he owned both and in 1804 was a nominee of 
the city's Ayuntamiento for noble title. 62 
By the time of his death in the early 1840s Colonel Acevedo had 
gathered up a number of other properties in the state of Queretaro. 
These were then distributed amongst the children of his marriage. 
Jose received Colorado, but he spent most of his time in Mexico City and 
was. content to lease the property at the rate of about 1,500 pesos a 
year - he died intestate and apparently childless in the mid-1870s and 
the hacienda was sold off by his executor and sister Ana Acevedo de 
.· 63 
Barazorda. This sister had been bequeathed the smaller property, also 
adjacent to Bravo, of San Bartolome de Apa.pataro - Ana had married the 
General Panfilo Barazorda, and they seemed t·o have spent most of their 
time in Mexico City,with the.hacienda leased out at about 750 pesos a 
year, at least from as early as the 1860s. Ana died in Mexico City in 
the early 1890s and Apapataro passed into the hands of her son Adrian 
who then sold it in the September of 1899. Two other daughters, 
Guadalupe and Maria de Jesus, were left the hacienda of La Cueva - we 
know little of what happened to this property other than the fact that 
it was sold off in 1883 to Agustin Gonzalez de Cosio for 50,000.pesos; 
at this time the hacienda was mortgaged to a total of almost 42,500 
pesos, and its business was handled by Guadalupe's attorney Felipe· 
Hernandez. 65 Guadalupe had married a Victor Covarrubias who seems to 
have been a Mexico City lawyer. The emergent impression is that La Cueva 
was granted precious little attention from its owner. 
The only Acevedo who seems to have taken an interest in the es.tates 
of their father Colonel Pedro Antonio was the ·first-born, Manuel.· ·He 
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had inherited both Bravo and also Casa Blanca, and although he seems 
to have died in Mexico City he clearly spent much of his time in 
Queretaro. His estate was also consolidated by his marri~ge to Concepcion 
! 
Figueroa, another of the heiresses of San Marcos. This connection 
gives us an insight into his business, since he was in regular communica-
·tion with our old friend the Presbiterio Jose Francisco Figueroa._ The 
latter's correspondence is full of references to Manuel's difficulties 
and disasters in Bravo, and although his brother-in-law was suitably 
sympathetic to these tribulations he was also firmly insistent that 
Manuel met certain outstanding debts - one of over 10,000 pesos for 
oxen delivered to Bravo. 66 
Manuel died in 1975. UnfortUnately we have no details as to the 
condition of his estate at that time, other than the fact of an 
outstanding mortgage of 10;000 pesos on Bravo and in the name of his 
brother-in-law Figueroa. He was survived by his widow Concepcion, and 
their eight children, seven of whom were boys. Manuel's property was 
maintained intact and run on behalf of his heirs, but in 1884 the 
company showed the signs of strain. Casa Blanca was sold off to the 
hacienda's mortgagee, Trinidad Rivera, for.22,000 pesos, and Bravo was 
split into three properties, La Ceja del Bravo, La Tinaja and San Rafael. 
A property owned since 1878 by the widow, called San Jose de la Sabanilla 
in Jerecuaro, and leased from Mexico City in 1880, was also now sold to 
the tenants, the Rivas brothers. The third son, Lu1s, was then given 
the task of administering the family's properties, but this seemed to 
make little difference - after only three years Lu1s reported that 
things were going from bad to worse, and that accumulated losses over 
. 67 
this period already amounted to $16,787.84. 
By the opening of the 1890s the business was in a state of disarray. 
The inore viable fraction, San Rafael, was in the hands of the elde:~t 
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Acevedo, Pedro, but within two years this was encwnbered by a loan 
advanced by Tomas Gomez of 8,000 pesos at an interest rate of one per 
cent per month. The follovring year; 1893, Pedro abandoned all efforts 
to administer the property himself and handed it over to Gregorio 
Matagon - the contract was to run for two years, Gregorio was to 
receive a monthly salary of 50 pesos and also 2% of. all profits on arable 
68 produce. Once this period was up Pedro leased San Rafael to Eugenio 
Tovar •. · The nature of this contract suggests that the Acevedo business 
was still it:! poor shape. The lease took in the hacienda's livestock -
50 oxen and 10 mules - a quantity which indicates that San Rafael had 
been run at below capacity. More to the point were the financial 
arrangements: the rent was set at 5,000 pesos per year, but this was 
reduced to 3,000 pesos on the condition that Tovar undertook to pay 
off Acevedo's 12,000. pesos debt to Tom~s Gomez. TI1e following year 
. . 
Acevedo raised 40,000 pesos by mortgaging his property to the tenant 
Tovar and his partner Ildefonso Berriolope, with the interest at 6% 
being discounted from the rent. What then became of Pedro is confused 
but we do know that he never returned to take an active hand in 
administering San Rafael, and that it remained leased out until the 
. . 69 
division of the property after his death in 1913. 
Fortune seemed to shine no more favourably on the other parts of 
Colonel Acevedo's inheritance. The second son, Agustfn, took over 
where Lufs had failed, in the administration of La ~eja, __ a~d by ~892 
he had started to preside over the partition and sale of the property 
70 in small lots of between 50 and 700 hectares. What remain~d, some 
8,000 hectares, was transferred t8 Pedro at a cost of .71,610-pesos. 
It is unclear what befell this last remnant of the Acevedo legacy, but 
all the indicators suggest that it was not successful. Sometime _:~ound 
1907 ~oB Pedro raised a mortgage of 170,000 on the properties from "':he 
' 
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Banco Internacional e Hipotecario de Mexico~ and this was still 
outstanding at the time of his death. Not long after a further 3,000. 
and more hectares were sold to Concepcion Borja de Perez. Pedro's 
I 
heir and youngest brother, Rafael, then soldiered on with what was 
left, two fractions covering some 4~000.hectares and called La Ceja 
and Sali trilla, but disaster was in store for him as well! . Mortgaged 
to the limit, Rafael was forced into a futures contract in wheat with· 
Antonio Posada y Hermanos - the crop failed and his property was 
embargoed; with the subsequent sale to Baldomero Perez paying·off the 
outstanding debts and mortgages. As a result of this catalogue of 
failures and enforced sales the Acevedo estates had been dissipated 
and the family's descendents were thus left with little to defend 
. 71 during the years of agrarian reform which followed the Revolution. 
LANDOWNERSHIP IN 'l'liE PROFIRIATO AND THE BREAK-UP OF THE GREAT ESTATE 
The Acevedo story is important not only because it provides us 
with a contrast to the successful emergence of newfamilies like the 
Loyolas, Verazas, and Urquizas, but also because of ·its case of hacienda 
fragmentation. The prevailing image of land ownership during the 
Porfiriato is still one of the encroaching hacienda and increasing 
concentration. The evidence from Queretaro offers us a different 
perspective. 
We have already noted the cases of Bravo and Chichimequillas 
both histories show· how· hacendados under pressure began to sell off pieces 
of their estate. Even earlier on the same fate had befallen the large 
·· compl:exes- of--Atongo, Esperanza, and Jofre. And then during the 1880s 
and 1890s other properties followed the same course - Balvanera, Batan~ 
Bolancos, Carranza, Griega, Tlacote el Alto, Menchaca and Pozo. Some 
were broken up becav.se of financial difficulties, some to accommo(.'ate 
the_ consequ_~I1.G~~- Q.f_ a _divided inheritance, and others by way of a 
'· 
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rationalization. The diversity of these reasons is perhaps less 
important than the effects of such fragmentation. 
In the first place it is clear that the trend in land holding was 
away from concentration rather than tmvards it. Quite apart from the 
mass of small units carved out of the communal lands after the Reforma,72 
there was an increasing number of modest-sized- properties on the market. 
According to data given in 1874 the district of Queretaro itself 
contained 75 properties, 53 haciendas and 22 ranchos·. 73 A provisional 
search of the records for only about half of this-district in the years 
up to the Revolution revealed no less than 130 separate units. Detaiied 
examination of some 61 of these showed how the majority of landholdings 
were in fact of fairly modest dimensions - 84% of those examined were 
less than 1500 hectares. 74 
The other important effect of this trend was that it appears to 
have opened up space for the development of a larger group of small 
producers. Evidence for this is as yet inconclusive, but there are 
good reasons for doubting the validity of the standard image of the 
Porfiriato as a polarized society composed of a handful of great 
landowners and a mass of landless countryfolk, at least in Queretaro 
and nearby Apa.seo. 
In the first place there was the fact of hacienda fragmentation--
the small size of many of the fragments made land available to people 
of quite humble origin. The 1892 fragmentation of Bravo is a case in 
point. Close to 3,000 hectares were sold off to 14 separate buyers -
over 14,500 pesos changed hands, the majority at the time of sale, and 
what remained on credit was duly paid off within a year. The appearance 
of the purchasers is also significant - all of them lived in the small 
- - - ~ . . . 7) 
town nearby, called Hu1m1lpan, and all of them were 1ll1terate. -
,_ 
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There are other snippets of evidence to support this impression. 
Quite apart from the growing possibility of buying small areas of land, 
it is also clear that the practice of leasing out was again 'ri.dely 
employed. This seems to have benefitted two separate strata of 
practical agriculturalists. Large sections or entire properties were 
rented by a number of enterprising new arrivals who were backedby. 
established figures or solid guarantees. We have already noted the 
case of Alfonso Veraza and his very successful lease of the hacienda· 
. ·. - . . . . . . 
Capilla during the first and second decades of the twentieth ·century •. 
There were others who survived the squeeze of the events following the 
Revolution, and will therefore appear again - Alejandro and Isidro 
Fernandez, Alberto Villasan~e, and the families of Rofz, Cevallos and 
Soto. All of these Here to become men of some significance and w~B.lth. 
The other strata of tenants show up less clearly. These were 
people of more humble origin, similar to the purchasers of the Bravo 
fractions. Evidence of their existence is thus more impressionistic. 
Nonetheless the signs are there. The notarial records for the years 
after 1870 reveal an increasing number of cases of modestly self-made 
men. A clutch of wills appears - all of which depict the gradual 
advancement and accumulation achieved by unremitting sweat and toil. 
The typical case is of an illiterate couple starting out married life 
with next to nothing, perhaps a few pesos and a .yoke of oxen; the last 
testament then reflects on a life of worthy effort with just rewards -
fragments of land have been bought or rented, crop~ have been raised on 
a sharecropping basis, and at no time have the precious. fruits of such 
dedication been squandered. The death-bed is. embued wi.th a certain 
reflective satisfaction, and there is pride expressed in the om1ership 
of a house in the city and in the proxy signature of a literate son. 76 
'·. 
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A last witness of these efforts and of the people who. expended 
them can be found in the surviving records of the flouring mill on the 
hacienda of Batan. These run from December 1899 through to the middle 
of Jm1e 1902 and record all the consignments of wheat received by the 
mill during these years. A handful of large suppliers dominate the 
overall quantity of grain delivered and ground - such as Andres Arias 
from El Cerrito, Ildefonso Berriolope, the tenant of San TI.afael, and 
Orozco and Veraza of Capilla and other properties, but what is significant 
is the high incidence of relatively small consignments from less than 
lOOkg up to 2 tons. These entries imply that there was a considerable 
number of small-producing clients dealing. with the Batan mill, probably 
raising wheat on plots from garden size up to 2. 5 hectares. 77 
BYSTANDERS IN THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION - QUERETARO IN 1910 
All of this leaves us with the impression of a class structure with 
more flexibility than has previously been imagined. Clearly the main 
division between .landowners and landless labour dominated the country-
"d 78 s1 e, but there is now evidence of the slight confusion of this 
polarity by the existence of tenants, large and small, an.d of small-
holding peasantry or rancheros. The effects of. this confusion and 
flexibility may in turn contribute to our understanding of what seemed 
to have happened in Queretaro at the time of the Mexican Revolution. 
A recent assessment of the Revolution has it "barely spluttering 
to a start" in November ·1910~ 79 It seems that it even faile.d to do 
this much in Queretaro. Early signs that there was something amiss 
were limited to a show of force outside the Hercules textile-mill, where 
there had been trouble with labour disputes and strikes since the 1890s, 
and to the sporadic violence and cries of "mueran los Espafioles" in the 
midst of the elections held in 1911. 80 · Perhaps as a result of this and 
of the news of risings elsewhere to the south and the north the 
Queretaro government took fright - in any event in 1912 the Cuerpo 
Rural was rearmed with 200 new 1-1a.users freshly imported from Germany by 
81 
an agent called Enrique Hauber. According to the reports available· 
. . I . 
to us these were put to prec1ous l1ttle use - although somewhat later 
in 1917 an expedition was necessary to cut off .the advance of a so-
called revolutionary column under Nunez in the area of Chichimequillas. 
Witnesses recalling those distant days remembered the encampment of 
Carranza's armies in San Juanico in 1916, but in terms of casualties 
their only recollections were those of the epidemic of Spanish flu 
. . 1 8 82 wh1ch swept through the state 1n 91 • 
This will not come as news to most readers. It is now well known 
that the revolutionary outbursts were sporadic and localised, and that 
in many cases hacienda labour showed no inc·lination to rise up against 
. 83 . 
the owners. We have a fairly clear idea of why the peasantry rose 
behind Zapata in the region of Morelos84 and also of the background to 
85 the disturbances in the north. In a move to complete the picture it 
would be worthwhile to make a brief examination of the apparent state 
of passivity in Queretaro - to explain in effect why it was that the 
campesinos there remained bystanders to an event which was to be so 
crucl.al to the destiny of the Mexican state and its people. · Some .'of .the 
ground relevant to this question has already been covered. Queretaro's 
campesinos had certainly not experienced a widespread encroachment of 
their communal lands by the hacienda. 86 But they had, nonetheless, 
seen the hacendados grow rich whilst their own standards of living were 
at best stagnating and at worst in decline. 87 
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Agrarian discontent and radical ideology in nineteenth~century.Queretaro 
It has been correctly observed that the peasantry always have 
grounds for rebellion, but that what is crucial is the degree to which 
88 these are collectively perceived and acted upon. Whilst it is perhaps 
an economic distortion to refer to the agricultural labour force in 
nineteenth-century Queretaro as the peasantry, it is quite legitimate 
to do 50 in terms of the prevailing culture and consciousness. There 
can be no doubt that the labour processes which prevailed in the 
countryside of the Baj1o had done little to erode sentimental attachments 
to the land, or that the labour force was still disposed to dream of 
life in terms of some peasant arcadia. 
We know that, in general, the numerous peasant rebellions of the 
nineteenth century ~xpressed widespread Indian grievances. ·over lost 
lands and the attempt to have it restored. The importance in these 
rebellions of the peasantry's relative cultural and economic autonomy 
has been rightly emphasised, and finds parallels further afield than 
the Zapata rising in Morelos. But, as we have already noted, the Baj1o 
·had been an essentially frontier society with an ever decreasing imprint 
of Indian distinction and autonomy. Small wonder, then, that the 
. . 
· agrarian discontent mentioned earlier which broke out there and further 
north towards San Luis Potos1 from the middle of the nineteenth century 
came to be expressed in the more secular terms of agrarian justice, 
demanding the redistribution of hacienda lands, and reflecting more an 
ideological lineage with the French Revolution than Wlth a pre-Columbian 
restoration. 
In this way it can be seen that the peasantry of Queretaro were 
by no means insulated from the acknowledgedly crucial influence of a 
. . . ·a 1 89 rad1cal1z1ng 1 eo ogy. Quite apart from the -vridespread influenr.~e of 
the liberal critique of the hacienda as an economic and social 
'· 
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anachronism, late nineteenth~century Queretaro must have resounded 
with the more radical sentiments of the nearby Sierra Gorda with its 
Plan de la Barranca, and of the not-so-distant Chalco. 90 Even if the 
anarchic brigandage of the 1860s showed no signs of 'social banditry', 
it seems legitimate to assume that the stubborn persistence of mule 
· traffic around the region would have provided for the steady percolation 
·of these radical ideas. 
Such an assumption is supported by a careful reading of the government 
journals for the period, revealing, as they do, an insistent repudiation 
of reports, published in the "working class press", of inhuman working 
conditions on the state's haciendas and of the maltreatment of their 
p~ons, mixed with stern warnings against strikes·and conununism. A 
further indication of the spread of such ideas, and of the gove.rninent 1 s · 
disposition to identify such tendencies, is to be found in the arrest 
in March 1881 of a group of eleven self-titled 'socialists 1 in the 
Queretaro congregaci6n of·La Punta, conspiring to "commit crimes 
. . 91 
. against persons and property" •. 
Agrarian agitation and land redistribution in Queretaro 
The echoing of ideological militancy from the Sierra and elsewhere. 
clearly both worried the state government and gave encouragement to 
localised discontent. The municipal authorities of a number of pueblos 
provided the necessary vehicle for dissent and agitation, such that 
over the years l878-82·land grants were made to Santa Rosa, 
Tequisquiapan, Toliman, Penamiller, Cadereyta and Soriano. 92 
____________ ........ There _is __ no _doubt that the focus of agrarian tension and subsequent 
agitation was to be found between the haciendas and the pueblos. This 
had previously been manifest in disputes over access to water anL 
firewood as well as to land. A careful reading of .the government ~ress 
suggests that the first years of the Porfiriato, perhaps as a reaci~ion 
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to the reckoned betrayal of the promises undertaken at Tuxtepec, 
witnessed widespread struggles of an "alarming character", thereby 
threatening "once again to plunge the country into a state of 
degeneration". ~eports in 1879 refer to instances of unavoidable 
bloodshed in neighbouring states as having been.provoked by the insistent 
encroachment onto hacienda lands by "pueblos de ind1genasi' who lamentably 
"believe(d) that all the land within sight oftheir homes must be 
theirs". 93 
Whatever the ideological context for these agitations, the state 
government in Queretaro was clearly rattled, and hasty measures were 
_taken to encourage the offended hacendados to make the necessary 
concessions. These did not incorporate the actual disputed areas, but, 
to the accompaniment of ringing official tribute to the honour and-
generosity of the hacendados, lands were made over to the pueblos in 
larger dimensions than those petitioned for. Such was their benevolence 
that one of the number, the appropriately named Benigno Cabrera, 
donated a stream as well as land to the pueblo of San Pedro Toliman. 
The entire negotiations and settlement had been conducted within 
the context of illegitimate claims being treated with beneficient 
paternalism. But w·hatever the context- and motivation, the effect of 
these measures was undoubtedly to take the steam out of the agrarian 
agitation and restore the regime of calm-and stability. Once accomplished, 
the state government.was able to extend their paternalism to other 
neighbouring states, where disputes had apparently not been preempted 
so effectively. 
The land concessions described above reflect the culture of 
paternalism which prevailed in Queretaro during the nineteenth eentury. 
Although in this case the culture extended to relations between the 
hacendados and the pueblos, the ethos was, strictly speaking, an 
,_ 
integral dimension of the hacienda itself. Whereas the correspondence 
of Bernabe Loyola is occasionally sharpened with references to the 
thefts and inconveniences perpetrated by the inhabitants of the.pueblo 
I 
Santa Rosa, as for instance, when he demands severe and deterring 
sentences to be meted out to those guilty of stealing firewood from 
JuriquilUi,. his attitudes to his own employees display altogether a 
different and more tolerant quality. Such attitudes ·are to be found in 
examples already·mentl.oned - as for instance in the moving advocacy 
made to the priest of Santa Rosa on the part of sharecropper Ireneo 
Oldalde, who had apparently committed misdemeanours with his novia 
Maria •••• don Bern.abe pleaded his case and gave testimony to Ireneo's 
love for Maria and his firm intention to marry her once the harvest had 
provided him with the wherewithalL There are other such instances:· 
the underwriting of the Church bill for workers' baptisms .and marriages, 
amounting to $162 for 1871, and the advice given to his brother-in-law, 
Jose Carmona, that the hacienda store.shoUld only stoc~ the essentials 
for life and that wages should be seen to reach the peons' wives.94 
The detailed expression of this ethos, sanctioned and encouraged 
by the Church J.n Queretaro,?5 in effect constituted a mo:re rational use 
of labour rather than some generalized change of heart on the behalf 
of the hacendados, and coincides with that most predominant trend of 
the nineteenth century, the move away from absentee rentier incomes 
towards the direct and more personalised system of demesne cultivation. 
All of this must have contributed to the relative peace and stability 
which ·prevailed in Queretaro during the years of the Mexican Revolution. 
'· 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE REVOLUTION AND AGRARIAN REFORM: THE BOURGEOISIE IN RETREAT 
Queretaro may have been more or less untouched by the armed 
upheavals of the Revolution, but it was ·not immune to the effects which 
followed. 
Early on in the Revolutionary decade the area was dominat:d by the 
Carrancistas. This was then disrupted by Villa's sweep to Mexico City 
during 1914, forcing General Pablo Gonzalez to abandon Queretaro for 
1 Pachuca. Villa's domination was short-lived, coming to grief in the 
battle with Obreg6n outside Celaya in the summer of 1915. Villa's 
subsequent retreat to his northern stronghold left the centre of.Mexico 
under the control of Dbreg6n's army and within the politicai domain of 
the First Chief Carranza. True to his flair for symbolic splendour 
Carranza seized this opportunity to-embark upon a triumphal tour of his 
new-found domain. From Veracruz he went north to Tampico and beyond to 
Torre6n, where he was joined by the victorious soldier Obreg6n. From 
there he travelled.further north to cross the border, before turning 
south, via Nuevo Laredo, Matamoros, and. San Lufs Potos:l. . The object 
of the trip was to consolidate the impression of his exclusive control 
over Mexico. Reception in San Lufs Potosf was at best cool, causing 
Carranza to curtail his visit and hurry on to Queretaro. He arrived 
there on 30 December 1915 and had originally planned to stay only a 
few days. Presumably the First Chief found the atmosphere in Queretaro 
· ainenable and supportive since he remained there for six weeks and made 
"2 
it his temporary capital. 
CARRANZA AND THE CONSITUTIONAL CONVENTION IN QUERETARO 
It must be remembered that Carranza was a figure from the Porfirian 
mould. He had held public office under Porfirio Diaz and was a 
hacendado of some standing, owning an estate of 80,000 hectares in 
Coahuila. His opposition to any major structural changes in the agrarian 
econo~ was well known. All of this must have made him a welcome and 
reassuring guest amongst the hacendados of Queretaro. 
Just prior to Carranza's arrival the state had witnessed the first 
rumblings of agrarian discontent. The centrally situa:ted pueblo of 
Pedro Escobedo had raised a petition for a land grant against the 
haciendas of Ahorcado, San Clemente, Sauz, Lira and the rancho Arroyo 
Seco. 3 The reactions of the respective owners suggest that the 
hacendados were in no moou to make any concessions; at the same time it 
is possible to detect a certain insecurity in their uncompromising 
trucUlence. Quite apart from the standard arguments that any expropria-
tion would damage the regional economy and disrupt a time-honoured 
pattern of irrigation, the indignant .hacendados also threatened to take 
vindictive measures against the pueblo - by denying its people a water 
supply, derived from a source on their properties, and by refusing to 
give work to any of the petitioning beneficiaries. 4 
Other petitions followed from other pueblos. In the midst of all 
this. Carranza chose to make Queretaro the st~ge for the Constitutional 
Convention of 1916-17, charged with the responsibility of drawing up a 
new Revolutionary constitution. Part of the reasons for this choice 
was Carranza's desire to stress the continuity of thi~ initiative with 
the Liberal constitution of 1857. It.was also the place in which he 
had conducted much of his governmental affairs. In any event the 
location of the Convention in Queretaro was of some importance to the 
climate of opinion in the area. 
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Delagates to the Convention were to be elected on the basis of 
qualified universal manhood suffrage, introduced by Carranza at the 
same time as the initiative to hold the constitutional assembly. 
Whether or not these measures were successful in convening a body 
representative of the Mexican people has, of course, been since debated 
and doubted. It was, however, clear within days of the delegates' 
arrival that the spectrum of opinion represented was indeed broad. 
. 5 . 
Even Zapata had his champion, Colonel Luis T. Narro of Puebla, and 
the faction opposed to the power of the hacienda had a formidable 
leader in Francisco J. Mugica- although not a delegate, Andres Holina 
Enr!quez also attended the Convention and was an·influential party to 
the drafting of the agrarian Article 127. 6 
The status quo retains power in Queretaro - under protest 
Queretaro had three delegates in the Convention. None of them 
could be described as members of the ancien regime, but they were 
equally unsympathetic to the radical wing of the aseembly. Juan Frias 
came from a landowning family in the state and was a follower of 
Madero. He had·served in the Madrista Twenty-sixth Congress from 
September 1912 to October 1913 and was an old-fashioned constitutional 
liberal, espousing the cause of Liberty and its guarantee by the rule 
of law and order. 7 
Less is known about the background of Ernesto Perusquia. It is 
possible that he was not really from Queretaro but liad· come ·a.s an 
official closely associated with Carranza. He may, however, have had 
relations in the area: there were a number of small landowners of the 
same name (around Apaseo and Celaya). He worked in the department of 
Finance and in 1917 attracted a lot of critical attention on acc0unt of 
his sudden wealth. 8 He was clearly a member of Carranza's inner ~ircle. 
His aspirations to become the elected Governor of Queretaro in the 
.. 
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summer of 1917 were threatened by the scandal surrounding his unexplained 
and recent wealth. Carranza intervened on his behalf by installing a 
nephew, General Emilio Salinas, as interim governor - by way of 
Salinas' good offices Perusquia's success was assured, and by early 
1918 he had achieved his ambition to become elected Governor. 
Queretaro's third delegate was Lie. Jose Marfa Truchuelo. He was 
a young lawyer from the state and had served as. a member of various of 
the state's adniinistrations since _1911. One such early regime had 
been headed by Carlos Marfa Loyola·, . son of don Bernabe. He served 
as Third Secretary to'the Convention and was well-known as a strong· 
advocate of judicial reform. 9 By the end of the Revolutionary decade 
he had become an established figure in Queretaro politics and 
succeeded Perusquia as Governor in 192l~lO 
All of this is designed to highlight the political mood of Queretaro 
during the last years of the Revolution. The area was clearly behind 
Carranza and his men "\fere maintained in power. At the same time the 
radical voice of the agraristas could not be totally muffled, especially 
during the lively months of the Constitutional Convention. Its presence 
in Queretaro provided a legitimate forum for the radicals from outside 
of Queretaro itself, and also for some from within -the opening session 
· of the Convention was delayed by the appearance of a delegation of 
textile workers welcoming the convention as '~revolutionary" and depicting 
their own -.;-Tretchedness as the result of "the greed of evil Mexican 
capitalists";11 these were followed by a local representative of the 
Liberal Party who evoked the name of Madero and.denounced "the hydra 
-· 
of the priest, the latifundistas; the cacique, and militarism" -.;~hich 
12 -. 
had oppressed the people and "entombed.thenation". 
: Queretaro had always been regarded as a centre of' Mexican 
conservatism, along with the states of MexicoandPuebla, but it W':!.S 
'· 
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1 d t o 1 t th o I o o 13 a so use o be1ng c ose o e nat1on s pol1t1cal pulse. Its 
oligarchy was closely connected with the capital and was generally 
well informed. The years after the outbreak of the Revolution would 
have been no different, especially given Carranza's choice to use the 
city as the seat of his temporary government and of the Constitutional 
Convention. The absence of any concerted uprising in Queretaro had 
allowed the old interests to hold onto power in the state but this did 
not mean that they were naive or complacent about their long-term 
position. 
As in the previous era of agrarian conflict the main threat came 
from the state's pueblos. The initial petition from Pedro Escobedo had 
been followed by others from Pueblito, which was rejected on the grounds 
that the land titles were forged, and from the pueblos of Amealco, 
the centre of. Otom1 population in the state -the villa Amealco itself, 
and San .Juan Dehedo, San Miguel Tlaxcaltepec, .Santiago Mexquititlan, and 
. 11~ San Ildefonso Tultepec. 
The old interests gave little away- by 1920 only four land grants· 
had been conceded, affecting a mere eight haciendas, whilst eight 
1 0 ·o db 0 • d 15 app 1cat1ons ha een reJecte •. During the three years which followed, 
1921-23, absolutely no land grants were made in Queretaro. The 
governments of Perusquia and Truchuelo were meantime taking measures 
to reduce the blatantly privileged status of land ownership •. From 1918 
on modest moves were taken against the hacienda, but .primarily as a 
way to raise revenue for the state exchequer. Land taxes were raised 
to a 1% rating, and property values were considerably revised - the 
combined value of the haciendas La Llave, Balvanera, and Montenegro, 
0 f 0 11° . 16 Th for example, were ra1sed by hal a m1 1on pesos.. ese measures 
do not appear to have been pursued with any great seriousness, hcwever, 
since it is clear that the hacendados concerned achieved a considel"able 
degree of success in reversing the revaluations - by 1924, 163 
petitions had been raised against these increases, only 28 of which 
. . 17 
were not accepted. 
Land was also made subject to a graduated tax designed to support 
public security, and its produce was taxed to provide funds for 
public education. In the latter case each of the hacienda's main crops -
wheat, chickpeas, lentils, beans, maize, barley and chile -was subject 
to a tax of varying amounts - wheat, for instance, was charged at the 
rate of 50 cents per carga of 16i kilos, mai~e at 20 cents per carga 
of.l40 kilos, and chile at 5 cents per 11.5 kilos.18 
AGRARIAN THREAT AND BOURGEOIS REACTION 
These measures were clearly no threat to the existence of the 
hacienda - they were, after all, fashioned by people from the same class 
as the hacendados. Even so, Queretaro's landowners remained alert to 
the possibility of future problems. As early as the autumn of.l921 a 
caucus of the state's landowners came together to establish the 
Sindicato de Agricultura de Queretaro, an organization. affiliated to 
the Sindicato Nacional de Agricultura, and dedicated to the "effective 
defence of the right to ,hold property" •. There were 37 initial signatories 
to the sindicato's founding charter, and another 18 joined by proxy. 
The first general meeting was held later that same year, on the lOth of 
November, in the house of the secretary, Manuel Legarreta- a noble 
colonial edifice on Hidalgo. Twenty-eight of the·. original signatories 
attended this meeting as well as seven others new to the organization -
···-··-·- .~he~m:;_ely~~ _r~presenting a further six proxy members. 
thus committed to the Sindicato reached 68.19 
The total number 
The President of. the sindicato was Emilio Valdelamar, the o~~er of 
a modest property called Tejeda in Pueblito which he had acquired 
through his marriage to Maria Prado. Manuel Legarreta on the other 
'· 
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hand came from a distinguished lineage, owners of the expansive 
haciendas of Montenegro, Jofre and Buenavista, stretching north to the 
Guanajuato border from the pueblo of Santa Rosa. The pattern of the 
membership appears to have reflected this same duality of the sindicato's 
officials. - Queretaro's largest landowning family, the .prominent 
. . G "' C . 20 t d b . h Porf1.r1.ans. onzalez de os1.o,. were represen e y two members, t e 
spinster Dolores and her nephew Carlos, whilst others, like Refugio 
Barron, Anselmo Tejeida and Juan Hernandez, were more rancheros than 
hacendados, and some others were only tenants. 
Queretaro's landoWners.were thus organizing to defend their 
interests, initiatives which revealed a collective nervousness about 
the future of the hacienda. The solidarity forged ¥rithin the meetings 
of the.Sinclicato must. have.provided some reassurance. There were other 
organizations which complemented the function of the Sindicato. The 
Camara Agricola Nacional de Queretaro still organized and drew together 
much the same interests as the Sindicato, although its public fa~ade 
appears to have been less stridently biased towards the state's 
landowners - in 192t~, for example, it promoted a project to improve 
the trunk. road from Queretaro to Mexico City as far as San Juan del R1o. 
A similar awareness of the new political exigencies can be found 
in another organization established during those years - the Asociaci6n 
Regional de Ganaderos. This was formed early in 1924 and drew together 
the state's most enterprising stock-breeders. Members were charged a 
fee of o.ne peso a month and had the right to elect a governing col.mcil 
of eight. The council's responsibilities included the publication of 
a journal, 'El Ganadero', thepromotion of a state show and various 
fairs, and the purchase of a suitable small~holding for the purposes of 
raising pedigree breeding stock. The whole tenor of the asociacion's 
charter was biased towards notions of the common good and of devel;)pment 
'· 
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through cooperation - the staging of the first grand show, Exposici6n 
Regional de Ganaderia, in Queretaro, was billed as a project of 
"true patriotism". 21 
The law of 'pequefia propiedad' 
Similar interests controlled the State's executive and legislature. 
'I'he_re,gimes of Perusquia and Truchuelo showed scant sympathy for the 
wretched condition of many of the pueblos, and were clearly bent on 
accelerating the process of agricultural modernization. True to their 
Liberal outlook they regarded the key to this development to be the 
'small-holder'. Legislation on the use of idle lands was drawn up in 
the majority of the states during the early twenties: of all of these, 
Queretaro was the least concerned with the issue of size, specifying 
only that contracts· should be issued on areas not larger than the 
amount the petitioner could cultivate - there was no reference to the 
. 22 
way in which this cultivation should proceed. In a similar way the 
Queretaro government sought -to encourage the active use of the best 
lands by imposing a doubled rate of tax on irrigable land which had 
been left idle. 
By far the most obvious expression of the legislature's inclinations 
is to be found in the state's Agrarian Law, drafted and approved in 
1923. As elsewhere in Mexico, this legislation followed the constitutional 
precepts ·Of Article 27. Its specified objectives included the 
establishment of rules for the break-up of large properties, the fixing 
of legal maximums fo~ individual properties, and the general promotion 
---of- -the _!pequefia propiedad'. _To give clarity to these specifications it 
was' first necessary to classify lands according to type. These were 
five: irrigable by means of running water or springs; irrigable ·l1y 
means of machinery (such as pumps) or the periodic control of waters 
_ CC?ntai~e?- __ _?x__~_~s_L arable lands without irrigation or temporal; as yet 
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uncultivated lands but with the capacity for arableproduction; and 
hillside lands, useful only for the grazing of livestock. 
The· law then specified the maximum area that any single individual 
might legally own. Five separate models were laid down to correspond 
with the five catagories of land types - in this way it was legal to 
own areas of any one of the following: 
250 hectares of irrigable (natural) 
1,000 hectares of irrigable (mechanical) 
2,000 hectares of temporal 
2,500 hectares of potential temporal 
12,500 hectares of hillside pastures 
Excluded from these dimensions were various items crucial to 
successful agricultural production, such as farm buildings, dams and 
reservoirs, irrigation channels, tracks and roads, woodland, fruit 
orchards and plantations. Further evidence of the bias towards the 
progressive agriculturalist was expressed in the stipulation that any 
lands improved, and thereby changing status- from temporalto irrigable 
(mechanical) 'for instance - would remain the legal property of the 
improving party for a period of t1fenty years. Artesian wells had been 
·sunk in Queretaro during .the last years of the Porfiriato but their 
full development was to be delayed until later. Nonetheless the potential 
this facility promised to the state's landowners was. already clear -
it is obvious that this last legal stipulation was drafted with such a 
promising prospect in mind. In effect, the 1923 Agrarian Law in 
Queretaro attempted to guarantee landowners the legal right to hold up 
to 2000 hectares of irrigable land, more even than the.pro9perous 
. . f Ch. h. ; l 23 hac1enda o 1c 1mequ1 las. Only in the spacious northern states of 
Chihuahua and Coahuila did a state legislature attempt to allow t~1e 
individual to hold a larger arable property than th1s. 24 
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Lie. Jose Marfa Truchuelo was followed as governor of Queretaro 
by another lawYer of an established family, Lie. Constantino Llaca. 
With relatives holding lands in the area of San Juan del R1o the new 
governor was no keener to accelerate the pace of agrarian reform than 
.· . 25 his predecessors. After the total suspension of land grants during 
the years 1921-24, a slow start was once again initiated in 1925.- Even. 
so, progress remained incredibly lethargic - by the end of 1928 only 
-19 ejidos were in existence, encompassing only 41,091 hectares of land. 
Almost·as many petitions for land had been rejected on one legal ground 
26 
o.r another • 
Insecurity and the collapse of confidence 
In spite of this general.r~assuring context, the twenties were 
unsettling ti~es for the Queretaro landowners. There are various 
indications that they had lost faith in the security of the future for 
the hacienda. Family businesses and family properties began to break 
up. The old Queretaro family of Samaniego, owners of the adjacent 
haciendas of Carretas and Callejas since before the Insurgency, had 
continued their management as a corporate enterprise since 1898. In 
1921 the constituent,siblings dissolved the company and sold the-
haciendas in lots. 27 The extensive properties of the widow Paula 
Escoto Vda. de Vicente had already been broken up in 1917, as had 
La Cueva and Los Cues. Other properties, such as Montenegro and 
Laborcilla, followed suit in .the mid-twenties. 28 
Even the solid stock of the Loyolas were rattled. Don Bernabe's 
--------'first--family-had been set up-in business on the small properties of 
La Era and La Prov1dencia. From the middle of June 1894 these l~~ds 
had been run as a single integrated unit within the corporate guidance 
of C.M. Loyola y Hermanos - by 1926 the brothers were clearly unsdtled 
by events on __ the_Mexican stage_ and had dissolved the company and 
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divided up the lands between them. Perhaps this move had something to 
do with the experiences of one of the brothers, Alvaro, during the 
previous year. The Loyolas had also owned a property called Santa Rosa 
J~ripeo situated just across the border in ~1ichoacan, close to Ciudad 
Hidalgo. Santa Rosa had been troubled during the years of the Revolution 
and the agricultural year of 1923-24 had registered_ losses of almost 
1500 pesos. A nearby pueblo San Lorenzo was also clamouring for lands, 
and had the sympathetic ear of the state's governor, Francisco Mligica -
the radical delegate to the 1917 Convention who cannot have failed to 
have left an impression on the astute Loyolas. Various attempts ~ere 
made to sell the hacienda and it is clear that Alvaro Loyola was 
desperately engaged in reducing the costs of running the property. In 
February 1923 he wrote to the resident administrator informing him that 
he had contracted a land surveyor to draw up plans for fragmentation. 
Later the same year he noted that the irrigable land had deteriorated 
to such an extent that the sharecroppers preferred to cultivate maize 
· · instead of wheat. By May 1925 he had instructed the administrator to 
turn over the entire hacienda to sharecropping in an attempt to make 
f •t . 29 some pro 1 from 1t. 
This was a trend which was found elsewhere. With confidence ebbing 
on.all sides more and more hacendados resorted to wholesale use of 
sharecropping. _Whereas previously the practice had been limited to 
only the poorer lands and the least profitable deme~~e cr()PS - maize 
and beans - now it was introduced into the most fertile lands and the 
most remunerative produ.cts. In 1923, for example, sharecrop~ers were 
producing wheat and tomatoes on the once-profitable demesne lands of 
the hacienda Carrillo. 30 
The mood of uncertainty had been compounded by a worse than 
average spell of weather in Queretaro. From 1921 to 1930 only one year 
'· 
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could be classified as 'good' with more than 600 mm of rainfall. Three 
others were average, but the other six were bad, two total disasters 
":31 
with barely a drop of rain falling in the entire year. The effects 
! 
I 
In the summer of 1923, . of these conditions show up in various ways. 
for example, the government press reported that sharecroppers were 
losing their temporal crops "year after year" on account of the poor 
rains, and that the sector was suffering a "profound economic crisis". 32 
Similar misfortune had also overtaken the company of .Maciel, Orozco 
and Garcilita. This company had been formed in l920 for the duration 
of ten years; each of the four partners had invested five thousand 
pesos, six thousand of which was to be spent on new agricultural 
equipment and the rest on the rent ofa hacienda in nearby Guanajuato. 
·According to the outline of the contraCt the partners anticipated 
making annual profits in the region of 30,000 pesos. Things did not, 
however, go according to plan - by 1925 the partners reported that 
"on account of the preceding bad years (they) had not been able to 
make any profit, but rather had recorded losses of considerable amounts". 33 
The company was prematurely dissolved. 
Not everyone abandoned direct cultivation in favour.of sharecropping. 
Alvaro Loyola continued producing wheat, tomatoes and chickpeas ·on his 
rancho La Venta outside San Juan del Rio throughout the mid-twenties, 
with the tomatoes already finding an industrial market in the Clemente 
. . . . 34 
Jacques cann1ng plant. 
The same state of affairs could be found on the hacienda of 
Chichimequillas under the enterprising regime of Remigio Noriega, but 
earlier, Chichimequillas was. a large and well-endow·ed. property. It 
was situated well to the north of Queretaro away from the fertile 
basins of the capital and San Juan del Rio, but it enjoyed the ben~fit 
of a deep and flat-bottomed canyon. These fertile soils were watered 
by a reservoir called Nuestra Sefiora del Carmen, itself gathering 
rainfall from the heights of Pinal de Zamorano and Natanzas on the 
borderlands of Queretaro and Guanajuato. The reservoir had a capacity 
of more than six and a half million cubic metres, sufficient to irrigate 
· the 1500 hectares of accessible land on the hacienda. 
Disaster struck Chichimequillas on Christmas Eve 1925. The reasons 
were unknown- hypotheses included the combination of high rainfall and 
a minor earth tremor - but the effects were devastating: the dam of 
Nuestra Sefiora del Carmen burst open and was washed away. Chichimequillas' 
productive capacity was severely affected and profits were almost cut 
by half; meanwhile it was reckoned repairs to the drum would cost in the 
. region of a hundred and twenty thousand pesos. 
The significance of these events lay in the aftermath. The regime 
of Noriega, previously so enterprising, made the decision to seil 
rather than to repair. Furthermore, comments made in a digest of the 
production towards the end of the decade pointed to the ready 
possibility· of reducing wage levels and increasing profits through the 
introduction of machinery. The fact that the hitherto innovative 
. . 
Noriega had not himself made such investments implies that the general 
uncertainty in the future had damaged the rate of investment in 
d. . t" 35 mo ern~za ~on. 
THE END OF AN EPOCH: THE CRISTIADA AND THE RISE OF·()SORNIA 
There were other reasons for the mood of uncertainty which prevailed 
during the later twent-ies. Prominent amongst these was the influence 
of the Cristero rising of 1926-29. While the main focus of this was 
further to the west, beyond and including Jalisco and Michoacan, the 
whole of the Bajfo was seriously affected. It was a confusing period 
for the Queretaro landowners, since they shared certain things with the 
' 
Cristeros. Both groups 
fiercely opposed to the 
were fervently 
. t 36 agrar1s as. 
religious, and both were 
Despite this apparent overlap of interests an alliance between 
' i 
the Cristeros and the area's hacendados was never forged. The Cristeros 
were in the main men of far humbler origin, a class difference which 
was not conducive to collaboration, and in any case they recognized 
37 
.the. fact that there was indeed an 'agrarian problem'. . In addition 
to this the Church hierarchy had never been committed to the armed 
struggle, especially in Queretaro under the rule of the moderate bishop 
Banegas. Given that Queretaro had always been a centre of privileged 
religiosity, there was a n~tural overlap of kin between Church arid'land 
ownership, and this compounded the division between the hacendado and 
the Cristero. 
The effect of the rebellion on the hacendado was nonetheless 
unsettling. 0~ one level it caused upset and inconvenience to the pious -
the Churches vrere closed by the State and mass had to be heard secretly 
38 
· ·. in improvised chapels in cas cos or town houses. But beyond this there 
was a more importarit effect. The substance of this lay in the Mexican 
goverriment 's ambiguous commitment to widespread agrarian- -reform. 
Porfirio Diaz's departure had left a vacuum at the centre of Mexico's 
polity-which in the Twenties was still only precariously filled. 39 
The men who had achieved this precarious hold were from the north-west, 
Obregon and Calles. This was a region of very distinctive composition 
where the notion of the ejido ~~s predominantly foreign. 40 As a result 
the regime developed only a negative view of this institution, regarding 
-------------------- .. ----···------ -·· ---·- . .. -- --
it as a merely transitional stage with no real economic role to play. 
The _ejido would.just provide the backward peasantry with an opportunity 
to learn the discipline so crucial to successful agriculture, and would 
41 then aspire to the status of enterprising small-holder. 
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The other side to this was the Sonorenses' support for the 
"campesinos de la clase media", the class reckoned by Calles to possess 
42 
the dynamism and enterprise so crucial to agrarian development. 
What agrarian reform there was to be should thus be turned to the 
. advantage of this aspiring bourgeoisie. Herein was the dilemma faci.ng 
Calles. He had no conviction in widespread agrarian reform or in ·the 
.creation of a multitude of ejidatarios, but his hold on state power was 
still tenuous. The Cristero rebellion aggravated this state of affairs, 
and in subduing it Calles crune to rely upon the support of a great 
number of landless peasants or agraristas. 25,000 of them fought 
alongside the Federal soldiers, thereby earning the vehement emnity of 
·the Cristeros, men who were in most respects indistinguishable from 
. . l~ 3 
themselves. Ravaged and shattered by· the experience of such .a conflict -· 
they would have made a dangerously resentfUl and anomie gathering in 
peacetime. 
The fact of this uncomfortable dilemma had not been missed by the 
most astute of the Queretaro agriculturalists. They were able·to 
detect Calles' favourable disposition towards the dynamic enterprises 
they had come to regard as their own creation. For this reason above 
all others they had no basis to make a common cause with the Cristeros. 
Many of the most enterprising were openly hostile to the rebellion, and 
one in particular, ManuelUrquiza of Obrajuelo, was singled out as a 
44 dedicated and active enemy of the cause • 
. All of this turned out to be a vain and rearguard rally on the 
part of the hacendado. The political exigencies born of the. agrarista 
support during the Cristero reqellion left Calles with little room for 
manoeuvre~ If the new state was to consolidate its hold on Mexico, 
concessions to principle had to b.e made, and its support had to l;e 
. 45 . broadened at the base. The upshot of th1s was a return to the I'rocess 
236 
of agrarian reform, with a rapid acceleration during the rule of 
Emilio Portes Gil. 
By the late Twenties, therefore, the morale of the Queretaro 
. I 
I 
landowners had reached a low ebb. Their uncertainties were confirmed 
by the spurt of land redistribution which took place during 1929 -
. over 50 ,ooo. hectares were expropriated and 22 petitions "had been conceded. 46 
Only three petitions had been successfully resisted, a failure rate 
due to an amendment to the Agrarian Law introduced by Portes Gil. The 
effect of this had been to extend the basis of a legitimate claim for 
land- previously such a right had depended upon a petition of proven 
restitution and upon a limited series of residential political statuses. 
All that was now required 1vas that petitioners were in need of land, 
without which they were liable to impoverishment and destitution. 
Hopes may have been momentarily rekindled after Calles had 
managed to displace the populist Portes Gil with Ortiz Rubio, and had 
declared himself in opposition to any further agrarian reform on account 
·of'"the damage it was inflicting on the national economy". 47 But in 
Queretaro these were short-lived, since by the sUllliller of 1931 it was 
clear that the new state governor would be Saturnine Osornio. 
0 . h d l d. . . . t th . N . 1 C . 48 sorn1o a ta connect1ons Wl h · e L1ga ac1ona ampes1na, · 
and later became the leader of the more moderate faction which split 
away to form the Liga Central de Comunidades Agrarias. 49 He was thus 
a prominent member of that core group which came to champion the 
presidential candidature of Lazaro Cardenas, and supported it by 
mobilizing the peasantry behind the newly-formed banner of the 
relatively moderate Confederacion Campesina Mexicana. The group 
included Portes Gil, the leader of the CCM- Graciano S~chez, and the 
. . ~ • ~0 
powerfulcau:dillo of San Luis Potosi:, General Saturn1no Cedl.llo.' 
Osornio' s successful election to the governorship of Queretar·o 
·-------· ____ .. -- . 51 
was secured by the intervention of Cedillo and his followers, a d-=bt 
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which he promptly acknowledged by the staging of the second congress of 
the CCM in Queretaro. With the CCM in control of the state apparatus 
and a committed agrarista about to assume the Presidency, the days of 
the Queretaro hacienda were fatally numbered. By April 1935 the 
number of ejidos had been increased to 120 with grants of over 175,000 
hectares. 52 The pace of redistribution did not ease·. and. in 1936 
almost 16,000 hectares were affected at the behest of the state 
authorities, with a further 27,000 and more discharged by Cardenas' 
· ff. · 1 53 nat1onal o 1c1a s. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE RISE AND FALL ·oF ·cARDENISMO 
THE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAMME 
Lazaro Cardenas had committed himself to the project of agrarian 
·reform during his electoral campaign for the Presidency - he had 
promised that, if elected, "nothing would stop (him) until the peasantry 
had received the best land and the state had provided all.the financial, 
moral and material aid possible". 1 His previous wide experience in 
politics and the army, including the Revolution itself and the struggle 
to subdue the Cristeros, had given.him a comprehensive knowledge of 
h u . . 2 t e ~ex1can campes1nos. His ambition was to reshape Mexico such that 
the lives of these ordinary people were transformed. This was to be 
achieved by way of a blend of national autonomy and widespread 
agrarian reform, in which there was to be a reconciliation between land 
and factory somewhat reminiscent of Robert Owen. 3 
His candidacy was declared on the first of May 1933. During the 
first week of December the Segunda Cohvenci6n Ordinaria of the PNR 
was staged in Queretaro. 4 There the first Six-year Plan, including the 
proposed drive for agrarian reform, was approved and Cardenas was 
designated the party's official candidate. Once again the landed class 
of Queretaro had acted as the involuntary host to a threatening drama. 5 
·Once President, Cardenas spent as much time touring the Mexican 
countryside as he did ensconced in the presidential offices. Land 
redistribution was immediately speeded up, peaking during th~ years of 
1936 and 19376 - almost eighteen.million hectares were redistributed 
during his term of office. This process, combined with related social 
projects, cost the Mexican exchequer dear. Even the more forbidding 
targets, such as the Laguna cotton estates and the Mexican oil interests, 
'· 
all financed by foreign capital, did not deter Cardenas. Business 
confidence took a further turn for the worse and there followed-the 
inevitable flight of capital, domestic and foreign. 7 Cardenas' project 
came to depend increasingly upon deficit financing, and with dwindlin·g 
external support, this entailed an increase in money circulation and 
b . t . . 8 su sequen J.nflatJ.on. The rate of inflation first picked up in 1936, 
and sharpened up considerably during 1937. Over the period 1936-39 the 
general price index rose 26.6%, an annual average of 8.8%. Basic 
. . . . 
essentials were particularly affected - staple foods increased by over 
25%, clothing by almost 30%, and household goods by more than 33%. 9 
These trends had been partly caused by a serious fall in the production 
10 
of staple grains over the years 1936-38. ·Calles, then in exile in the 
United States, blamed this decline on the ill effects-of the Agrarian 
Reform and on the inefficiencies of the collectivized ejidos introduced 
by Card~nas. CardE:mistas in reply blamed the weather - which certainly 
in Queretaro had not been good- 1936 hadbeen better than average with 
680 mm of rainfall, but the subsequent two years were both poor, with 
378 mm and 445 mm respectively. 11 
INFLATION AND POLITICAL SUCCESSION 
Whatever the actual causes the effects were devastating, particularly 
for the urban middle and working classes. By 1938-39 the level of 
discontent amongst these groups had reached alarming proportions, with 
wildcat strikes occurring regularly, and more coo1~dinated ·stoppages-
threatened in such key·areas as the railways, petrol and electricity. 
Mining was also affected in Guariajuato and Chihuahua, teachers went 
on strike in Veracruz and Nuevo Le6n, workers left the textile mills 
. ' 12 in Puebla, and engineers threatened to do the same J.n Veracruz. 
Cardenas was thus under siege from the urban population •. He was 
also under a great deal of political pressure from the right. On t.he 
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. agrarian front there was the Confederaci6n de Camaras Nacionales de 
Comercio e Industria arguing that the reform was inflicting considerable 
damage on the agricultural economy as a whole, thereby creating shortages 
i 
I 
'in basic staples; it was al~o argued that ejidatarios were no better off 
as beneficiaries of the reform than they had been as peones employed 
. ' 13' ' . . 
on the old hacJ.endas. More dJ.sturbJ.ng was the growth of_ support for 
fascism in Mexico, sinarquismo and Acci6n Nacional. This was 
. . - - . -
sufficiently threatening to persuade influential members of the ieft, 
such as the Communist leader of the CTM, Vicente Lombardo Toledano, 
not to struggle for a continuat~on of the Cardenista policies.14 
The combination of all these pressures arid disturbances had 
precipitated a serious crisis in Mexico by the middle of 1938. The 
recently amalgamated components of the PRM were in a state of disarray 
over the questions of future policies and the successor to Cardenas. 
The party was composed of -four basic groupings, although each of these 
had their own internal divisions and heterogeneity - the military, 
I 
industrial labour, the peasantry, and a grouping of more individualistic 
I 
interests including some of the least powerful middle class. The impact 
of declining agricultural production, of urban dissidence born of 
rising inflation, and of competing political pressures to both the left 
and the right combined to throw the PRM into a profound crisis. 
Confl1cting interests and indecision threatened to shatter the 
precarious amalgam. . This was .then aggravated by the premature _emergence 
of contenders for the party's nomination, including General Manuel_Avila 
Camacho, the conciliator, and General Francisco Mugica, radical 
·--- ----~-- ------------------ ----· - ---
agrarista and legitimate.heir to the traditions of Cardenismo. 
Camacho had declared his candidacy in July 1938, almost two and a 
half years before the incumbent Cardenas was due to step down. H·~ had 
the. backing of the military and was known to be loyal to Cardenas, but 
,_ 
little was known about his position on the pressing questions of labour 
and agrarian reform. This obscurity was his greatest asset - his main 
opponent, Mugica, was an established radical from as far back as the 
Queretaro Convention of 1917 and could hardly match Camacho's pretensions 
as a conciliator. With this advantage he was able to secure the 
support of a powerful caucus of governors and senators, and of the 
.crucial Lombardo Toledano, who was more concerned about the threat from 
the fascist right. The CNC ~ beneficiary of the agrarian reforms urider 
Cardenas, was less independent of the PNR establishment, and as soon as 
it was clear which way the wind was blowing, the leadership under 
Graciano Sanchez duly backed the candidature of Camacho. 
fi1e National Convention'of the CNC had met to endorse this nomination 
1n late February 1939. Within little more than two months Camacho had 
showed his hand on.the agrarian question in a speech delivered in 
Pachuca, Hidalgo. His objective would be to take up "thebattle of 
~ncreased production". 15 In connection to this struggle he emphasised 
I 
~he urgent need to clarify the status of the pequena propiedad, or 
small-holding, and to give private landownership security of tenure. 
He even went so far as to suggest that the much maligned collective 
ejidos would be more efficient if divided up into individually run 
parcels • 
. Although this latter aspect of Camacho's electoral programme was 
somewhat modified over the subsequent months, it was clear that the 
I. 
incumbent Cardenas 'vas in retreat. It was supposed that his mm 
I 
preference had always been for fellow agrarista Fr~~cisco Mugica, and 
that he had been restrained from declaring it for fear of the divisive 
consequences. Camacho connived in this fa~ade of unity and made the 
i 
symbolic gesture of forming a balanced commissionto draw up the 
Second Si~-year Plan, with three radicals and five moderates, but it 
'-
was clear that the weight of official opinion had shifted in favour of 
· · · · a t th ··a 16 pr1vate landownersh1p as oppose o e eJ1 o. By 1940 this shift 
was so marked that President Cardenas was obliged to preside over his 
I 
own defeat, and in September of that year he introduced amendments to 
the Agrarian Code which gave legal immunity to specifiea sizes of privately 
held lands, called Certificades de Inafectabilidad. These measures were 
to . be ironically amongst Cardenas' last acts as President of Mexico 
before he stepped down on the 29th of November 1940. 
PRESIDEI~T AVILA CAMACHO AND BOURGEOIS REVIVAL. 
Within ten days of the succession Avila Camacho had embarked upon 
a course which would reverse the trend of the previous sexenio. He 
immediately decreed measures to individualize the ejidos and began 
to curb the pace of land redistribution - most of the land made over 
to the peasantry during Camacho's regime in fact came from provisional 
17 procedures initiated during the Cardenas years. Attention '-ras 
redirected onto the problems of production and as to how the rural 
i 
sector could be made to take advantage of the improving external 
I 
·conditions - the outbreak of World War Two had created a demand in the 
USA and beyond which could not be satisfied domestically, and there were 
thus great opportunities for the export sector in Mexico. 
Camacho's policies reflected this new concern, "the battle for 
increased production" as he called it. Various· mechanisms were designed · 
to foster improved productivity.. Large state financing went i_nto the 
construction of darns and irrigation channels, thereby absorbing over 
-··-··- _____ 2.9.%. ~t.:t!l~ .ll~_tional allc:>cati?n to agriculture. The problem· of 
communications, still a prominent factor in the Mexican economy, was 
given priority over all other considerations and took more than :talf of 
. . t 18 the budget for publ1c 1nvestmen • In addition to these financial aids 
the agrarian sector was also favoured by certain tax exemptions, export 
subsidies, and the incentives of guaranteed high prices. 
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It was clear that this context had been created to encourage 
production in the private sector. In conjunction with these financial 
measures Avila Camacho set out to woo the besieged remnants of the 
old landowning class and especially to increase their number through 
the sale of newly developed lands to aspirant entrepreneurs rather than 
to hopeful ejidatarios. In April 1942 he moved to reassure producers 
for the export sector by raising the legal maximum for landholdi.ng of 
. 19 
'plantation' . crops to 300 hectares. . He also attempted to restore 
confidence to the private sector by granting legal immunity to a great 
number of holdings: the pace of concessions made to the· ejido sector 
was drastically retarded over .the Camacho years, but the number of 
Certificades de Inafectabilidad issued during the same time reached 
8,000, with a further 200 and more in the category of ganader1a. 
The land affected by these concessions came close to three million 
20 hectares. 
Political reorganization of the party was also undertaken to 
favour the interests of private enterprise. Thevoicepiece of the 
Mexican campesinos, the CNC, was increasingly shackled to the office 
of the Presidency, and a firm supporter of Camacho was given the post 
of leader in place of the old Cardenista Graciano Sanchez. 21 In 
·contrast, the Presidential ear was granted more readily to the party's 
·organ of the middle class, the CNOP, and.later on, in 1945, the 
country's private landowners were given official party status with the 
formation of the Conf'ederaci6n Nacional de la Pequefia Propiedad Agricola. 
In tune with this offi~ial party status, the CNPPA adopted a 
conciliatory line vis-a-vis the ejido and declared that both sectors 
could work hand in hand for the national interest. This tone r~flected 
the strength of their hand in relation to government policy, as did 
thfdr demands for an increase in the number of guaranteed tenlires and 
'· 
0 
248 
. . d"t d h . . 22 for a1d 1n the areas of ere 1 ar. mec an1zat1on. 
Prospects for the campesinos vere not so favourable. The· Camacho 
regime had done nothing to halt the rate of inflation - with prices 
i 
indexed at 100 in 1934, ten years later they were at 310 and in the 
23 
countryside, at 1~32.4. The new class of ejidatarios may well have 
been better fed than previously, but in general terms the agricultural 
sector was failing to meet the national demand for staples. Thewholesale 
price of food rose over the period 1929-48 by 175%. Particularly 
affected were the basics, maize and wheat: these were in such. short 
supply that prices doubled over 1942-44, and trebled over the longer 
period 1942-50. A disastrous harvest in 1943 brought discontent in the 
countryside to the point of rioting, and the government was forced to take 
short-term solutions in importing grain from the USA. Over the years 
1941-43 an average annual amount of thirty-five million pesos was spent 
on imported wheat: this may not have compared badly with other Latl.n American 
countries of the time but it had a damaging effect on the Camacho 
. . . 
policies of domestic industrialization - hard-earned dollars earmarked 
~or the import of capital goods were draining away on the basic task of 
feeding the nation. 24 
.Avila Camacho and his successor Miguel Aleman assigned the 
responsibility for this task increasingly to the private sector. The 
whole drift of government expenditure on irrigation projects and the 
opening of new·lands reflected this orientation. So,.too, did the attempt 
I 
to improve crop productivity through the domestic production of fertilizers 
·and the establishment of Rockefeller research institutions _f_or improved 
~eed strains, particularly for maize and wheat. An American f!.gronomist, 
Norman Borlaug, headed this research effort and arrived in Me.xico in 
1944. His initial impression of wheat production in the country 
reflected the parlous state of Mexican agriculture at the time. feed 
'· 
varieties used were totally unimproved and critically vulnerable to 
common stem and leaf diseases; production was archaic and mechanization 
almost non-existent; soils were impoverished and unfertilized, and 
25 yields were down to a national average of 750 kg per hectare. 
The exception to this picture was the Pacific North-west, Sonora 
and Sinaloa - there methods were more modern and yields were double the 
national average. To a large extent this exceptional perfo~ance 
reflected the 1musual history of the area. As we have already nQ"j;ed, 
men from this area dominated the presidency during the early years after 
the Revolution. As a result much of the state investment made at that 
time ended up in the North-west, in the form of vast .irrigation schemes. 
Iri addition to this advantage there was the asset of the land itself, 
virtually uncolonized and therefore naturally bountiful.· The plains of 
Sonora, Hermosillo and the Yaqui valley, later to become the archetype 
of Mexican capitalist agriculture, were virtually deserted until the 
1890s. Government projects, like the huge Angostura damacross the 
Y~qui valley opened in 1941, created vast new areas of arable lands, 
. 26 
ni6st of which was destined for the private sector. 
Many of the beneficiaries of this ample government patronage had 
no long-standing ties with the land: there was no traditional hacendado 
class in the region and most of the new landowners were parvenues from 
the Revolution, men with political connections such as the son of the 
President Plutarco Calles, or urban businessmen with an astute eye for 
the land's commercial prospects. It is worth noting that there was a 
minority amongst them who were exiles of the Agrarian Ref.orm in the 
LagUna and the Baj1o - ex~hacendados who had lost their land and ~ere 
attempting to re-establish themselves in a different region. These men 
were describedas "knowing their business" and have since been 
characterized as "among the best farmers of the· nation". 27 One of these 
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wa:s Pedro Loyola, who had left Queretaro with his son Enrique and three· 
of his medieros including Pedro Perez during the 1930s. 28 
In this way the North-west flourished. By stark comparison, the 
I 
. traditional bread-basket of Mexico, the mesa central and in particular 
the Baj1o, suffered a protracted decline. In this area government 
expenditure on irrigation was relatively insignificant and delayed until 
later years. Over the period 1941-70 the three states of the Pacifi:c 
North-west took almost 37% of the state's expenditure on irrigation; 
during the same time the vastly more populous states of the centre-north 
relevant to this study, Guanajuato, Queretaro, Jalisco and Michoacan, 
were allocated between them a mere 11 1/2%. 29 ·These realities· of the 
uncolonized frontier and higher state· capitalization were dramatically 
registered in rates of growth; the North-west boomed· and bet>-reen 1949-51 
and 1960-62 recorded annual average increases of almost.8%- by contrast, 
the Centre grew at the slowest rate of less than 2 1/2%. 30 
AGRARIAN DECLINE IN THE. BAJIO 
None of this should have surprised those who had witnessed the· 
course of events in the Baj1o since the Revolutionary decade. As we saw 
earlier, the accelerated break-up of the haciendas during theyears of 
Saturnino Osornio and President. Cardenas had finally fulfilled the fears 
of the hacendado, fears conceived some twenty years earlier at the.time 
of the Revolutionary Convention. The coup de grace may have been 
delivered by. this du~, but surely mortal damage had already been done 
to·the hacienda economy by the long years of lingering doubts and 
Evidence of this profound debilitation is manifold. We have seen 
,how improvements in agricultural productivity had been accomplished 
during the years of the Restored Republic and the subsequent Porfi:r;iato. 
251 
A good part of this had·been due to the successes of the new patterns of 
management. Closer and more informed supervision had provided the· 
progressive hacendado with ample opportunity to exploit the market 
benefits of cheap labour and remunerative produce. The subsequent 
increase in profitability had made the hacienda attractive to capital 
even though these were arable producers for the domestic market. The· · 
virtues of the new regime were not missed by the landowners and secure 
in,the knowledge of sufficient returns they began to reinvest at least 
a portion of their profits in modernizing their properties. Compared to 
the most advanced sectors in Europe and the USA this development towards 
mechanization may not have been that impressive but the trend was 
·nonetheless on the move. 
For all the reasons discussed above, disruption and disillusion, 
the years after the Revolution witnessed the abrupt halt to these 
developments •. Anxious about the future of substantial land-holdings 
hacendados adopted measures to disguise the extent of their properties 
I . 
a~d to reduce the measures of risk and investment involved in ·production. 
Sharecropping was introduced into the production of even the demesne 
crops, previously integrated units of production were broken up, and 
there was a generalized withdrawal of interest and commitment to the 
.hacienda. 
This is the picture which also emerges from the state census drawn 
·~p in 1929-30. The trend towards owner-management prevalent during the 
--- - ·---- -- -
I 
Porfiriato had clearly been reversed. The census shows that there were 
some 78 haciendas and 216 ranchos in the prosperous south-east, which · 
~ncluded the fertile basins of Queretaro and San Juan del Rfo. All of 
these were larger than 50 hectares. At the same time there were no 
fewer than 256 · adml.nistrators at work in the area as well as 26. t·~nant 
'farmers. · ·These figures· indicate. that the number of landowners. dirBctlf 
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31 involved in production had fallen to a very insignificant level. 
The already-detected trend towards sharecropping and decapitalization 
also finds an echo in the 1929-30 census: according to this doctunent 
there were only 31 trucks and 46 tractors in the entire s~ate of Queretaro. 32 
,_ 
The fact that these figures signify a drastic slowing-up in the.process 
of mechanization is important for its own sake, but in addition to this 
there are also firm indications that this was a most inappro:priate 
moment to withhold such investments. 
This was becaus·e the bonanza of the Baj1o 1 s natural fertility was 
coming to an end, as already implied by the area's poor performance in 
comparison with the Pacific North-west. A close analysis of the data 
available sugg~sts that the soils were already demanding greater 
attention at the time of the departure of Porfirio D1az. The. hacienda 
accounts for San Juanico show that wheat yields in the twentieth century 
were considerably down on those of.fifty years earlier, perhaps by as 
much as 4o%. We also know.from.the letters of Jose Loyola that the· soils 
of Juriquilla were·being.dressed with cattle manure during the· 1890s. 
Further evidence of this declining fertility can be gleaned from the 
. 1924 report drawn up for the Comisi6n Nacional Agraria ~n a petition 
from the barrio of El Retablo which bordered the.hacienda of San 
Juanico. Later on in the 1920s. similar findings were recorded in 
reports on·the comparable properties of Casa Blanca,Jacal, and San 
Isidro de los Olveras: in this case the reporting agronomist,. 
Ing. Gonzalo Araiza, enthused over the efficiency of an electric I_>ump 
for irrigating the land but.added that.frequent cropping without 
------·-------- ---------------------
fertilization was doing considerable damage to the soil. 
'All of this fits within what we know of the general decline of 
. production in the area. According to an American report ominously 
titled "Mexico's Capacity to Pay",publishedin Washington in 1929, 
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Queretaro's production of beans was declining rapidly during the 
t t . 33 la e went1es. Production of every crop except maize in Queretaro 
had fallen to levels well below those recorded during the early years of 
the Po:ufiriato. 
_TABLE 14: Agricultural Production in Queretaro: 
the 1880s and 1925-31 compared 
188os 1925 1926 1927 1928 1930 .. 1931 
Camote 1,200 90 615 795 1,019 1,013 805 
Chile verde 450 90 113 99 229 71 83 
Chickpeas 1,200 155 189 183 321 199 438 
Wheat 23,000 7,419 6,933 7,311 6,401 5,613 10,610 
Maize 42,000 43,190 64,407 41,390 41,625 22,140. 64,815 
All figures given in tons. 
Source: 1880s, .La Sombra, 22 February 1891. 
1925-1931, Archivo de Ramon Fernandez y Fernandez, 
El Colegio de Michoacan. 
Especially serious was the decline in the production of wheat. 
All the indications are that this fall was a consequence of declining 
yields rather than a general withdrawal from.the production of the· crop. 
The figures on yields per . hectare indicate that the Bajfo soils were 
indeed exhausted and no longer able to sustain high returns without 
modern attention. Lands which had once been the envy of the ~orld were 
now drastically impoverished and producing crops quite in-ferior to.·· 
comparable areas elsewhere in the world. 
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TABLE 15: Wheat Yields in Queretaro, 1925-31 
1925-39 average: 556 kg/hectare 
1930 506 kg/hectare 
1931 685 kg/hectare 
In the mid-nineteenth century the average yield was 
reckoned to be in theregion of 1400 kg/hectare. 
Sources: Archivo de Ramon Fernandez y Fernandez, 
El Colegio de Michoacan; RASO (1848) p.37 
and ASJ/LC 1857-65. 
It is clear that the accumulative effects of the area's difficult 
environmental conditions had begun to bear heavily on Queretaro's 
agrarian economy, and pointed urgently to the need for higher levels of 
capitalization. The hazards of the region's rainfall had emphasised 
again and again the necessity of modernizing the systems of irrigation 
with artesian ·wells ~ the decade of the 1930s was no better than that 
of the 1920s with fiv-e years classified as bad against only one good. 34 
Fragmentary evidence from agronomists' reports for a slightly 
later period, the early 1940s, confirms this impression •. _ The once 
fertile lands of Jurica and Carrillo were producing only 500 kilos 
of wheat per hectare, whilst maize crops in Bravo and Calamanda had 
fallen to 450 kg/h and 375 kg/h respectively. These reports all noted· 
the backward technology used to cultivate the land in just the same w_a;r 
as Norman Borlaug - animal-drawn wooden ploughs "scarcely broke the· 
. . 
surface of the land", and the uninterrupted year-on-year cultivation of 
__________ _maifi~_yjj::,bovt __ the ___ u~e_ of' manl,lre or fertilizer was draining the soil of 
its natural fertility. 35 
Quite apart from the effect of the alterat~?ns wrought by the 
Agrarian Programme, the impact of this decline on the sector's 
profitability was devastating. According to a studied. report drawn up 
'· 
2)) 
by Ing~ Ezequiel Roman on wheat production in the ejido of Colorado in 
1936, irrigated wheat yielded a return per hectare of only 22.05.pesos. 
A similar detailed study was made in the ejido of Carrillo Puerto during 
1943, by which time inflation had taken a heavy toll on the-purchasing 
. 36 
power of the peso. In this case wheat production was again carefully 
costed according to each task and the net revenue per hectare w:as 
calculated at 64 pesos. 
Both of these figures appear to be considerably inferior to those 
achieved by the hacienda San Juanico. We have previously seen how 
wheat production there yielded a net return of around 50 pesos per· 
hectare during the years 1856-64. Even with the svbsequent decline in 
soil productivity the higher market values of the Porfiriato would have 
secured similar if not improved returns during the last years before 
the Revolution. 
It is difficult to make an accurate assessment of these contrasting 
fi~1res in terms of real profitability since the rate of inflation 
over the period in question vas considerable. We can, however, get 
some idea of the .decline by reducing each amount to its contemporary 
worth in maize. 50 pesos in the 1850sand 1860swould have bought 
about 50 fanegas of maize, whereas the more recent profits would only 
have managed 5 1/2 and 8 fanegas respectively. 
It is clear that this comparison cannot take account of the 
variations within the sample - individual years are a hazardous basis 
for such a calculation and 1ve must assume that the differences between 
the regimes of hacienda and ejido .would also have had an effect. Even 
so, the areas in question, the irrigable lands o·f San Juanico, Jurica, 
Carrillo, and Colorado, were all comparable, and we know: that y:L.elds 
from the.se lands had indeed· fallen over the period by perhaps as much 
as 50%. or more. Given this, it would appear legitimate to attribute at 
least some credence to the calculated comparison made above, .?-~d _tv 
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conclude that the decades following the Revolution witnessed a drastic 
fall in profitability. The political circumstances clearly account 
for a good part of this decline but it is also fair to infer that the 
I 
failure to compensate for soil exhaustion and a difficult climate.was 
equally important. Even as late as the early 1950s the area's soils 
were described as "extremely deficient in nitrogen" and the reports 
and figures for the period suggest that the common practice was. still 
to cultivate without the use of fertilizers. 37 
'· 
257 
Footnotes to Chapter Eight 
1. Charles C. Cumberland, Mexico; The· Struggle for Modernity (New:· York, 
1968 ed.), p.298. 
2. Alicia Hernandez Chavez, La Mecanica Cardenista (Mexico, 1979), 
HRM vol. 16, pp.210-l3. 
3. Ram6n Beteta, 'Economic Aspects. of the Six-year Plan'. in Economic 
and Social Policy of Mexico (Mexico, 1935), pp.44 ff. quoted in 
Sanford A. Mosk, Industrial Revolution in Mexico (Berkeley and 
Los Angeles, 1950), p.58. 
4. Gonzalez 1979, p.238. 
5. Hernandez Chavez 1979, p.213. 
6. Luis Medina, Del Cardenismo al Avilacamachismo (Mexico, 1978)", 
HRM vol. 18, p.248. 
7. Mosk 1950, p.6o. 
8. Medina 1978, pp. 39~41. 
9. Medina 19'(8, p.4o. 
10. Medina .1978, p.l9. 
11. Secretar1a de Agricultura y Recursos Hidraulicos, Qro. 
12. Medina 1978, p.42, fn. 46. 
13. ·Medina 1978, pp.27-29. 
14. Medina 1978, p~63. 
15. Hewitt 1976, p.l3. 
16. Medina 1978, p.94, fn. 137. 
17. Medina 1978, p.248. 
18. Blanca Torres Ramirez, Mexico en la Segunda.Guerra.Mundial (Mexico, 
1979), HRM vol. 19, p.286. 
19. Medina 1978, p.243. 
20 •. Medina 1978, p.272. 
21. Medina 1978, p.190. 
'· 
22. Medina 1978, p.280. 
23. Hewitt 1976, p.9 and data taken from el Archivo del senor Ramon 
Ferniindez y Fernandez, El Colegio de Michoacan, Zainora. 
24. Mosk 1950, p.286; Hewitt 1976, p.ll. · 
25. Quoted in Hewitt 1976, pp.26-27. 
26. Hewitt 1976, passim. 
27. Hewitt 1976, pp.l45-46. 
28. Oral evidence from Hilario Ledesma, ex-peon of Juriquilla. 
29. Hewitt 1976, p.l8; Clark W. Reynolds, The Mexican Economy: Twentieth-
Century Structure and Growth (New Haven 1970), pp.l56-6o. 
30 •. Eduardo L. Venezian and William K. Gamble, The Agricultural Develop-
ment of Mexico: Its Structure and Growth since 1950 (New York, 
1969), pp.68-69. 
31. Censo Agrfcola Ganadero 1930, pp.l2-l3. 
32. Censo Agrfcola Ganadero 1930, p.21. 
33. Quoted in Krauze 1977, p.l68. 
·34. Secretaria de Agricultura y Recursos Hidraulicos, Queretaro. 
35. DAQ/Files for Carrillo Puerto, Bravo and Calamanda. 
36. DAQ/Files for Carrillo Puerto and Colorado. 
37. AJ/Circular from.Oficina de Estudios Especiales, Direcci6n General 
de ~gricultura, Departamento de Extension Agrfcola, dated 15 October 
1954. 
259 
CHAPTER NINE 
ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND CAPITALIST AGRICULTURE 
IN QUERETARO 1940~80 
AGRARIAN REFORM AND CLASS DECOMPOSITION 
· By the 1940s the shape of the agrarian economy in Queretaro had 
been transformed - the traditional centre-piece of the hacienda had 
been replaced by a multitude of ejidos and pequenos propiedades. We 
have already seen how the years of neglect and virtually non-existent 
investment associated with this transformation had left the Queretaro 
countrys~de a mere shadow of its former self. It is now time to 
consider the fate that had befallen that class of landowners and 
agriculturalists which had previously ridden so high on the successes 
of the Porfirian hacienda. 
In general terms, the social decomposition of these years was far 
less profound that the economic decomposition. The hacendado class in 
Queretaro certainly suffered a serious setback.during the incursions of 
the Cristiada and the Agrarian Reform, some fevr such as Juventino Guerra 
of San Jose el Alto even lost their lives, but it would be far from the 
truth to say that it had been ruined by the experience. 
The main reason for this resilience lay in the fact that the class 
had developed a number of interests separate from the productive 
hacienda. It had been quite common for members of the landowning 
families to enter the professions - by the time of the Revolution there 
were many doctors, lawyers, engineers and state bureaucrats at work in 
the capital, most of them bearing the name of one of the state's 
landowning lineages. One of those families, de la Llata, ownerE of the 
prosperous hacienda Tlacote el Alto, had chosen to educate all but one 
of the numerous sons, Antonio - who was then left to administer th~ 
property. 
260 ... 
In addition to this. trend of professionalization hacendados had 
diversified their interests as their profits had become more substantial • 
. Francisco Urquiza of Jurica and Agua Azul had invested in ~ successful 
I 
I 
brick factory designed to take advantage of the growing demand for 
h . . . Q -"t. 1 ous1ng 1n uere aro. Others developed businesses closely associated· 
with that of hacienda production - Alfonso Veraza invested considerable 
amounts in improving the flour mill of Batiin, whilst two owners of 
San Juanico had similar ventures on the move - Braulio Iriarte owned 
the mill close to .Santa Rosa Jaripeo in Michoaciin as well as a trading 
house in Mexico City, and Florencio Sanchez. ran a company trading in 
. . . 
2 A f ' gra1n also 1n the cap1 tal. urther case was that of Sant1ago Jimeno 
of the hacienda Capilla who invested in a project to set up a brewery 
... . 
1n Queretaro. 
Other lucrative concerns included the boom in transportation at the 
time of the Porfiriato: some Queretaro landowners had money invested 
in the major lines, whilst others moved to set up a company to run 
smaller ventures around the city and beyond to the townships of Pueblito 
and Acambaro. Finance also proved attractive, and many local hacendados 
-
were responsible for the establishment of the initial capital for el 
... . 3 . ... . . Banco de Queretaro, · wh1lst Bernabe Loyola d1ed ln th no fewer than 
four hundred lOdO~peso shares in el Banco Internacional e Hipotecario. 4 
Perhaps the most dramatic development of the late Porfiriato in 
Queretaro was hydro-electric power. Electric lights.in the state 
capital represented the apogee of progress through the application of 
science, and in the source of the power there lvas the secondary asset 
of irrigation - not to mention the anticipated symmetry of the electric 
water pump irrigating the lands of adjacent haciendas. The Campania 
Hidro-EH!ctrica de Queretaro was established in the first .years or the 
Twentieth century, and by the outbreak of the Revolution· a:.:·se·cond •lam, 
constructe1 across the river of San Juan at the point of a 120 metre 
waterfall called El Paso de las Rosas. This dam had taken fourteen 
months to complete and had cost 135,000 pesos. 5 Machinery for·:the 
generator had been purchased from a German company Veith of Heidheim 
6 
at a cost of 350,000 German marks. The company had been established 
on the basis of a capital sum of 310,000 pesos in.the early years of 
the century by way of the sale of 100-peso shares. By 1921 further 
issues of shares had swollen the capital sum of the company to well over 
one and a half million pesos. 7 By 1925 the company was providing 
electricity to light a number of pueblos and haciendas, and also 
powered sixty industrial plants including the textile mills of the 
Co:rripafiia Industrial Manufacturera (which had been Hercules of the 
Cayetano Rubio family) and the flour mills of San Antonio and El Fen~x. 8 
In addition to these interests the company had also developed a number 
of artesian wells and water-pumps for the purposes of irrigation -
some 45, spread across the .valleys of San Juan del Rio, westwards over 
the plain of Queretaro as far as Apaseo, with a total extractive 
capacity of 3200 litres of water per second. 9 
Unfortunately we do not know how profitable this company turned out 
to be, but there is every reason to think that such a monopoly over the 
new power would have been very successful - it is also clear that the 
company was able to buy some of the concerns it supplied, like the 
flour-mill of Guadalupe in Pueblito and the irrigable rancho of the 
same name belonging to the company's debtor Julian Gutierrez. From 
the point of view of the argument presented here the important thing 
to note is that the vast majority of the money invested in the company 
came from the state's hacendados. There is little doubt that such 
investments helped these families to overcome the>losses they incurred 
. . 10 during the years .of recess1on and agrar1an reform. 
'· 
Finally, of course, it should be noted that the retarded pace of 
the agrarian reform gave the landowners every opportunity to reduce 
the effects of the expropriations - as we have already not~d, several 
i 
properties were divided up and sold before they could be affected by 
petitions from pueblos of nuclei of resident workers. In addition to 
this defensive strategy many of the class had the advantage of owning 
property in the city, either Queretaro or Mexico City. ·one of the 
. . . 
effects of the agrarian reconstruction over these_ years was the 
displacement of a large number of rural residents. The later push 
towards industrialization combined with this displacement to make 
urban real estate a very valuable asset indeed~ 
Time and diversified interests had thus given many hacendados the 
I opp~rtunity to withdraw from the economy they had helped to establish. 
The majority of them chose to do so. Their withdral-Tal, combined with 
the State's failure to do anything more than to redistribute land to 
undercapitalized ejidos, condemned the area to more than three decades 
of economic decline. But in the midst of it there emerged the modern 
pattern of land tenure for the region. The Cardenas years of division 
and redistribution ·were followed by Camacho' s_ consolidat-ion of the· 
private sector, and during the 1940s and early 1950s there was a rush 
of applications in Queretaro to have properties registered as lega.J.ly 
immune. The result was that the state was more or less equally divided 
between the two sectors, with more than 800 private holdings and over 
27,000 ejido plots: land held privately amounted to over 640,000.hectares, 
whereas ejidal lands covered almost 495,000.hectares (Secretario de la 
-----~-~ ·--·-··-·-- --------------------. . .. -
Reforma Agraria, Queretaro). 
HACENDADO SURVIVORS AND THE RISE OF THE CAPITALIST RANCHERO: 
FOUR CASE STUDIES 
Although the majority of Queretaro's hacendados chose to withdraw 
from the land there were others who stayed on. Their attempt to survive 
the difficult years which followed the Revolution w~s eased by the way 
in which the agrarian reform unfolded sporadically and then gave way 
to the revival of the private holding. An analysis of some .of their 
number will serve to demonstrate the path of their development and · 
their connections with the previous epoch. 
The Villasantes 
Alberto Maria Villasante y Orue was born in Bilbao in 1876. He 
came to Mexico at some point during the first two decades of this 
century til ready married to a sefiora de Vicente. In 1926 he ·bought the 
haciendas of which he had been tenant - San Juanico and La Comunidad -
. 11 from a fellow Spaniard, Braulio Iriarte, for 200,000 pesos. Within 
a. few years these lands had been affected by donations to the neighbouring 
pueblos of Santa Maria Magdalena and San Antonio de la Punta. As a 
result of these grants the area of the properties was reduced from 
12 973 hectares to about 350. 
Villasante was not deterred by these set-backs and attempted to 
make up for the loss of area by renting other land •. In 1929 he took 
out the tenancy of Santa Maria Magdalena, an adjacent hacienda of some 
245 hectares owned by a citizen of the United States, Eduardo Orlando 
Orrin. By this time don Alberto was involved in establishing a dairy 
unit in San Juanico - referred to as a Unidad Agricola Industrial Lechera. · 
He was coming under considerable pressure from a petition for further 
land grants from the pueblo of El Retablo, and his case against 
additional expropriations was strengthened by the attempt to set up 
. 13 
such a un1t. 
'· 
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In 1930 Queretaro's Comisi6n Agraria Local gave one Ing. Ruperto 
Parra the task of assessing the validity of Villasante's claim. His 
·report provides us with a useful profile of the hacienda's production 
I 
' 
at the time. 
The evidence included in the report confirms the trend pointed to 
earlier' of declining productivity. This was especially the _case for . 
. . 
wheat and le~tils- yields for the former were down to 700 kg per 
hectare, whilst lentil crops barely surpassed 275 kg per hectare. The 
straw from these crops was an important component in feeding the 
livestock, as was the maize produced on the hacienda. Equally important 
was alfalfa -·Villasante was producing over 1250 tons of this per year 
from a plot of 28 1/2 hextares, and was in the process of extending this 
to a further 12 hectares. Also in preparation was a field of roots, 
some 22 hectares, which was to supplement the feed for the livestock. 
It will be remembered that imported breeds of dairy cattle were 
already stabled in San Juanico during the last years of the Porfiriato. 
Villasante had maintained this tradition and was holding some 89 mature 
cows, mainly Holstein but some too of the Swiss breed, as well as two 
bulls and a number of growing offspring. Methods of cultivation were 
still in the process of modernization and for this reason there were 
. . . d 14 
a number. of draught stock ma1nta1ned on the hac1en a. . 
. Daily requirements for cows in milk were considerable - 46 kg of 
green alfalfa, 11 1/2 kg of maize straw, and 2 kg of bran or maize flour; 
during the months of September and October roots replaced the maize 
straw and the alfalfa ration was increased to 60 kg. These amounts 
were halved when the cows were dried off and one tenth of them was 
required per head of unweaned sucklers. 
The rest of the livestock held on the hacienda also made dem:mds 
on the arable production. As a result of these various requiremei:rf;s 
I 
the report computed an aggregate annual list for the Sail Juanico milk 
unit -
2244 tons of alfalfa 
1324 tons of maize straw 
146 tons of ground maize 
28 tons of roots · 
Alongside this list the report drew up the quantities of produce 
which the haciendas of San Juanico and La Comunidad were capable of :.. 
1285.5 tons of alfalfa 
491.0 . tons of maize straw 
230.25 tons of maize grain 
7.9 tons of lentils 
29.5 tons of lentil straw 
57.25 tons of wheat grain 
123.0 toris of wheat straw 
The production was thus reckoned .to be insufficient for ·the needs 
.of the livestock, such that a deficit of 5827.62 pesos was left 
outstanding at the end of every year - money spent on the purchase of 
the balance required. 
On the basis of this reportIng. Parra accepted the.position 
advanced by Alberto Villasante and endorsed his claim that the 
properties constituted a Unidad Agricola Industrial Lechera. 
The petitioners in El Retablo did not let the matter rest at this 
and took their claim to the Comisi6n Nacional Agraria. The national 
authorities were by this time already affected by the emergent candidature 
of Lazaro Cardenas. An agronomist. was despatched to Queretaro, one· 
Ing. Ignacio Nunez, during the last months of 1932. His report was 
submitted in January 1933 and shows that there were a number of points 
\in contention. 
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Ing. Nunez's main complaint was that the earlier estimates for 
San Juanico's productive capacity had been lower than they should have 
been. Root yields had been underestimated, and producing cattle could 
. I . 
also have survived on less than half the allowance for maize straw. But 
1 above all, Nunez argued that the original report had considerably 
! 
underplayed the capacity of the hacienda to produce alfalfa. Villasante 
had reported that each plot was cut seven times a year and that on this 
basis one could produce the fodder at a rate of 45 tons per hectare. 
Ignacio Nufiez reckoned that land in the area in question could have 
withstood ten cuts a year, and with good care and correct irrigation, 
the yield could reach an average of 80·tons per hectare. With returns 
of this scale the plots of alfalfa in production and in preparation were 
seen as quite sufficient for the hacienda's livestock. 
Ignacio Nufie.z was probably stretching a point. It is true that 
i the Parra figure of 45 tons per hectare was something of an underestimate, 
I. 
since the average yields in Queretaro at the time w·ere in the region of 
50 tons, and San Juanico's lands were better than average (although here 
it must be remembered that only the top quality soils were involved in 
.I 
I 
the production of alfalfa). This said, however, it is important to note 
that average yields for alfalfa did not exceed the level of 50 tons per 
hectare until the late 1950s, and that present returns from the best 
lands in the area are not much higher than those stipulated by Ing. 
Nunez in 1933.15 . 
Nunez went some way towards admitting the exaggerated nature of 
his case in the course of his conclusions - there he s~ggest~d that 
···--~-----·t---·- --- .. - --·. ·-- -~ ~-- ..... ·---
. expropriations of San Juanico be kept to a minimum since larger losses 
I would je,opardize the unit's possibilities of staying in production. In 
I 
i the event his suggestions were taken up, and San Juanico lost onl~r 53 
I 
: hectares of irrigated land to the ejido of El Retablo. .Some 298 
; hectares remained. 
Villasante had clearly expected some degree of expropriation. 
The same·year of the Parr~ survey he had taken out a seven-year tenancy 
on the considerable hacienda of San Joaquin de la Cueva to the south 
of San Juanico. This property, previously owned by the spinster 
heiress Dolores Gonzalez de Cosio and bequeathed by her to a nephew, 
Carlos Gonz~lez de Cosio y Rubio, was almost 7,000.hectares in dimension, 
16 
and was rented out at between 9,000 and 10,400 pesos. Very little 
came of this move, however, since within a couple of years of the 
,contract the agrarista governor Saturnine Osornio had granted over 
4,000 hectares of the hacienda's land to the rancheria of La Cueva. 
Don Alberto was more successful in his contract of tenancy for 
the adjacent property of Santa Maria Magdalena. As noted earlier, he 
had first rented this hacienda in 1929 from Eduardo Orrin. The contract 
was drawn up again in 1938,.this time for a rent of 5,000 pesos in 
·1 d · a f" · · · 17 sl. ver an for an l.n e l.nJ.te perl.od. 
Even more significant than these strategies to compensate for 
shortages of fodder were don Alberto's attempt to modernize his methods 
of production. At the end of the Twenties he was still using some 
oxen in the cultivation of San Juanico, but this number had been reduced 
to only 22 yokes. He was already well on the way to dispensing with 
i 
·1 these beasts and replacing them with mules - these, he said, were easier 
and cheaper to maintain, had a higher work-rate than oxen, and also 
needed less maize straw and open pasture - which could then be saved 
for the dairy herd. 
Mules were an improvement, and by the middle of 1933 Villasante 
had sold off all·but 18 of his oxen and increased the mule stock to 128. 
But even with these changes he was aware of the continuing problem of 
fodder, especially as the dairy herd was expanding by the year. ais 
objective was to totally replace these draught animals with machim~ry, 
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thereby leaving all fodder for the dairy cattle. The move to mechanize 
production had already been started by Villasante in the late 1920s. 
when he had bought two tractors, one a Fordson the other a Moline, and 
I 
botq capable of drawinga two-share plough. In 1932 he bought a third, 
this time a John Deere model capable of using a four-share plough. 
The detailedlist_of the machinery found on the hacienda.in June 1933 
shows the extent to which this move towards mechanization was underway, 
and bears witness to the early commitment of Alberto Yillasante. 18 
Not unreasonably he also took precautions to safeguard these 
investments. In 1934 the 298 hectaresof San Juanico were divided into 
two fractions: one Alberto Villasante registered in his own name, 
comprising 140.70 hectares, including over 50 that were irrigable and 
over 10.5 of casco. The other fraction covered some 159.20 hectares 
of temporal lands and was registered as the property of one Alberto 
Villasante y de Vicente, the son of the other owner. Applications for 
Certificados de Inafectabilidad were dUly made for these properties 
in the mid-Forties and approved, somewhat belatedly, more than ten years 
.1 ti 19 a er. 
In this way the Villasante operation developed on the basis of 
some 536.60 hectares~ 298.90 hectares of which were owned by the 
family and 237.70 rented from the family of Orrin. The tenancy on this 
latter area, the ex-hacienda of Santa Marfa Magdalena, was renewed at 
the begiru1ing of the 1950s for a further term of ten years, with the 
rent now up to 10,000 pesos per year. This renewed contract was 
between don Alberto senior and the divorced wife of Eduardo Orrin, 
Guadalupe Cisneros, and her three adult children, Jorge, Carlos, and 
·.· I -
Carinen. All were based in Mexico City, except Carmen who was a citizen 
of the USA and lived in Dallas - and the young men were employed 
' 
I 
respectively as airline pilot and tourist guide. Unsurprisingly in 
'· 
these circumstances, the contract drawn up in 1951 incorporated an 
option on the part of the tenant to purchase the property. In 1954 
the elder Alberto renounced his right to this option and the property 
was sold instead to his second son, Jose Ramon. By this time the 
pioneering Villasante was close to eighty years old and had opted to 
move to Mexico City, leaving the casco of San Juanico to Jose Ramon, 
then twenty-eight. The purchase of Santa Marfa Magdalena cost the latter 
70,000 pesos, a sum cleared by three cheques from the Banco Nacional de 
Mexico. Within two years this had been split into two parts, one of 
151.10 hectares and registered in the name of Jose Ramon, the other 
86.60 hectares and registered as the property ofhis sister Carolina. 20 
By the end of 1956 both of these units had been granted the immunity 
of Certificados de Inafectabilidad, and within a generation had been 
passed on to the present incumbent Ignacio Villasante, second son of 
Jose Ramon anddedicated ranchero. The combined area is now cultivated 
intensively: yields of oats, barley, and wheat all reach up to 5 1/4 
··tons per hectare, crops of maize surpass ·even these at a maximum of 
6 tqns per hectare, whilst the heaviest yielder of all, sorghum, produces 
21 
at a rate of up to 9 tons the hectare. 
The R6:lz Buenos 
Alberto Marfa Villasante y Orue was a relatively recent arrival 
in Queretaro and started out as a tenant farmer. He was also an 
immigrant from Spain. So too was Cipriano Bueno Fei-~n~ndez~ the son of 
Francisco Bueno and Serafina Fernandez, but in his case the departure 
from the mother country had been somewhat earlier. From the-.little 
information available it appears that don Cipriano arrived in Veracruz 
during the middle years of the Porfiriato. He probably arrived with 
.. 21 
his • sister Francisca and brother Vidal. They seemed to settle L'l 
I 
Veracruz and only made contact with Queretaro at the turn of the 
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century, when Ci~riano bought some 1,700.hectares of land from Julian 
G . 22 ut1errez. These were the bulk of what had been the hacienda of 
San Rafael, once an annexe of the poorly administered estates of the 
I 
Feli~ family centred on the expansive Chichimequillas. 
In 1911 don Cipriano bought the last fraction of this hacienda, 
a fUrther 116 hectares of arable temporal for 3,800 pesos. 23 Little 
mer~ is known of this man, other than the fact that he was a share-
holder in.an enterprise based.on the two Chichimequillas mines of 
La Union and La Providencia ~n 1923. 24 Some three years later he died 
whilst on a visit to Veracruz - probably to spend some time with his 
sister Francisca who had remained in the city after marrying one Jose 
R6fz, also an immigrant from ~pain. 25 
Don Cipriano had never married and consequently made· his nephew·· 
Jose Ro1z Bueno heir.to his estate. Francisco had borne two children, 
one,in 1883 called Celestino, the other in 1886- Jose. When his 
unc+e died Jose moved .up to Queretaro and lived in a house on Juarez. 
I 
... - I 
He ~iscovered that his estate included the hacienda San Rafael and also 
the!main hotel in Queretaro, situated on the central plaza and 
appropriately called Gran Hotel •. Within weeks he had.leased both 
these properties to his elder brother Celestino Ro1z Bueno for a five-
26 year term at 12,000 pesos a year. 
Some years before :his uncle died Celestinomarried a Spanish 
senora called Soledad Gonz~ez. Their first-born was a girl, Francisca, 
named after her paternal grandmother. The second child was a boy, 
I 
calfed Jose after his grandfather. Four other children follQwed during 
the;years of their move to Queretaro.- Luis, Marina, Ana, and 
I -
Guadalupe Margarita. Although.approaching middle-:-age Celestino started 
' 
' . . 27 
out! afresh as hotelier and tenant farmer. 
'· 
\•' .· 
:':.'· 
•''.f' •. ,. 
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The hacienda San Rafael had never attracted any careful attention 
or constructive investment. It had suffered from.being in the shadow 
of the better-endowed Chichimequillas, and the Felilf :family had used 
it primarily to raise money as they plunged ever further into debt -
it vas for this reason that don Cipriano had bought it up in separate 
fractions. 
By the time Celestino arrived a good part of it vas covered by 
rough pasture, although there were some 900 hectares classified as 
second-class temporal. Two hundred draught oxen grazed the pastures 
along with some fifty breeding cows to maintain their number, and 
these were sufficient to cultivate an annual crop of maize on the basis 
of sharecropping •. It cannot have attracted much attention from the 
agraristas and in any case it wa~ favoured by the lack of any nearby 
nuclei of population or pueblos. As a result San Rafael survived the 
period of Osornio and Cardenas with minimal losses of only around 300 . 
hectares. Part of this success was also due to the registered 
fraLionamiento of the property during the period, into six pieces. 
I 
I 
A closer search on the part of the authorities would, however, have 
seen through this strategy, since all but one of the fractions were 
reg~stered in the names of minors, all children of Jose Ro1z, and it 
was clear that the property was still being run as a single unit.· 
Nonetheless, encouraged by this survival, Celestino Ro1z began to 
. mak,e investments in his property. He bought a Ford truck to make 
transport between Queretaro and the hacienda easier and-more efficient, I . . 
I 
andl more importantly, he started to sink artesian wells in order to be 
I 
abl~ to irrigate. The :first well was_vorking before the end of the 
I I . 
1930s and a more systematic attitude to production.vas subsequently 
! 
I 
' 
adopted. Irrigated lands were used intensively to take two crops a year, 
s~er maize and winter wheat. To ensure crops of reasonable .weight 
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Celestino dressed the irrigated lands with manure from the stab.led 
stock, and was content to reap up to two tons of maize per hectare, and 
over one and a quarter tons of wheat. ·He also started the/production 
28 
of alfalfa. 
The 1940s were years of consolidation for Celestino - a second 
artesian well was sunk and all the fractions of the hacienda were 
successfully established as legally immune pequefias propiedades, as 
follows -
Fraction II. 200 hec~~res temporal. Jose Ro1z Bueno. 
Fraction III. 158.32 h temporal and 
173 hectares pastures. Jose Ro1z Gonzalez. 
Fraction IV. 158.32 h temporal and 
173 hectares pastures. Ana Ro1z Gonzalez. 
Fraction v. As above. Guadalupe M. Ro1z G. 
Fr·action VI. 200 hectares temEoral. Luis Ro1z Gonzalez. 
Fraction·· IA 142 hectares temporal. Francisca R.G. de Amieva. 
Fraction IB As above. Marina Rol:z Gonzalez. 29 
As a result the property had access to considerably more than one 
thousand hectares of arable land' much of it level enough to take 
irrigation. Further money was invested in this during the early 1950s 
when the management of the estate was increasingly taken over by the 
eldest son, Jose Ro1z Bueno. By 1954 there were eight water-pumps 
working on San Rafael, and Jose began to irrigate 65 hectares of· 
alfalfa. At the same time he started to import pure bred Holstein 
cows from the United States. These cost him 3,000 pesos a head, at a 
30 time when the daily wage in the area stood at less than six pesos. 
Gi.Jen this ·-high price the San Rafael herd was only built up slowly -
~ . -· ----
by :the late 1960s. there were only eighty cows of this pedigree on the 
I . 
hacienda. 
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The build up may have been gradual but the final results were 
:formidable and the enterprise's success was guaranteed. By the end of 
the 1970s the herd of mature animals, all Holstein, .. had reached 1800,. 
with a regular milking population of 1400 spread across four diaries 
equipped with the most up-to-date machinery. In terms of the values 
current-in 1980 each cow was worth about 30,000 pesos,.and the irrigable 
~and, once temporal and barely marketable, had risen in value to well in 
excess of one hundred thousand pesos per hectare. Alfalfa from these 
lands was produced at a rate of up to one hundred tons per hectare and 
priced, according to season, at between 550 and 800 pesos per ton. 31 
During the early 1960s there was a degree of pressure for land 
from the growing pueblo of San Rafael. A survey conducted by the state's 
agrarian department showed that there were almost eighty people who 
qualified for ejidal lands. In order to meet some of these people's 
needs the government bought almost 750 hectares from San Rafael's 
fractions, some 326.2 of which was arable. This purchase gave plots of 
eight hectares to half of those qualified, leaving the rest without 
1 ' d 32 an • 
Whether or not this subtraction caused the enterprise any problems 
of supply is not known, but it is the case that by the end of the 1970s 
the Rofz herds had grown to the point where it was necessary to rent 
at least two hundred hectares of ejidal lands, all with access to water 
f0r irrigation and costing between six and eight thousand __ pesos :per_ 
hectare. By this stage the Ro1z enterprl.se -had reached very impressive 
proportions, and no fewer than seventy workers were employed_on a 
regular basis. Future prospects havebeen done no harm by the emergence 
! -·-
of an alliance in the area between the Ro1z family of San Rafael and 
that of the Amievas, descendents of Remigio Noriega and current owners 
I . 
off the remnants of the neighbouring hacienda of Chichimequillas. The 
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eldest Amieva, Salvador, had married the eldest Rol:z, Francisca, and in 
.1.980 Jose Rofz 's eldest son and heir apparant, Jorge, _was married to 
the eldest daughter of Salvador Amieva's youngest brother, Remigio -
I . 
I 
her name is Luz Mar1a. Wealthy though these families are, the young 
couple are in the_process of establishing their new home at the end of 
a dirt track in the middle of the San Rafael estate. 33 
'The Fernandez Garcl'a 
The cases of Villasante and Ro1z provide examples of enterprises 
:which were· established in the years after the end of the Revolution. 
The history of the Fernandez Garc1a brothers shows how similar endeavours 
could take root during the earlier decades of the Porfiriato. 
At some unspecified point during those times six brothers arrived 
in Mexico from the Spanish province of Santander. It is possible that 
,they were nephews of the Garc1a brothers, Victor and Patricio, who had 
st~rted out i~ 1870 as tenants of San Juanico and later became respected 
34 
agriculturalists in the area. In any event, three of the Fernandez 
brothers moved up to Queretaro - Isidro, the eldest, Alejandro, and 
Joaquin, at that time still only a boy. At the turn of the century they 
were tenants in Amascala and raising wheat for sale to the Batan mill 
in quantities of over 12 tons. 35 Within a few years they had managed 
to buy two fractions of the old hacienda of Menchaca from Vicente Franco 
315 hectares in all, costing 12,000 pesos. To cover this purchase 
Isidro Fernandez had managed to-raise a loan from the Banco de Londres 
y Mexico of 18,000 pesos at eight per cent over a two-year period. The 
----·-----purchase-.included_a.house on .. the property and barns - the balance of 
i - 6,000 pesos was spent on the first of the Fernandez dairy herd. 36 
Within two years of this purchase the Menchaca properties were 
sold, ~resumably to pay off the outstanding debt which had come due at 
the Ban;!o de Londres y Mexico. The brothers had not done badly out of 
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the transaction, since at least on the fraction called San Jose they 
made a profit of 1500 pesos. 37 The same year, 1906, they took out the 
tenancy on the prosperous hacienda of Carretas, which lay on the south-
eastern edge of the city of Queretaro. The contract was for a five-
year period and cost 15,000 pesos to be paid bi-annually and in advance. 
Tlle first payment was covered by Joaquin Garcfa who also acted as 
guarantor to the brothers - it may be that this Garcfa was a maternal 
relative of the Fernandez brothers and also connected to the Garcfa 
t . d 1" 38 brothers men 1one ear 1er. . 
The stock they had maintained on Menchaca was then moved to the 
casco of Carretas. Within the first few years of their efforts there 
the Fernandez brothers became relatively well established. We know from 
a contract drawn up in 1908 by a grain merchant called Luis Escovar that 
the Fernandez brothers received the sum of 4000 pesos, advanced on the 
sale of the green maize still in the field and reckoned to be at least 
1300 fanegas. 
! 
The importance of this contract was that the collateral 
for :this advance a.IJ10unted to a mere 30 head .. of the Fernandez dairy herd. 
This; gave each cow a rough valuation of about 130 pesos when local breeds 
were valued at only 25 pesos per head for dairy stock - it is clear that 
the Fernandez·brothers were already owners of imported stock from the 
United States. 39 
:A later inventory drawn up· for Carretas confirms this inference. 
This suggests that they were well-established as dairy farmers and were · 
pursurr.ng a modern line of production. The livestock ·stabled on 
I 
I 
I Carretas was valued that year at over 30,000 pesos, and comprised four 
I 
i 
pure-bred bulls, three Swiss and one Holandes, and a hundred cows of 
i 
these ibreeds as well as Dorano - there were also another fifty which 
I 
r- ~ b d. _4o had be.en produced by the Fernandez br()thers by cross- ree 1ng. ·_No 
doubt ~-hese cattle thrived on the alfalfa produced in Carretas from a 
I 
'· 
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plot of over 24 hectares of irrigated land. 
The contract in Carretas expired in the summer of 1211. ·The· : 
brothers were well enough established to divide their interests ~d set 
I 
up independently of one another. Alejandro had already become the· 
tenant of the hacienda Negreta in Pueblito in January 1909, a contract 
which lasted for five years and cost 4250 pesos per year~ ·Negreta was 
a fraction of the old hacienda of Balvanera and was composed of only 
some 104 hectares most of which was hil],side. 41 
During those years Alejandro had remained unmarried, but Isidro 
had taken a wife from the powerful Queretaro lineage of Rubio - Dolores, 
daughter of Jose Maria Rubio. In 1910 his father-in-law helped Isidro 
to take a firmer hold on the business of milk production by acting as 
guarantor to two tenancies. The most important was that of the hacienda 
Casa Blanca, well-endowed and conveniently situated on the outskirts of 
the city of Queretaro. The other concerned two irrigated plots raising 
alfalfa close to the road leading from Queretaro to Hercules. Casa 
\ 
Blanba cost don Isidro 4400 .. pesos a year, . and the plots a further 800 
I 
I 42 
pesos. 
Within a year of these contracts being drawn up don Isidro had 
strengthened his position. Previously various crucial assets in Casa 
Blanca had been withheld, especially the use of the water pump. In a 
new contract drawn up in 1913 the entire complex of Casa Blanca and 
El Jacal was made over for five years at an annual cost of 16,000 pesos. 43 
In 1918 the contract was extended for at least another year, with the 
specification that the rent was paid in silver. 
--·-·-···---·--·---- _.L .. _____________ .. -----·--··· --- . -- .. -· .. -·· . . 
I 
By the beginning of the 1920s don Isidro had made· enough money to 
I -· 
I I . . . 
move i,nto a property market which had been thrown into an unsettled 
' 
state '.bY the preceding years of upheaval ·and the rising rhetoric for 
agrarik·.~ reform. There is some evidence to suggest that he :bought the 
'· 
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hacienda of El Cerrito which lay between Queretaro and Pueblito. ·This 
property had been part of the complex based on San Juanico and 
administered by Bernabe Loyola in the 1850s and 1860s. It was a small 
estate of only around 450 hectares but nonetheless valuable - on account 
of. its good soils and convenient location~ Timoteo Fernandez de 
Ju~regui sold it to Andres Arias in 1895 for 44,000 pesos, and_it ap~ears 
that 'it was the beneficiaries of his will who sold it to Isidro 
Fernandez in 1920 or 1921. 44 
The whole procedure of this transaction confirms our earlier 
impression of a landed class uncertain about the future of private 
holdings. Registration of the sale was delayed until 1927 when it was 
listed as three separate transactions. Fraction one of El Cerrito was 
apparently the property of Isidro himself, at a cost of 42,000 pesos-
the other two were registered in the names of his wife, Dolores Rubio, 
and son Pedro, with values at_tached of 28,000 and 30,000 pesos 
respectively. Each fraction had been limited to between 140 and 150 
' 
' 
heciares, presumable. to conform to the notion of a pequena propiedad. 45 
Two fragments of evidence suggest that the transaction had indeed 
taken place. In the first place there is the notarised record of don 
Isidro 1 s redemption of a debt of 70,000 pesos· ,outstanding on the property 
in 1921- payment was made in full to Jose Marfa Mesa, the creditor. 46 
Further evidence was provided by Alejandro Fern(ndez, nephew-of don 
Isid~o and son of his young brother Joaqu1n- acco~~ing~o t~is source 
I • the fam1ly ran the hacienda from 1921 onwards. 
I . 
lit appears. that don Isidro had left the running of El Cerrito to 
i - -------
his young brother Joaqu1~, whilst he himself turned his attention to the 
I 
prope.rty he had rented, El Jacal. This had been broken up by the owner 
! 
I 
Dolorles Aguiar de Salazar and six of. these fractions were sold to don 
I 
Isidro~ although all of them were registered in the names of his 
I 
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children - Pedro, Joaqu1n, Ana, Carmen, Dolores and Concepci6n. The 
first two ran the unit and were billed as tenants of the others' 
fractions. On the basis of this arrangement a very successful dairy 
I 
! 
enterprise was built up and at least three of the fractions were given 
Certificados de Inafectabilidad during the 1940s - guaranteeing the 
enterprise a minimum of almost 190 hectares of. irrigated land. 47 This 
successful unit was only finally run down as Joaqu1n Fernandez moved 
beyond middle age and found that the expansion of the city limits of 
Queretaro had given his agricultural property the inflated value of urban 
real estate. 
The other Joaqu1n, young brother of his namesake's father, had in 
the meantime made efforts to maintain the family's interests in dairy 
production on El Cerrito. Throughout the Twenties up to two hundred 
imported cows were milked there as well as some six hundred goats. The 
average production per head amounted to between eight and ten litres a 
day at a time when milk sold at ten centavos per litre. Thirty per cent 
of the production was turned into cream, butter, or cheese. 48 The 
successful development of this enterprise was then interrupted by the 
agrarian reform instigated by Lazaro Cardenas during the middle 1930s. 
The defense that the·property had been divided into three separate units, 
each constituting a pequeffa propiedad, was summarily dismissed since .it 
was clear that the lands were run as an integrated enterprise. In any 
event the Cardenista officials regarded the hacienda as still owned by 
the succession of Andres Arias and the petitioning Pueblito was granted 
a fair slice of El Cerrito, including 117 hectares of irrigable land. 49 
The Fernandez family were left with 145 hectares, the majority of which 
remains the property of Joaqu1n's son Alejandro - although eighty 
hecta::.~es are irrigated by some four artesian. wells and sufficient alfalfa 
is produced to.maintain more·than thirty Freisans in milk, the condition 
'· 
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deteriorating health (about t~n years ago some twenty hecatres of 
El Cerrito were sold in order to finance an operation in a hospital 
in San Antonio, Texas). 
Class continuity: five generations of Urquizas ort the land 
By now it will be clear that the majority of Queretaro's Porfirian 
landowners gave way to the pressures of the post-Revolutionary years. · 
The cases we have reviewed so far suggest that the threads.of moderniza-
tion were picked up by men who were far from being powerful hacendados 
at the turn of the Century. Even the history of the Amievas, now in 
control of a lucrative enterprise based on the casco of Chichiinequillas, 
is hardly evidence of any protracted continuity, since a considerable 
part of the family's contemporary fortune·has been made in business 
activities in Mexico City. In keeping with this path of development 
the casco of the hacienda has been expensively modernized and the 
stables contain no fewer than fifty thoroughbred horses - and Rodolfo, 
the second son of Remigio Amieva, has the unusual distinction of 
playing top-flight polo. 
Against this case, however, there are others which exemplify a 
different tradition.. One of Berhabe Loyola's great· grandsons maintains 
the family's commitment to local agriculture, and similar strands of 
continuity may be traced in the families of Cevallos and Marti'nez, 
once of the hacienda Colorado, and of Mancillo and Montes in neighbouring 
Calaillanda. Other agriculturalists of recent prominence reveal connections 
which run back to humbler origins in the Porfiriato, such as the 
tenants of a fraction of the hacienda Bravo, called Ostendi, and the 
. "' 50 
rancheros of Corralejo by the name of Hernandez. 
Ad4itional cases point up a separate pattern already mentioned in 
connection to the development of a rural bourgeoisie in the north-
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western states of Sonora and Sinaloa. There it was discovered that 
some of the best agriculturalists to emerge during the expansion of the· 
1940s and 1950s were exiles from the Reform Programme, hacendados from 
the Baj1o who had lost their lands or sold up I in order to make a new 
51 
and anonymous start. Similar patterns show up amongst the most 
successful dairy farmers of Queretaro - the Gonzalez Olveras, for example, 
now owners of a unit of Ro1z dimensions in Tlacote el Alto and of one 
of the largest retailers of dairy machinery in Queretaro, were 
previously a hacendado family of some importance in neighbouring Hidalgo. 
A similar case is that of the de Alba brothers, reputable dairy farmers 
of lands in Pueblito, once belonging to the haciendas of Balvanera, 
Tejeda and El Bravo - their father had been a successful hacendado in 
. 52 
Aguascalientes. 
The begin.ilings 
One family which was prominent during the Porfiriato has, however, 
man~ged to transcend the d1fficulties of the intervening period and 
remains one of the most important of the contemporary times - the· 
Urquizas. The Urquiza clan is now very considerable and is distributed 
far and wide in Mexico, but it all started with the arrival of two 
brothers, ·Francisco and Manuel, at some point in the late 1820s. 53 They. 
came from the Basque provinces of Spain and Manuel, at least·' soon 
settled in the area of Maravat1o in the borderlands of Michoacan and 
Queretaro - not. far from_ the b:i,:r:thplace of their contemporary Bernabe 
Loyola. 
We do not know what Manuel accomplished in Maravat{o, except that 
he married soon after arriving, to a Teresa Balbuena. The couple raised 
seven children there, the first, Francisco, being born in 1833. 54 
Antonio followed in 1836, and thereafter there was Dionisio, Manuel, 
Teresa, Coletta, and Ignacio. Little is known of the last five except 
'· 
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that Dionisio and Manuel moved north, that Teresa married a chemical 
engineer called Julian Sierra, and that Coletta remained a spinster. 55 
The Urquizas of the eastern Baj1o sprang from the efforts of the eldest 
t1m brothers, Francisco and Antonio. 
Francisco Urquiza Balbuena 
By the time Francisco was in his thirties he had moved from 
Maravat:lo to the city of Queretaro. There he moved in the highest of 
society and soon met the youngest heir of Colonel Jose Francisco 
Figueroa, Dolores. In 1871 when Dolores was thirty they agreed to 
marry. 56 Dolores had been only about nine years old when her father 
died - her mother had died even earlier. She had been left in the care 
of her only brot.her, Jose Francisco, priest and enterprising man_ager ·of 
San Marcos. Dolores' share of the considerable estate, which included 
shares in the textile plant outside Guadalajara, called Atemajac, and 
the mine Fresnillo, as well as the hacienda of San Marcos, came to more 
than seventy thousand pesos - almost two-thirds of this remained as 
. h S M M . . G' 57 cred1t advanced to the pure aser of an arcos, aur1c1o omez. 
Dolores Figueroa was thus a most wealthy heiress, entitled to considerable 
assets and in receipt of an income of over two and a half thousand 
pesos in interest per annum. There can be no doubt that Francisco 
Urquiza had made a splendid match, and within a few years of marriage he 
was well on his way to a substantial fortune. 
The first property the couple acquired was the well-endowed 
hacienda of Jurica, situated close to the city of Queretaro and .adjacent 
. -
to Juriquilla. Including its annexes, Alvarado and Mandiola, the 
property covered almost three thousand hectares with a considerable 
part irrigable and blessed with excellent soils - the hacienda had 
been in the hands of the prominent family of L6pez Ecala since soon 
58 
after the Insurgency and cost Dolores over fifty thousand pesos. 
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Don Francisco made this hacienda an important part of his business 
ventures, first by making the most of.its agricultural potential 
(quite soon after the purchase date he paid five thousand pesos to 
I 
Bernaba Loyola to acquire additional water, and during the later years 
of the Porfiriato the hacienda featured as often as any other as an 
example of the state's flourishing modern agriculture), and later by_· 
building a brick factory there to capitalize on the boom in urban 
construction during the 1890s. 59 
Francisco flourishes 
Soon after the family's estate was extended to include the 
neigqbouring Salitrillo, and also the excellent property of Mayorazgo, 
located on the fertile plains between Apaseo el Grande and Celaya, 
nearby in the state of Guanajuato. With the enterprise in Jurica well 
established Francisco Urquiza transferred his attentions to this area. 
Adjacent to .the hacienda of I.fayorazgo was the property of Agua Azul,· 
which had been recently made into a flourishing unit by the enterprise 
of Alfonso Marfa Veraza •. According to the will of Dolores the family 
enterprise was by this time making ample profits and wel;L able to extend 
. . t 6o . . b h. 1ts 1nteres s. · ·Th1s 1s borne out y the 1story of the purchase of 
the hacienda of Agua Azul - a property of over six thousand hectares 
and with access to.an ample source of water- although the subject of a 
dispute between the hacienda and neighbouring pueblos of Apaseo and 
Tenango and the hacienda of San Cristobal. 
Alfonso Veraza sold Agua Azul to Francisco Urquiza in December 1894 
·-·-····---····at. a __ cost_of .. l60,000 pesos.· ... It is significant that the purchase was 
made in .the name of.Francisco rather than Dolores, who had been the 
legal owner of all previous purchases, since it implies that Francisco 
was by that time able to enter negotiations on the basis of his own and 
61 
recently earned assets. Quite apart from the profits he was entitled 
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to from the enterprises of Jurica and Mayorazgo, he had also entered 
into a partnership with Amado Obregon, the joint owner of the 
haciendas of Los Trojes and San Juan Mart1n, both conveniently located 
. 62 
adjacent to Mayorazgo. 
Amado Obregon was in debt to the tune of 42,000 pesos, a sum 
raised on the strength of the haciendas in question. When the partnership 
was contracted in the autumn of 1893 this debt was redeemed by Francisco 
Urquiza,· thereby leaving don Amado w·ith an obligation to pay him off 
at an interest rate of s1x per cent. The owner of the hacienda moved 
to Mexico City to join the rest of his family, one of whom, Lauro, was 
a doctor, and left the business of administration to don Francisco. In 
return for this overall responsibility he received an annual fee of six 
thousand pesos to be taken out of the-hacienda's revenue. ·Until the 
debt of 42,000 pesos was paid off Francisco Urquiza was also entitled to 
two--thirds of the remaining profits, whilst the remainder was despatched 
to Mexico City for the Obregon family. There vras also something in 
this contract for don Francisco's eldest son, Francisco Jose, since he 
took over the everyday direction of thehacienda and received an annual 
salary of one thousand pesos as well as .ten pesos a week for living 
costs and any produce from the hacienda that he required. 
We are left with the impression that this was a profitable venture 
for Francisco Urquiza. The contract ran for the specified period of 
five years and at the end of it there was no mentiQ~_ of _any_qutstan4ing 
debt - we may assume from this that the effort had earned don Francisco 
at least fifty thousand pesos if not more. The inventory for the 
haciendas drawn up at the time of the· contract suggests that such an 
.. 
incon:e was indeed possible. The lands were well placed on the fertile 
plains of Celaya and, quite apart from the usual crops produced in the 
area, t.here were fields of peanuts, tobacco and sweet-potato. It is 
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clear that some modernizing trends were also well under.way, creating a 
sound basis for profitability - the quality of the livestock ~~s bei?~ 
improved by the presence of an imported pure-bred Swiss bull, valued at 
I 
three hundred pesos and more than seven times higher than that of_the 
local equivalent, and the list of machinery was also quite impressive, 
including a steam-driven thresher worth fifteen hundred pesos and 
several other items of modern equipment •. The value of all inventoried 
items, excluding that of the land, the unharvested and stored crops, and 
the buildings; reached the impressive figure of almost twenty thousand 
pesos - a firm indication that Trojes was well capitalized and a most 
viable unit for don Francisco's attentions. 63 
Some fifteen months after·.this partnership had been formed 
Francisco Urquiza bought Agua Azul. At the time of the purchase he was 
only able to put down twenty-five thousand pesos, scarcely more than 
fifteen per cent of the total purchase price. Fifteen thousand pesos 
were still owed by Alfonso Veraza to the previous owner, Marfa Navarrete 
de Aguilar, who had inherited the properties of Agua Azul and Mayorazgo 
from her maternal grandparents, Lie. Octaviano Munoz Ledo and Clara 
Garro - this mortgage was transferred to Francisco Urquiza. The other 
outstanding mortgage was of twenty thousand pesos and in favour of the 
Hospital Civil in Queretaro. The remaining hundred thousand pesos 
Francisco agreed to pay Alfonso Veraza over nine years at an interest 
rate of six per cent - the_ first two annual installments were to be 
... ~- . - -
fifteen 64 thousand pesos, .the other seven of ten thousand. Within a year, 
however, don Francisco had managed to pay off thirty thous~~ pesos of 
---··------~-------- ------- --···--· ---
this debt, and soon after the rest was also redeemed ahead of schedule. 65 
There can be no doubt that Francisco Urquiza had assembled a 
substantial fortune by the time he drew up his will in the late 1890s. 66 
Both he and Dolores declared that their joint estate had grown 
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considerably on account of hard work and well-earned profits, and as 
a result included the haciendas of Jurica and annexes, Salitrillo, 
Mayorazgo, Agua Azul, and thehuerta of San Javier in the city of 
Queretaro. Quite apart from the· additional assets of the brick factory 
in Jurica and a noble town house on the Avenue of the Sixteenth of 
September, the family of Francisco and Dolores were the·most prominent 
shareholders in the establishment of the Bank of Queretaro in .1903. 
Significantly, don Francisco included in his will a clause reco~ending 
the formation of a family company to run the family estates instead of 
dividing them up according to the heirs, and that this company maintained 
the properties as an integrated unit for as long as possible. This he 
averred was a sure guarantee of successful business. He died in 
August 1904 aged 71, leaving a widow and five children, Francisco Jose, 
Manuel Marfa, Guadalupe, Leonor, and Dolores - a sixth child, Carlos, 
had died in his youth. At the time of their father's death the· 
youngest was sixteen and the eldest thirty-two. 
Antonio Urquiza Balbuena 
Francisco's brother Antonio had not made quite such_a dramatic 
success of his life, at least in terms of business and accumulation. 
There is some evidence to suggest that he stayed on in Maravat{o .somewhat 
longer and acquired some small properties there - Apeo, Guaracha, and 
Las Piedras. He married a little later than Francisco, also to a woman 
of some standing in Queretaro society, Marfa Luisa Couturier-; but· by 
all accounts with less in the way of an inheritance. Three sons were 
born, Luis, Ignacio, and Antonio, but their mother died whilst they were 
"t 67 all qm. e young. 
At the time of her death Francisco was already well on the way to 
becoming one of the area's most successful agriculturalists. Even 
though his eldest son, Francisco Jose, took some responsibility for the 
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administration of the property Trojes at the age of only twenty-one, 
it is clear that Francisco almost had more haciendas thari he could 
cope with. For this reason he took on his brother Antonio as a 
I 
partner in 1895 in a company set up to develop the haciendas of 
Mayorazgo and AgUa Azul. Don Francisco was the socio capitalista, or 
financier, whilst the job of actual day-to-day administration fell to 
Antonio. Within two years of the partnership the company was extended 
to take inthe hacienda of Trojes as well, the three properties forming 
68 
an integrated complex between the towns of the two Apaseos·and Celaya. 
At some point during this partnership Antonio met the owner of the 
hacienda Soledad y Rincon near Dolores in Guanajuato. This property 
had been owned by a senor Abasolo, by all accounts a progressive 
hacendado during the years of the mid-century. The hacienda had been 
reviewed as to its credit worthiness by the trustees of the Convents of 
Santa Clara and of the Capuchines - the report had been favourable, the 
hacienda was apparently in good condition and well-run with livestock 
. 69 
alone worth over ten thousand pesos. Senor Abasolo had then died 
leaving his widow, Ana Galvan, childless and the sole heir to the 
estate. Both she and Antonio Urquiza must have been well advanced in 
years when they married - it appears that only the young Antonio 
Urquiza Courturier accompanied the couple ~o Rincon, the other two sons 
had presumably already left home. Not long after don Antonio died and 
Ana Galvan was widowed a second time, although on this occasion she was 
left with the consolation of having the young Antonio at home - whom she 
had adopted. 70 During the early years of this century she sent him 
---------north--to--Ohio-in -the -Unlted States where he studied animal husbandry 
at lli1iversity ievel~7l 
'· 
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The third generation and the Revolution 
The generation of the young Antonio and his cousins .was in command 
of the family's.assets at the time of the Revolution and beyond. 72 
The most important were Francisco, Manuel, and Antonio. The rest of 
the Urquiza Figueroas feature only obliquely in the subsequent survival 
of the family since they were women - Dolores remained single, Guadalupe 
married a Salvador Alvarez (whose sister was Francisco Jose's first wife), 
and Leonor married one of Bernabe Loyola's sons, Fernando. Antonio's 
brothers meanwhile moved beyond the compass of Queretaro society - Luis 
at first bought land in Morelia and then left to become a director of 
the Banco Comercial in Mexico City, whilst Ignacio bought thehacienda 
El Tesorero in Uruapan, Michoacan, and was to suffer a near-fatal 
shooting accident there. 
Francisco Jose and Manuel came to dominate the properties 
accumulated by their father Francisco and mother Dolores. The· former 
married twice, once to Sara Alvarez and later to Angela Rubio, and left 
eight children. This line had inherited Jurica, most of which was lost 
to the agrarian reform - the family gained some belated consolation 
from the fact that Isabel, the second-born, married a senor Calzada 
and was thus to mother a recent governor of the state of Queretaro -
Antonio Calzada Urquiza, initially trained as an architect. 
The lineage derived from Manuel Marfa was more successful in 
retaining possession of inherited lands. Manuel h~g married twice -
to sisters Trinidad and Marfa Septien. He had taken over the Urquiza 
lands between Apaseo and Celaya, the haciendas of Mayorazgo and 
Obrajuelo. It will be remembered that he had incurred fierce 
cond<~mnation from the Cristeros in the area for taking an active part-
against them in the late Twenties. His political shrewdness showed up 
again when he divided up the family lands to accord with the legal 
. -- ---~--- -~--------- --· - .. , .. __________ --
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rulings on immunity. As a result there are today three separate 
nuclei of lands in the area, all run by descendents of Manuei l1ar1a 
Urquiza Figueroa. Two areas of Obrajuelo were passed down through the· I . 
second son, Carlos, to his offspring, Jorge and Jose Urquiza James - the 
former has also proved to be successful within the PRI and now heads 
the state authority on tourist development. Further lands had been passed 
to Francisco, first son of Manuel's second marriage, and this is currently 
run by him and his only son, also confusingly called Francisco. Like the 
unit mentioned above, run by Jose Urquiza. James, this area is dedicated 
to the intensive production of milk. 
The same story is to be found in relation to the iands passed on to 
the other sons of Manuel Marfa - Manuel and Ignacio, and to their sons, 
Humberto and Eduardo. 73 This unit consists of at least 270 hectares of 
irrigated land and is more or less exclusively turned over to the 
intensive production of fast-growing grasses and alfalfa. This is cut 
for fodder and fed to herds of pedigree Holstein cattle spread over 
four stables and dairies. Comparable to the Rofz enterprise based on 
San Rafael, the herds here number some 1800 head with a milking 
population of around 1400. ~ average daily production is .of the order of 
thirty thousand litres. The strength of the family's initiative and 
enterprise can be measured by the fact that this activity is only one 
aspect of their business - a larger part consists of the entire process 
of milk pasteurization and distribution. Descendents of Manuel Urquiza 
Figueroa are the major shareholders of the Alpura company based in 
Queretaro and Mexico City, and one of the country's largest milk 
processors and distributors. The managing director of this company is 
Manuel Maria's fourth son, Ignacio Urquiza Septien and still owner of 
a thriving dairy unit in Obrajuelo. 
'· 
·Antonio Urquiza and the Jersey tradition 
True to the qualities of Antonio Urquiza Balbuena, the lineage which 
has descended from him has been somewhat less grandiose and diversified 
in its accomplishments. His third son and namesake started out on a 
course of modernization before· the break-up of the hacienda Soledad y 
Rincon, the property of his stepmother. Midway through the Revolution, 
however, she died leaving the property to six heirs, her sister Isabel 
Galvan de Gavidia resident in Mexico City, her four nieces from this 
sister, and her stepson Antonio Urquiza Corturier. The hacienda had 
been divided up by Ing. Manuel Garc{a Perez in 1918 and Antonio had 
inherited the sixth fraction comprising almost two and a half thousand 
hectares. 74 
A few years earlier Antonio had married a descendent of one of 
the most prominent of the Queretaro families, Dolores Fernandez de 
J 
,.. . 
uaregu1. Once Antonio.had built a house and stable on the fraction 
they moved out to Rincon and began to i'nvest in the development of the 
·land. At least six wells were stmk and in 1922 one of these was fitted 
with a pump. This coincided with the import of pedrigree cattle from 
the USA, the fruit of Antonio's education in Ohio - Hereford, Doran, 
and Jersey. These last were to become the hallmark of the family's 
emergence as dairy farmers, but first of all they had to be moved from 
Rincon, this partly sold as fractions and partly expropriated for 
redistribution, to a new property for the Urquizas, the hacienda of 
Carretas. 75 
Carretas and Bordo Colorado 
The hacienda of Carretas had a long.and illustrious history in 
Quere:caro - it was niost notably the property of the Lt. Col. Manuel 
Samani~go del Castillo, Creole loyalist in the wars of Independence 
and suc~essful commander of the Dragones de Sierra Gorda. In recognition 
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of his services to the Spanish crown, don Nanuel was granted the· noble 
title of Conde in October 182i, the lastsuch title to be issued to a 
~K • 76 !'!ex1.can colonel. 
Samaniego had inherited Carretas from his uncle Juan Antonio del 
Castillo y Llata, a gapuchin from the province of Santander who married 
the daughter of the notorious first Conde de Sierra Gorda, Col. J. de 
Escandon y Lleras, the man reputed to have encouraged Norelos to join 
Hidalgo in the Insurgencia of 1810.~7 
Nanuel Samaniego married well - to a daughter Catalina of a 
marriage between two ···.of the most celebrated families of the Queretaro 
elite - the Fernandez de Ju~regui and the de la Canal. The couple appear 
to have had six children, Nanuel, Joaquin, Uriel, Naria Loreto, Maria 
de la Luz, and Soledad Gelaty. The parents died at some unknown date 
during the latter half of the Nineteenth century and the hacienda Carretas 
was maintained intact for some considerable time. According to a document 
drawn up in the .late 1880s the property ~oras directed by a company called 
Samaniego and company, the administration of which was left to Manue1. 78 
There is evidence to-suggest that this company ran the hacienda directly 
until late on in the period of the Porfiriato. It was then leased out 
to the dairy farmer Isidro Fernandez during the years immediately before 
the Revolution. 79 
During the Revolution the hacienda was rented to Alberto Legarreta, 
and by that time it was the property of Manuel Samaniego and his 
. - ··- -
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children, Joaqu1.n, Nanuel and Dolores. The property was then divided 
between these three and each fraction of the hacienda was pu~ on the 
market and sold during the years of 1920-22 - Manuel Ordonez bought 
some seven hundred hectares named La Providencia, Manuel Alcocer bought 
the fraction of the casco, some five hundred and fifty hectares_, and 
the rest of the land, denominated El Mirador, went to Ricardo Feregrin6. 81 
'· 
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During the 1920s Manuel Alcocer worked the fraction of the casco 
and then broke the land into two pieces, the smaller he sold to a 
Miguel Mesa, leaving the larger, some 477 hectares, to a certain Arturo 
Dussange. Within a year this latter fraction had been further subdivided 
and sold to the Urquizas from Rinc6n. Antonio bought fraction two of 
the casco for 13,000 pesos (to be paid in gold coins)- 102.hectares of 
arable land and 300 of hill pastures. His wife Dolores Fern~ndez de 
Juaregui bought the actual casco and surrounding land for 17,500 pesos 
in gold - the house and buildings covered almost eight heCtares, there 
were over thirty hectares of:.arable land temporal, and the other thirty 
·were irrigated by waters driven by a pump. Further land was also acquired 
at that time by don Antonio, land attached to the fraction of Carretas 
called La Lorna. During the years of Osornio some of these hectares 
were expropriated for agrarian redistribution such that the family was 
left with some four hundred hectares in total - one hundred and eighty 
of these, sixty of which were arable temporal, .were registered in the 
name of Javier Urquiza, Antonio's fifth child, whilst the rest were 
legally owned by Don Antonio himself •. Early in the 1940s both these 
areas, denominated La Lorna and El Casco de Carretas resp~ctively, were 
granted immunity with certificados de inafectabilidad. 82 
The pedigree Jerseys stabled on Rincon were brought to the buildings 
of the old hacienda Carretas in 1929. Attempts to increase the amount 
of water available to the lands were at first frustrated, but then don 
Antonio met with success with a four-inch pump and later with a six-inch. 
With twenty-five hectares of alfalfa in production don Antonio was set 
to build up his herd of Jersey cattle and to begin to extend his 
business of milk retailing. In this he was assisted by his brother-in-
law, David Fern!lndez de Jmi"regui, who was a lawyer based in Mexico City. 
Ir1 January 1921 don Antonio acquired eighty-five head of pure-bred 
Jersey cattle from the USA - three bulls, fifty-seven mature cows, 
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eleven yearlings, five heifers and five calves. Two years later don 
Andonio could redeem the debt he,owedto Barico Nacional de Mexico 
incurred by a loan to purchase the beasts in the first place. The· 
( 
agreement between the brothers-in-law gave all the new calves to the 
Mexico City lawyer and the profits from the milk production were shared 
83 
equally. . Production in these early days was not high, averaging only 
five litres per cow per day, but the richer quality of the Jersey 
product gave it a market value of twenty cents the litre, double that 
. 84 
,of the normal pr1ce. 
Production was maintained on these lines throughout the 1940s. 
The 1950s were years of rapid growth and modernization in Mexican 
agriculture as a whole and early in this decade don Antonio negotiated 
a considerable loan from the Banco Providencial de Queretaro in order 
to update his stock and machinery. The rancho of Carretas was used as 
collateral for this advance of a quarter of a million pesos. 85 Soon 
after, however, the urban and industrial boom.of the city of Queretaro 
gave the Urquizas a chance to improve their position. Carretas was 
situated on the edge of the old city and the Urquiza holdings now 
amounted to very valuable real estate. The agricultural lands were 
thus divided up into building plots and put up for sale during the years 
of 1958-59 - at least thirteen such areas were sold for private housing. 
Three of Al1tonio's children, Javier, Ana, and Jesus, were able to retain 
prime building plots for thei:r: _own houses, · and the actual casco of 
Carretas still remains unsold, awaiting the possible conversion into a 
hotel. This opportune fraccionamiento gave don Alltonio the-chance to 
establi~h each of his many children in one profession or another - only 
Javier remained true to the family tradition of practical farming. 
One of the largest building plots carved out of the Urquiza holdings 
in Carretas now houses a large shopping_complex including a cinema and 
·-. 
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a branch of the supermarket chain Gigante. This area_was developed 
by a real estate company based in Mexico.City. A part of the company's. 
holdings included an area of some 125 hectares to the north of Queretaro ~-
lands which had been part of the old haCienda of Atongo, closeto 
Chichimequillas and San Rafae1. 86 Don Antonio Urquiza exchanged the 
city plot for these lands early in the 1960s and re-established hi.s IQ.ilk 
·.enterprise out there. Much of the responsibility. for this project 
passed to Javier, and a new house and set of buildings were built on the 
rancho, which was given the name of Bordo Colorado. 
Artesian wells were sunk and all the land was brought into 
cultivation to produce maize, wheat, and malting barley, as well as 
fodder crops for the dairy herd - alfalfa, grasses, oats, and maize for 
silage production. In 1980 there were some~three hundred head of 
pedigree Jerseys on Bordo Colorado with a daily milking population of 
about one hundred and twenty. Top production, just after calving, 
amotmted to 43 litres a day, but the average daily yield, spread over 
the year and including the entire herd, fellto seventeen litres. It 
should be ren1embered that Jerseys do not produce as heavily as some of 
the larger breeds such as the Freisan and Holstein. In any event the 
Bordo Colorado Jerseys are recognised as amongst the very best in 
Mexico and are equally well respected in the United States. 87 
Responsibility for the future of the enterprise is now passing to 
Javier's fifth child, Arturo - his efforts now join .:those. _of_ his. third 
cousins in Obrajuelo to ensure that the connection between their Basque 
forefather and the Baj1o lands is extended to a fifth generation. 
'· 
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CHAPTER TEN 
EPILOGUE: THE RISE OF AN AGRARIAN BOURGEOISIE IN MEXICO: 
AN OPEN QUESTION 
For at least four decades after the outbreak of the Revolution 
Mexican historiography was dominated by the image of the hacienda as 
'feudal' and inefficient. Lone and dissenting voices such as that of 
1 Bulnes, were vrritten off as apologists of the Porfiriato. And then 
in 1950,coincidentwith the revival of the agrarian middle class under 
the regimes of Avila Camacho and Higuel Aleman, Jan Bazant published 
an article which argued that the hacienda had at least contained some 
elements of capitalist production. 2 The subsequent revision of the 
traditional concept has perhaps been slow to mature, partly on account 
of a dearth of documentary materials, but certain fundamental corrections 
have now been accomplished. 
Indeed, the whole area of enterprise and entrepreneur is now the 
subject of considerable interest. A recent collection of studies on 
. the formation and development of the bourgeoisie in Mexico has 
3 
emphasised the importance of research into this theme. ··rt is, however, 
significant that none of the cases which appear in this collection 
feature a hacendado as an example of the bourgeoisie, and the land in 
general is depicted as lying beyond the realm of productive and 
. . . 4 
enterpr1s1ng 1nvestment. 
Other recent assessments of Mexican agrarian history h~ve tended 
to suggest that the Porfirian hacienda had begun to make certain moves 
·----------t6wards--I'ulr-capitalist production, but that these were finally limited 
by a fa1lure to introduce a comprehensive system of free waged labour. 
Such works rely upon references to the 'formal domination of labour by 
capital' and 'a limited transition from precapitalist relations of 
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production' without very much in the way of hard evidence. Exceptions 
to these trends are identified as cases of bourgeois enterprises.rith 
foreign owners. Mexican hacendados producing crops for the export 
market are depicted as being closest to the bourgeois archetype and 
those producing for the domestic market, such as the examples from 
Queretaro featuring in the preceding pages, are reckoned to be the 
.. 5 
least advanced. · 
The 'contradictions inherent in this limited transition' are held 
to have been partially responsible for the agrarian crisis which 
preceded the outbreak of revolution in 1910. In turn, the measures 
introduced. by the Mexican state in the second half of the nineteenth 
century are reckoned to have been insufficient to pave the way for 
fully-fledged agrarian capitalism, and it thus was left to the 
Revolution and the subsequent Agrarian Reform to conclude this develop-
6 
ment. In short, this line of argt~ent has asserted that the agrarian 
bourgeoisie in Mexico has been a direct product of the Revolution and 
the Agrarian Programme - a position most bluntly proposed by Rodolfo 
Stavenhagen. 7 
To date only one intensive study on the agrarian bourgeoisie has 
appeared. This is the work of Hector Dfaz-Pblanco on the area of 
Valle de Santiago in the Baj1o. 8 It is significant that Dfaz-Polanco 
set out on this study with the intention to base his investigations on 
the position put forward by Stavenhagen, and thus to.limit his research 
to the period starting 'vi th the agrarian policies. of Cardenas in the 
mid-1930s. In the event the author found it necessary to take his 
work back to the years before the Revolution, in order to assess the 
nature and importance of changes and continuity. 9 It is unfortunate 
that he did not have access to material on the inner workings of the 
haciendas in the area, and thus the account of the earlier years remains 
somewhat impressionistic. 
'· 
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All of this is given as a back-drop to the preceding work on the 
agrarian bourgeoisie in Queretaro. The evidence and arguments 
presented in this thesis are designed to demonstrate that the question 
I 
of the Mexican hacienda is far from closed. Whatever else' is achieved, 
it is hoped that this'study on Queretaro will serve to maintain the 
debate on the nature and diversity of nineteenth-century rural Hexico, 
and to inten~dfy the more recent interest in the subject of the 
agrarian bourgeoisie. 
I 
I 
I 
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Appendix I 
Sharecropping Contracts on the Hacienda, Queretaro 1850-1910 
I 
~contrato de 'parceria {!ural.~ 
·Y u~ ~ 
- ... ::"-'·=· =~~---
Ooltdiciones hajo la:s cuales ............................... : ............................ , en. 
repre~entaci('lll de Ia Hacienda de ..................... _. ........................... hace contrato 
de serubrar A tnedias con ................................. · ......... ~ ...... ; ........................ .. 
1~ Primera. La duraciun del contrato sera ..................................... : ...... ~ .. . 
2~ SegniHla. El part.ido que se ado pta para los efectos de est~ contra to, Ps el 
<:onocido de "Mm>rEr.os.~' 
3~ 'rereera El mediero recibini. cada afio, el terreuo necesario para Ia siem b~a 
que ~meda hacer con ............... yunt.as de bueyes tomando como base, qne'con nna 
puetle tmbajarse un area Je ......... : .................... ~ ........ metros cuadrados. 
4~ Cuurta. La siembra a qn~ se <lestina el terreno sera ................................ : 
M Quinta. Adenu'ts clel terreno que la.Hacienda proporciouari al mediero cada 
a.iio, }e dar{t tam bien la semi lla que estime CO!lVeuieute; sien<lo obligaci6n de este 
· hacer de su sola cnenta todos los trabajos deJa labor y poner los bneyes y apero 
61.1 Sexta. Ouando la labor este eu fruto, lu Hacienda ponclra los veladores.que 
.juzgne couveniente para cuidar (1ne 110 ~ufra daiios ni robos y sn- costo lo aplicad. 
<l una c:ueuta IJL"Ovisional que se liq uidart'L eu la forwa c1ue {L continu·ac:ion se expresa. 
. . 
7~1 Septima. Cuando llegue la epoea cle la recoleccicin, la Hacienda se encarga-
rA de hacerla y tanto Hll custo eomo el de limpiar las semlllas y cle divisipn, asi co-
mo el costo cle velaclores, se clividini.u en clos pal"LL'S ignales de las ,que sed. una a 
eargo cle la Hacienda y Ia otra al clel lllediero, quien Ia pagan\. desde luego. 
8~ Octava. m procltH:to total del fruto, se di\'idin\. en.'dos partes iguales, en la. 
furma que la Hacil!llda estime <:011\"elliente, tlt• las cuali!S seni nua para estn y la otra 
para el metliero. 
!)'.1_ Novena. 1m puestas, de eoull'm aeuenlo, am has partes y reconociendo sus . 
_ pri..lpias obligacin11es_, e11 cu~l,_plimiento de la Ley qne previenc estos eontratos, fir-
ma ron de conform iclad. 
l.Lacieltda tle ....................... .' ............................................ de 18 
------·~·1·----- ... ----·-·-·---·--- -----
};ll representat;it'llt tle Ia Hacielllla, Mediero, 
Timbre de un peso por no expresar 
can~idad este contratu. 
.-
'· 
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~ontFato de Apar\eFia I~ ttrat .. 
Condiciones bajo las cuales __________________ -"-. , en 
representacion de la. Hacienda de hace contrato · 
de sembrar a medias cou ______________________ __,...._ 
Ia. Primera.-La duraci(,n del contrato sera ____________ _ 
· 2a: Segiinda.-El partido que se adopta para los efectos cle este contrato, es el 
. conocjdo de "QuiNTimos." · · . · 
3a. Tercera.-El me<liero recibin\ cada afio · yuutas de bueyes con liU • 
apero necesario o, sea bueyes, aradus armadas, " re~ 
jas, yugos, pares copundas y barzones y el area de 
terreno que pueda sembrar con las yuntas, calculando _____ _ 
·, 1netros c uad :-ados por catla un~. 
4a. Cuarta.-La siem bra a que S(' destine este terreno sera .· 
---------------· __ cuyas semillas le proporcionan\ Ia Hacienda.' 
f1a.: Quinta.-El mediero had por HU sola cuenta todo el trabajo,. descle el 
principia hasta que la labor este en fruto, en cuya cpoca la Hacienda pon(lra los 
veladores que ~stime neeesarios cuyo costa se liquiilan\. como aclelante se expresa. . 
. 6a. Sexta.-Al terminar la labor, el mediero entregan\ ala Hacienda los l>ue-
yes y aperos rccibidos, los cuales le sen\n entregados al auo siguiente, al dar prin-
cipia Ia: nueva labor y siempre que los merezca por su conducta y · trabajo aut.e-. 
. . 
nor. ,-. . 
7a. Septima . ..:._ E) metliero sed. responsa Lie de los bueyes y aperos que reciba 
y cualqniera p<~rdiua qne tenga la pagan\, a excepcion de los casos tin que no sea 
motivt~da por deseuido :;i!lo por venladera desgracia. • · · . . 
Ha. Oc:tava.-Llegada Ja cpoca de la cosechn, la liacieJJda la han\ de su cueu-
ta, pero tanto el eo:;to de e~ta, como el de 'limpiar alguuas semillas, si fuere necesa-
rio, y el <le vela<1ores, sera dividido entre ambas partes en ·la proporcion de tres 
qnintas a cargo de la Hacienda y ]as dos rest antes ·al del ~nediero. · . . .· · · 
Ha; Novena.-Ei producto tottil del frnt.o sen\ llividido en cinc_o partes igua-
les, en la forma que la Hacienda e:;time con_veuiente, de las cuales percibira esta.. 
tres quintas partes y las dos restantes el. mediero. 
1 Oa. Decima --EI sacate y rastrojo, quedan\ todo por cuenta -de la Hacienda, 
que se reserva el derecho de ha~er elnuevo reparto.. · . · 
·ua. Unuecima.-Impuestas de comun acnerdli ambas partes y reconociendo· 
· 11us pro pi as obligaeiones, en cnm plimiento d~ la Ley que previene estos contratos, 
firm::ron de eonformidad. 
\ 
I 
I 
Paeienda de _______ -~------'--------de 1.9 
EN HEl'Hl~SKt\TA(;lON DE LA HACIENDA, . :mmiERO, . · 
; . ·. 
'J'.ESTIGO, TES'l'IG0 1 . ·. :: · 
; . ~ 
.. 
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Appendix II 
Inventory of Estate, San· Juanico, Queretaro, 25 :Deceitib.er 1909. 
$ $ -
Cultivating implements and tools, total value 
including: 
10 ploughs with iron shares, brand mark 
'Stock' 
32 ploughs with iron shares, brand mark 
··oliver' 
33 ploughs with iron shares, brand mark 
'D. Bradley' 
19 ploughs with 1ron shares, brand mark 
'Masador no.3' 
Miscellaneous items in La Comunidad, totalling 
Agricultural machinery, totalling 
including: 
1 gleaner, brand-mark 'McCormick' 
1 seed drill for wheat 
1 muck-spreader 
6 'Deering' reapers 
1 upright steam-engine, 'Canton' 
1 harvester 
1 large thresher, 'Case' 
1 large thresher, 'Robey' 
1 upright steam-engine, 'Champion' 
1 horizontal steam-engine, 'Rafael' 
Machine shed, value of 
Carts, harnesses and.tackle, value of 
Garden tools and seeds, value of. 
Carpentry and tannery work-shops, value of 
Milking parlour and dairy, value of 
Forge, value of 
Magueyes, value of 
Cattle, thorough~bred, 101 head and value of 
Cattle, local stock, · 392 head including 
263 draught oxen, value of . 
579 head of goats, value of 
156 head of mules and horses, value of 
40 head of thorough-bred horses, value of 
Other livestock, value of 
Grain and other produce, value of 
Lands, value of 
Chapel, value of 
House contents, value of 
Unharvested crops, value of 
100.00 
288.00 .. 
264.00 .. 
266.08 
480.00 .. 
135.00. 
237.50 
570.00 
600.00 .. 
1,300.00 .. 
1,800.00 
1,735.00 
760.00 
950.00 
----- ------with ·miscellaneous· additions; bringing total value 
of estate to 
2,819.69 
418.89 
10,226.50 
3,144.91 
2,099.86 
74.o8 
122.38 
95.55 
209.63 
173.25 
8,495.00 
11,325.00. 
1,097. 50 . 
7 ,480.00. 
4, 700.00. 
273.00. 
1,999.08. 
146,929.00 
1,572.62 
746.47 
8,087.59 
211,071.74 
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Appendix III 
Estimated Annual Incomes Accruing to. Sharecroppers 
in Maize Production 
As noted earlier, sharecroppers in Queretarq we:re of twQ varieti.es, 
Medieros. (who received one half of the crop) and Quinteros Cw:ho receiyed 
only forty. per cent of the crop) • The ·following calculations are 
designed to suggest the best average results the sharecropper could 
have anticipated. 
Area of temporal land was unlikely to exceed 6 hectares. 
Optimum average yields from this land were unlikely to ex.ceed 600. kg 
per hectare (bearing in mind that sharecroppers did not receive the 
hacienda's prime maize lands). 
Averageannual harvest from 6 hectares: 3600kg. 
Deductions from this included the share accruing to the haCienda a_nd 
.costs corresponding to the sharecropper for vigilance and ha~vesting • 
. Harvesting costs in the· 1870s amounted to some ten centavos per· fanega 
(Bazant 1975: p.58). Assuming an average value of $1.50 per fanega 
of maize, deductions for harves·ting and vigilance, expressed in 
quantities of grain rather than money, would have amounted to some 
130 kg for Medieros and lOO.kg for Quinteros (taking each fanega.to 
weigh approximately 65 kg). 
Adult consumption of maize was of the order of some four and a half kiios·· 
... 
per week (Bazant 1977, p.67); an average family of two adults and four 
children would thus have required around 18 kg of maize per week, o~ 
nearly 950 kg over the year. Medieros would thus have been~· left with:· 
50% of 3600, minus 130 kg costs and 950 kg subsistence,.or 720 kg 
surplus. Quinteros were worse off, as follows: 40% of 3600, minus 100. ,kg 
costs and 950 kg subsistence, i_leaving only 390 kg surplus.· 
'· 
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With average values ·of maize at about $1.50 per fanega of 65 kg thes.e 
surpluses would have left Medieros with disposable incomes of. around 
$16.60,. and Quinteros with only $9.0. With wage rates at ~oughlY: $1.00 .. 
I . 
per week on the haciendas, these amounts were equal to incomes e~ned 
over relatively short periods of time, from nine to seventeen·w.eeks.. 
On this basis sharecropping would hardly have been a compelling choice 
for the Queretaro campesino, and we can safely assume that incomes·made 
from these contracts alone barely amounted to subsistence liying for 
an average family. 
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Appendix IV 
Hacienda Endebtedness 1876-1906 
Hacienda Date of $ Date of $ Percentage mortgage 
valuation . value mortgage value. of hda's valuation 
La Comunidad 1876 16,000 1876 4,000 25% 
lo de Casas 1875 35,000* 1876 5,800 16% 
La Cueva 1883 50,000 1875 10,000 20%: 
Vegil 1869 67,728 1876 17,150 25% 
San Francisco 1899 24,000. 1899 9,000 37% 
Jacal Grande 1883 74;700 1876 16,000 21% 
Alfajayuca 1884 36,000 1879 8,800 24% 
Bolanos 1870 7,000 1882 2,400 34% 
Balvanera F.2 a 1879 8,300 1882 5,000 60% 
Castillo 1884 71~ ,159 1884 46,432 63% 
Miranda 1901 . 49,285 1882 
Corralejo 1874 3,900 1874 
S. J. el Alto 1875 6,014 1875 3,414 57% 
Mandujano 1892 68,119 1892. 10,000. 15% 
Sab.anil1a 1871 33,362 1871 10,000 30% 
Sabanilla 1880 37,870 1880 36,000 95% 
Marroquin 1892 25,000* 1892 16,000 64% 
S. Vicente 1892 35,000 1892 15,000 43% 
La Ceja 1892 71,610 
't 
1892 27,436 38% 
Agua Azul 1892 160,000 1892 35,000 22% 
Carretas 1892 70,000* 1892 . 10,000 14% 
Gamboa F4a 1894 15.,000 1894 7,000 47% 
Castillo 1884 l 74,159 i899 10,127 14% 
S. Nicolas 1900 .72,800 1900 30,000. 41% 
-··-·-
·Amascala 1896 130,000 1891 10,000 8% 
La Cueva 1903 70,000* 1903 14,347 20% 
Guadalupe 1905 84,309 1906 22,500. 27% 
Ciervo 1906 90,000 1906 
- . - --·-. 
*Estimated value 
,;: 
308 
Appendix V 
Rural Properties in the District of Queretaro 1876-1910 
Size of Property (hectares) Number 
less than 200 9 
less than 500 30 
less than 1000 37 
less than 1500 -51 
more than 1500 10 
more than 2000 7 
more than 5000 3 
Total nlimber of properties analysed: 61 
Area accounted for: 67,525 hectares 
I 
I 
Cumulative % 
15 
38 
62 
84 
16 
13 
5 
Sources: compiled from Notarial Archives and Public Registry 
Office, Queretaro. 
'· 
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Appendix VI 
Social Mobility and the Land in Queretaro; 
The·ca.se of the Olveras 
Pedro Olvera was born on the hacienda of Batan:. close to the Cit~ 
of Queretaro:. some years before the outbreak of the Insurgenc~. ·B~ 
the time Mexico had achieved independence he had married one Ines· · 
Pulido and moved to the hacienda of Obraje de Ixtla:. situated nea.i;'b~ in 
the state of Guanajuato. The marriage was based on a capital of t:i.ve 
donkeys (Pedrots contribution) and four cows and six sheep(Ines'· 
dowry) • Ui thin a short space of time the couple's first son, Ignacio, 
was born, subsequently followed by seven other children - Andres, 
Alejandra, Romualda, Antonio, Juana, Gertrudiz, and Jose Marfa. Such 
a sequence of rapid procreation proved to be too much for Ines and she 
succumbed at some point in the mid-1830s. Within five months of her 
death Pedro had remarried, this time to a recently widowed woman named 
Dolores Olvera, the daughter of Queretanos Vicente Olvera and Arigida 
Rivera. Dolores had been married for less than two years to Jose 
Marfa Barron before he died leaving her penniless 'rith two small 
children, only one of whom survived. She was thus unable to offer 
Pedro Olvera anything in the way of a dowry, other than her ability to 
read and write. He, on the other hand, had flourished during the ~ears 
of his marriage to Ines Pulido, and was able to boast of a considerably 
increased capital - tl1anks to hard work, presumably as a sharecropper 
and tenant, Pedro's estate had reached the value of some $2500. of grain 
and livestock, and he also owned a small house worth $500. 
Pedro and Dolores then settled in the city of Queretaro and began 
assiduously to develop their agricultural interests. Initially this was 
limite~ to renting land, such as the Rancho of Arroyo Hondo belongi:ng 
to the hacienda of Bravo to the south of the city •... Jts their fortunes 
'· 
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rose, however, the Olveras were able to buy land for themselves and 
by the time of his death in 1877, Pedro was able to look back on a 
life of profitable hard work. His will d{d not specify any monetary 
! 
value but it is clear from the list of his possessions that he had come 
a long way from an illiterate campesino with but five donkeys to his 
name. On his death bed he was able to connt the Rancho of Sancillo in 
Apaseo, two irrigated gardens in San Isidro, Pu~blito, two houses, 80 
head of cattle of diverse ages, 25 yoke of oxen fully equipped to 
plough, 8 unbroken mares, 30 donkeys, 30 swine, 300 goats, 100 sheep, 
5 saddled horses, and a substantial reserve of grain from the previous 
ha~vest- Pedro had made·his will in mid-May, some four m0nths after 
the temporal crops had been harvested, and yet he still possessed the 
healthy amounts of 600 fanegas of maize and 50 fanegas of beans. 
Pedro had, however, left a large number of heirs to share the 
fruits of his hard work. All except Jose Marfa from his first marriage 
had survived him, and there were also five others from his life with 
Dolores - Miguel, Vicenta, Agripina, Inocencia, and Angel. In addition 
i' 
to these there were six fatherless grandchildren, the offspring of the 
two sons who had failed to outiive him. The subsequent division of 
his estate must hiwe left Pedro's heirs with considerably less capital 
with which to start their lives. 
Some idea of the impact of this division may be gleaned from the 
will of Dolores Olvera, made some seven years later, in 1884. According 
to the laws of inheritance Dolores had been entitled to take one half 
of the gains achieved during her marriage with Pedro. The estate she 
bequeathed to her six children must have reflected part o,f these gains -
the eleventh fraction of the Rancho Sancillo, 10 yoke of oxen, 200 goats 
and lCO kids, between 60 and.70 sheep, 8 donkeys, 20 swine, 15 cows 
and 12 calves, 600 fanegas of maize, 90 fanegas of beans, arid.$6oo in 
cash. 
.,.., ------~------------·---- ----- - -- -~----.-. 
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Despite the depletion of Pedro's capital, however, at least some 
of his offspring managed to sustain the family's momentum upwards. 
The records are incomplete but it is clear that both Antonio and 
Andres sold their shares of the Rancho Sancillo (some 50 hectares 
in each case) to the husband of their half-sister Inocencia, Nicanor 
Vazquez- a ranchero of Ojo Sarco in Apaseo, who_ was at this time 
busily accumulating portions of fragmented properties. What then 
became of Andres is uncertain, except that he married into the-~family 
o;f Ayala which was also engaged in buying up land - as, for instance, 
a fraction of the hacienda Bravo, measuring over 550 hectares and worth 
$3500 in 1892. 
The career of Antonio is somewhat clearer. Long before he sold 
out his interest in the Rancho Sancillo he had moved to the eastern 
side of the city of Queretaro ar..d bought the Rancho Buenavistilla for 
$3000.in the early 1870s. He had.married a Micaela Hernandez in the 
1860s and she had borne him eight children. They had started married 
life with no capital but by stint-of hard labour they had $3000 at 
· · Micaela's death. Antonio had then remarried a Dolores Figueroa and she 
in turn had borne him seven children, only three of whom survived. 
In 1902 he drew up a will which demonstrates the extent to which he had 
managed to maintain the tradition of his father. He lived in a house 
he owned in the small town of La Canada on the outskirts of Queretaro, 
and his listed estate included the Ranchos of Buenavistilla and 
El Capulin, 25.yoke of oxen, 40 cows, 800 goats, 8 mules, and 1 cart. 
Like his father Pedro, Antonio was illiterate, but now ther~ was a 
literate son Juan, and he signed all legal documents. Descendents of 
Antonio Olvera were still proprietors in Buenavistilla and El Capulin 
in the late 1950s. 
Even more successful than Antonio was Pedro's first son Ignacio. 
He had stayed in the place of his birth, the hacienda of Obra,je de Ixtla 
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and then married one Apolonia Olvera at some point in the late 1840s. 
The couple had ten children, nine of whom survived - Haximino, Tomas, 
Aurelio, Alejandro, Jose Ventura, Jose Dolores, Francisca, Marfa Jesus, 
. I 
and Luisa. Ignacio died on the 4th of October 1899, and it is clear 
from his estate that he had succeeded in accumulating a considerable 
amount of capital. The records do not provide us with a complete list 
of his possessions - only the main items are included, such as the two 
houses Ignacio owned, the two Ranchos of Arroyo Hondo and La Pefia, 
the irrigated plot·called Callej6n de San Andres, and the one thousand 
fanegas of maize remaining from the final harvest (the will ,.,as dra'm 
up in early March). The total value of the estate, including the 
working implements and livestock, can1e to the substantial sum of 
$37,515.17- the large part of this amount can be taken to represent 
profits earned by Ignacio over his working lifetime. 
A somewhat impressionistic picture of Ignacio's enterprise may be 
gleaned from a review of two documents drawn up shortly before his 
death. These were contracts of tenancy for his Ranchos of Arroyo Hondo 
and La Pefia, the former made over to his sons Maximino and Jose Ventura, 
and the latter to another two of his offspring, Alejandro and Francisca. 
Both Ranchos had houses and on Arroyo Hondo there was a well with a 
windmill. La Pefia was stocked with 35 draught oxen and 17 ploughs -
sufficient to cultivate up to 100 hectares of land; some 30 fanegas 
of maize were also inventoried for the specific purpose of sowing, a 
further indication that such an area was well within the capacity of 
the Rancho {it is highly likely that the surplus seed maize was 
possible to estimate that the tenants Alejandro and Francisca could 
have fi.nticipated an annual maize production of over 1000 · fanegas and 
worth around $2500. 
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The Rancho Arroyo Hondo was an even better prospect. It was 
stocked with 49 draught oxen and 28 ploughs - adequate to cultivate 
some 140 hectares or more. A similar amount of maize seed had been 
earmarked for sowing, and it is thus legitimate to reckon that the 
rancho offered the prospect of an annual maize harvest of some 1300 
fanegas with a value of about $3250. These estimates go some way toward 
. explaining how Ignacio Oivera was able to leave over $37,500 to his 
children, despite having lived the rough and ready life of an illiterate 
Mexican campesino. Descendents of Ignacio maintained tha family's 
interest in at least Arroyo Hondo through to the 1970s. 
Source: Compiled from the following references: 
ANQ/ST 1877-130 
ANQ/ST 1883-57 
ANQ/ST 1885 (1) - 86 
ANQ/CA 1892 (1) - 92 
ANQ/CA 1895 (2) - 35 
ANQ/CA 1898 (1) - 60,63 
ANQ/CA 1902 (1), 17 
ANQ/CME 1924, 14 
RPPQ, 1-4, p.60. 
RPPQ, 1-18, p.35. 
RPPQ, 1-20, p.219. 
RPPQ, 1-22, p.l82. 
RPPQ, 1-55, p.35. 
314 ---
Appendix VII 
Wheat Suppliers to the Mill of Batan, 1900-1902 
Consigmnents in kilos 
less than 100 
-, '100- 500 
501- 1,000 
1,001- 2,000 
2,001- 3,000 
3,001- 6,000 
6,001-10,000 
10,001-15,000 
over 15,000 
Total no. of consignments: 
Total weight of grain rec'd: 
Average weight of consignment: 
Numbers of consignments 
according to weight 
1900a 1901 
--14 9 
32 21 
6 16 
8 12 
4 3 
3 5 
7 6 
6 
6 
86 
382,570 kg 
4,448 kg 
6 
78 
361,569 kg 
4,635 kg 
4 
11 
4 
4 
2 
2 
2 
29 
62,238 kg 
2,146 kg 
a. 1900 includes 11 consignments made during the last 2 lveeks 
of 1899. 
b. 1902 runs only for the period from January 1st to June 18th -
wheat was harvested in May and Jlme, peak availability thus 
occurred in July and August after threshing and cleaning. 
Source: AB/LC 1899-1902. 
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Appendix VIII 
1903:Share-holders in the Compafil:a Hidro-Electrica, Queretaro 
Each share valued at $100, 
Francisco Gonzalez de Cosl:o •••••••••••••••••• 
AJ.onso de .la Isla .................... ~ .... ~ .. 
Ralll6n Martinez . ............................. . 
Fran-Cisco Pando .... ......................... . 
*Sociedad Jacobs y Cia •• ~ •••••••••.••••••••••• 
Ram6n Bueno ................................. . 
Saturnine Llano . ............................ . 
Rosendo Rivera . ............................. . 
.Adolfo Aguilar.· . ............................ . 
Ram6n r1art inez Uri be ........•........... ~ ..•. 
Carlos M. Loyola . ........................... . 
Be-rnabe Loy~la . .... ~ ._ .· .. ~ ~ ..... ~ .• ............ . 
JOSe Loyola . ............................ · .... . 
Sta. Dolores Gonzaiez de Cos1o •••••.••••••••• 
Desiderio Resendlz ....•........•............• 
Jose Marl:a Orozco •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
·Jose Marl:a Rivera •••.•••••••••••••••••••••.•• 
*AJ..bino Garcla ........................... . -... . 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
450 
100 
100 
50 
100 
100 
100 
50 
100 
100 
100 
50 
100 
*The only people listed here not known to have owned haciendas in 
the Queretaro area. 
Source: RPPQ, 1-45, p.22. 
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Appendix IX 
Inventory of Estate for San Juanico, Queretaro in 1933 
Livestock 
Holstein Friesian 
3 breeding bulls 
102 cows in production 
51 1st-calving heifers 
8 yearling bulls 
50 suckling calves 
8 cows in production, Swiss breed 
15 horses 
128 mules 
5 donkeys 
18 draught oxen 
158 nanny goats in production 
12 billy goats 
60 nannies about to kid 
31 kids 
16 rams 
118 ewes. 
22 first-lambers 
30 lambs 
1 boar 
11 sows 
25 weaners 
4 piglets 
222 head 
148 head 
18 head 
261 head 
186 head 
41 head 
2 tractors, Moline and Fordson, 2-share capacity 
l tractor, John Deere, 4-share capacity and totally equipped 
2 threshing machines, Roley and International 
2 combine-harvesters, MacCormick 
1 baler, John Deere 
2 binders, MacCormick 
2 centrifugal pumps, 2"/3 H.P. and 3"/22 H.P. 
2 electric generators for machinery, 30 H.P. and 7.5 H.P. 
Source: ARA, 1933 Expediente El Retablo. 
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Appendix X 
Ranchero Continuity in Queretaro: 
Cases of Ostendi and Hernandez 
Roman Ostendi came to Mexico from northern Spain during the last 
years of the Porfiriato, probably already married to a fellow Spaniard, 
Carmen Berriolope. Two children were born in Mexico before Carmen . 
died, Zacarfas in 1882 and Josefa a short time later. Don Roman then 
remarried, this time to a woman from a modest landowning family of· 
San Juan del Rio, called Josefa Ladr6n de Guevara. 
Don Roman variously described himself as 'labrador' and 'agricultor' 
but never as 'propietario' or 'hacendado' - we are left with the 
impression that he was a man of energy and ability rather than capital. 
Perhaps his second wife had access to some collateral - at least she was 
able to buy a modestly-sized property called San Bartolome de 
Apapataro in September 1899 for $15,000, repayable o~er six years at 
s1x per cent. 
The previous year don Roman had entered a contract with Ildefonso 
Berriolope (in all likelihood his ex-wife's brother) over the running 
of the hacienda San Rafael. This latter was a part of the Bravo 
estate and had been rented out to don Ildefonso by the owner Pedro 
Aqevedo also in 1898 for a period of 8 years - the cost for the first 
two was $4000 and it was then raised to $4700. Roman was described as 
the 'socio industrial' in this arrangement' which meant -that- he 'was .. 
responsible for the daily administration of the property. The contract 
with don Ildefonso was drawn up to last the same eight years of the 
contract of tenancy taken out on San Rafael, and don Roman was to receive 
a third of the profits as well as $6 per ,.,eek for personal expenses. 
I-~ is impossible to gauge how much he made from this contract, 
although we do know that San Rafael was a property with both fertile 
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lands and irrigation - the crop of wheat raised there in 1893 came to 
3000 cargas. Even though his partner died soon after, the contract 
ran for the full eight years with Jesus Berriolope in place of his 
I 
father. 
A last pa~nent of $750 was made to don Roman as late as 1911 - his 
share of the company's final liquidation. At least two years before 
this he had started to trade in grain in partnership with his son 
Zacarias. In addition to this enterprise they were still running the 
property San Bartolome, and on this basis the family was able to 
make some headway even during the difficult years of the Revolution. 
When don Roman died·in October 1918 at the age of 60 he was able to 
bequeath an estate of some $70,000, composed of San Bartolome and a 
house in Queretaro on Pasteur. 
Zacar1as then carried on in the tradition of his father. The 
property was held together until January 1934 when it was broken up to 
avoid the dangers of expropriation. Two fractions named El Cuaresmo and 
Lira were sold off for $14,000, and the rest of the land was divided 
up into three sections called La Virgen, El Patol, and Apapataro and 
registered in the. names of the family- the first two as-the property 
. of the twins, Manuel and Marfa Concepci6n, and the last as that of 
Zacarfas himself. All of these properties, including the two sold 
off, w·ere granted immunity from expropriation du,ring the first months 
of 1944. In addition to these lands Zacarias also had access to the 
entire territory of the ex-hacienda of Machorra. This had been the· 
property of Paula de Vicente and measured some 1427 hectares. By the 
~---------------------- ------------------- ------ .. --· 
1940s it had been successfully broken. up and was registered in the 
names of six of dona Paula's grandchildren, being administered on 
their behalf by their 'guardian' Zacarias Ostendi. In more recent 
times the family tradi t.ion has been maintained by don Zacar:las' 
-children·; --tlfree -gn·ls -named J osefina, Carmen, and Marfa Eugenia. 
'· 
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Carmen left Queretaro and married a ranchero living in San Luis Potosr, 
but the other two stayed on, retaining ownership in lands from Machorra 
and marrying respectively Jesus Urquiza, a son of don Antonio, and 
Alfonso Adame, a local ranchero of some note and until 1982 Queretaro~s 
Director of Forestry. 
Melchor Hernandez was born in the first decade of the nineteenth 
century on the hacienda del Muerto. He married one Marfa Jesus Pefia, 
and they had one child named Marcos who died before his father, at some 
point during the 1860s. Neither Melchor nor his wife started their married 
life with any capital, but later, as Melchor wrote in his will 
"(tthey) began to acquire various properties by stint of (their) hard 
work". This steady accumulatl.on was sustained during the years after 
. Marfa Jesus Is death'. and by the time Melchor died in 1877 the estate 
was in a fairly healthy condition. 
Melchor's principal property was composed of a house and garden on 
the edge of La Cafiada, and of two ranchos nearby, called Corralejo and 
· ·.· ·. Los Corrales. These were stocked with 20 yoke of oxen equipped to 
.·plough, 16 milking cows, and 200 sheep. He also left 200 fanegas of 
maize in Corralejo, and 30 fanegas each of beans and barley. He had 
also been tenant of a rancho called El Cerrito Colorado which he had run 
jointly with. his brother Ciricio. His uncollected debts amounted to 
the not inconsiderable sum of almost $1700. 
Melchor's son Marcos had died earlier, leaving a son and a widow, 
. - . 
called Nestor and Loreto Amaya respectively. Melchor's entire estate 
was inherited by Nestor Hernandez in 1877 when he was 24 years old. 
Some two years earlier he had married one Josefa Serrano, the daughter 
of Estevan Serrano - both the latter and his brother Vicente were prime 
cases of rancheros who achieved modest prosperity on the basis of hard 
work. 
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Nestor and Josefa proceeded to raise a family wbilst at the same 
time consolidating the properties left by Melchor. During the 1890s 
several purchases were made of lands adjacent to the original properties 
of Corralejo and Los Corrales, and a further orchard was bought· in 
La Canada for $1800 cash down. In addition to these Nestor also built 
up the rancho of La Cruz from a number of separate plots, _finally 
making ari integrated property of more than 177 hectares with a ranch 
ho.use. 
Nestor died intestate in the summer of 1919, leaving a widow 
60 years old, and eight children, all of whom were of legal age -
Maria Concepcion, Pastor, Aureliano, Flavia, Amado, Juan, Apolinar, 
and Micaela. They were left to divide an estate valued in 1929 at over 
$53,000 - livestock and grain· accounted for over $12,000. of this and 
the rest was composed of property - four houses in La Canada, ·two 
gardens nearby both with irrigation, two more houses in Hercules, the 
Rancho Corralejo (some 760 hectares, with ranch house and two barns), 
and the Rancho of La Cruz. In dona Josefa's will of 1930 the profits 
accumulated during the period of her marriage to Nestor were declared 
to have been close to $40,000. 
Two years before the division of Nestor's estate between his 
heirs the Rancho of Corralejo had been affected by the agrarian 
programme - close to 95 hectares were expropriated and made over to 
the nearby pueblo of Saldarriaga. All of the children then received 
more than $3600 in cash, and all except Flavia (who received her share 
in livestock and grain) were granted a fraction of Corralejo or La Cruz 
(of between 80 and 136 hectares). 
The Hernandez tradition was maintained in the area primarily by 
the suns Pastor, Juan, and Apolinar. Pastor was granted a certificate 
of immunity on the second fraction of La Cruz in July 1951, and then 
'· 
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passed the property to Apolinar's wife, Guadalupe Requenes. Apolinar 
had trained as an agronomist and held secure tenure on fractions 
three and four of La Cruz, whilst his wife was the legal owner of 
fraction two. The area was run as an integrated unit until Apolinar 
sold out in 1972. At a similar time Juan sold his share of Corralejo, 
fraction seven, and moved into trading agricultural machinery. 
Sources: ANQ/ST 1876 (2) - 118. 
ANQ/CA 1893 (1) - 85. 
ANQ/CA 1894 (1) 
- 39 and 181. 
RPPQ, 1-52, p.226. 
RPPQ, 1-54, p.36, 46. 
ARA, Exped. A/149. ' 
ARA, Exped. A/150. 
ARA, Exped. A/285. 
ARA, Exped. A/328. 
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